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I. INTRODUCTION
The importance of the cattle industry both to agriculture in
the United States and to the overall U.S. economy is difficult to
overstate. The single largest sector in agriculture for more than
40 years, the cattle industry currently has more than one mil-
lion operators and has generated more than $30 billion in agri-
cultural revenues annually for the last dozenyears.' During the
past several years, however, this vitally important sector of the
American economy has been in a state of substantial economic
crisis, a condition that largely persists today. Financially, the
industry overall has incurred more than five consecutive years
of substantial losses. 2 The years 1996-1998 were particularly
grim, as prices for cattle plummeted and cow-calf operators and
feedlots lost billions of dollars in equity.3 Declining living condi-
tions, the inability to replace aging equipment, and mounting
debt have put tremendous stress on many producers and their
families. The difficulties were so severe that in 1998 cattle pro-
1. For information regarding the farm receipts generated by cattle and
calves, see United States and State Farm Income Data, Table 5, by Commodity
Groups and selected Commodities, United States and States, 1950-1998, USDA/
ERS (visited April 6, 2000) <http'//www.econ.ag.gov/briefing/farmincome/
finfidmu.htm>. For information regarding the number of producers in the in-
dustry, see USDA/NASS, CATTL REPORT, January 1999 at 12.
2. Petitioner's Prehearing Brief. Anti-dumping Duty and Countervailing
Duty Investigations Concerning Live Cattle from Canada, USITC Inv. 701-TA-
386 (Final), and 731-TA-812 (Final) at 34, Table 2 (Sept. 30, 1999).
3. See discussion infra at section II.C.
452 [Vol. 9:449
TRADE AND CATTLE
ducers joined other farmers in protests along the U.S.-Canada
border, impeding the in-flow of agricultural products from Can-
ada including imports of cattle and beef.4
Concurrent with the downturn in the cattle industry are a
number of developments in the international arena that have
left the U.S. market for cattle and beef disproportionately more
liberalized than corresponding markets in other countries. For
example, U.S. bound tariffs for in-quota imports of fresh and
chilled beef are between 4 and 10 percent, while the bound rates
in countries such as Brazil, Indonesia, Japan, Korea and Mexico
range from 32.5 to over 50 percent, and even applied rates are
high. 5 Not surprisingly, despite U.S. competitiveness in cattle
and beef, the United States is running a trade deficit in beef,
with imports in 1998 totaling 2.64 billion pounds carcass weight
and exports 2.16 billion pounds carcass weight.6
Although there has been significant liberalization of the cat-
tle and beef markets in North America as a result of the Can-
ada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement and the North American Free
Trade Agreement, substantial imbalances in the movement of
cattle across NAFTA borders still exist. In 1998, for example,
U.S. imports of live cattle from Canada and Mexico exceeded 2
million head, while U.S. exports to both countries were only
about 285,000 head. 7 The combined deficits in cattle and beef
have aggravated the industry's difficulties by adding to the sup-
ply of cattle and beef at a time of already low market prices for
cattle.
Different groups within the industry have pursued a variety
of means to address the problems which beset the industry and
to restore the producers to a level of economic profitability, in-
cluding: (1) increasing cattle and beef producers' access to export
markets; (2) using the Packers and Stockyards Act and the anti-
trust laws to address perceived harm in the U.S. market from
concentration in the meat packing industry; (3) seeking changes
in labeling and other regulations to provide cattle producers
with a premium for their product; (4) seeking a restored share
of the retail dollar for cattle producers; and (5) use of the trade
4. See, e.g., Farmers, Ranchers Stage Blockade at Canadian Border,
WASHINGTON POST, September 22, 1998 at A2; Canada Requests WTO, NAFTA
Consultations Over Farm Blockade, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Sept. 25, 1998.
5. See discussion infra at section III.B.4 and Table 7.
6. See USDA/ERS, Livestock, Dairy And Poultry Situation And Outlook
December 1999 LDP-M-66 (Dec. 28, 1999), < http'J/usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/
reports/erssor/livestock ldp-mbb/1999/ldp-m66.pdf> at 7.
7. Id.
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remedy laws to help restore fair pricing to the U.S. market for
cattle.
While some of these efforts, which have been pursued for
several years, have yielded beneficial results, a large proportion
of the cattle industry remains destitute. Indeed, a recent report
from the U.S. Department of Agriculture forecasts a decline in
farm and ranch income in 2000 that could reach a five-year low.8
Many of the tools which have often yielded positive benefits to
other industries are either not well-suited to assisting the cattle
sector or may not be successful in time to save tens of thousands
of ranching families. Special rules are needed to address the
special circumstances of the cattle industry. The alternative - to
permit the emptying of ranches and rural communities in much
of America - is simply not an acceptable option.
In this article, we examine the condition of the cattle indus-
try and why the solutions that have been and are being pursued
are not working more expeditiously and effectively. Our discus-
sion of the condition of the industry draws from not only USDA
and other statistical data, but also from the written and oral tes-
timony offered by hundreds of witnesses from the industry dur-
ing the course of antidumping and countervailing duty
investigations on live cattle from Canada in 1999. Many are
members of Congress and government officials, others are senior
officers from some of the largest farmers' and cattlemen's as-
sociations in the country, while others are producers who have
been working all their lives in the industry.
Some efforts, such as the export-marketing opening initia-
tives and the antitrust litigation, are long-term partial solutions
which have not as yet yielded the benefits anticipated, but which
continue to be pursued and certainly provide potential answers
to some of the issues. Conversely, the unsuccessful experience
with other efforts, such as the trade remedy cases, suggest that
the trade laws, as currently written and administered, are not
well-suited to address the special needs of the cattle industry.
We conclude with proposals that may prove more effective in
helping the cattle industry obtain effective relief.
8. See USDA report predicts farm income drop in 2000, FARM BuREAu
NEws at 1 (Jan. 10, 2000).
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II. THE DOMESTIC CATTLE INDUSTRY - PORTRAIT OF
AN INDUSTRY IN CRISIS
A. OVERVIEW OF THE INDUSTRY
The domestic cattle industry is the single largest agricul-
tural sector in the United States, whether measured in terms of
the numbers of producers or the revenues it generates. In 1998,
there were a total of 1.15 million cattle operations throughout
the United States.9 The vast majority of producers - more than
800,000 - are cow-calf operators who maintain the herds of
brood cows and heifers which produce the calves that are raised
for slaughter to produce beef. In 1998, the industry generated
revenues totaling $33.7 billion year, or about 17 percent of total
agricultural commodity receipts.10 By comparison, the next
closest agricultural commodity was dairy, with total receipts of
$24.3 billion. 1 Cattle and calves have been the single largest
revenue-producing agricultural sector in the United States dat-
ing back as far as the 1950s. 12
The cattle industry constitutes a major part of the econo-
mies of nearly half of the states in the nation. According to the
National Association of State Departments of Agriculture,
"[c]attle production forms the largest segment of American agri-
culture. Beef cattle are raised in all 50 states . . . A healthy
cattle industry is important to nearly every state's agricultural
base."13 Table 1 shows states in which cattle was one of the top
six agricultural products in 1998.
The cattle industry also constitutes the livelihood for a sub-
stantial portion of Native Americans living on Indian reserva-
tions. Robert Miller, an Oklahoma rancher, Creek Indian and
President of the Intertribal Agriculture Council, explains:
... Indian reservations are on some of the most remote areas in the
country. The IAC represents 85 tribes with thousands of individual
producers, encompassing 56 million acres of agriculture trust land and
thousands of acres of privately-owned land, with at least 7.5 million
head of cattle. In some of these areas far distant from metropolitan
areas, Indians cannot operate casinos or even farm that particular
9. USDA/NASS, CAIrLE REPORT, January 1999 at 12.
10. United States and State Farm Income Data, Table 5, Cash Receipts, by
Commodity groups and selected Commodities, United States and States, 1992-
98, USDA/ERS, (visited Aug. 6, 1999) <http'J/www.econ.ag.gov/briefing
farmincome/finfidmu.htm>.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. R. Kirchhoff, NASDA, USITC Hearing, Live Cattle from Canada, T at
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Table 1.
States Where Cattle and Calves Are Among the Top
Agricultural Commodities on the Basis of Cash Receipts, 1998
Cattle and Calves among Leading Commodities
Ranks #1 Ranks #2 Ranks #3 Ranks #4 Ranks #5 Ranks #6
Texas Alabama Washington Louisiana Mississippi Connecticut
Nebraska West Virginia Wisconsin New York Georgia Florida
Kansas Idaho Virginia New Hampshire Michigan Indiana
Colorado Vermont Alaska California Arkansas South Carolina
Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Iowa Minnesota
South Dakota Missouri Kentucky Illinois Maryland
New Mexico North Dakota
Tennessee
Arizona
Montana
Utah
Wyoming
Nevada
Source: USDA ERS Cash Receipts ranking data available at http'/www.econ.ag.gov/briefing/
farmincome/receipts/rankings/misc/rk5Ostat.wkl
land. Thus, a majority of their land is used for grazing. In these areas,
cattle represent our number one source of income.
1 4
Cattle are also a vitally important means by which the
country derives value from vast amounts of land which other-
wise would not be productive. In many areas, particularly in the
West, the most suitable agricultural crop is forage, and the most
economically productive use of such forage is as feed for rumi-
nant animals, such as cattle. 15 Many of the areas are too low in
population to support dairy industries, which means that most
of the grazing and foraging is done by beef cattle. 16
Cattle producers are stewards of the land, taking care to
maintain the pastures and grasslands so they can sustain the
cattle herds. According to the 1997 Agriculture Census, of the
932 million acres of land in farms, about 396 million - or 42.5
percent - consisted of land that was used for pasture or grazing
of livestock.1 7 The vast majority of livestock grazed on such land
are cattle. Absent a vibrant and successful cattle industry,
therefore, much of that land would simply fall into disuse.
14. Live Cattle from Canada and Mexico, Testimony of Robert Miller, Pres-
ident, Intertribal Agriculture Council, Invs. Nos. 701-TA-386/731-TA-812-813
(Preliminary), Staff Conference T. at 37.
15. The Competitive Position of Canadian Live Cattle and Beef in U.S.
Markets, USITC, Pub. 1996, Inv. No. 332-241, at 12 (July 1987).
16. Id.
17. 1997 Census of Agriculture United States Data, Table 7, USDA/NASS,
<http'J/www.nass.usda.gov/census/census97/volumel/us-51/us-107.pdf>.
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Cattle raising is frequently a small family business.' 8
When cattle producers lose their jobs, it usually means they lose
their homes, in many cases homes that have been in the same
family for generations. "Eighty percent of cattle businesses have
been in the same family for more than 25 years and 10 percent
for more than 100 years."19
The cattle industry is often described as having three "sec-
tors" - the cow-calf sector, the stocker-yearling sector, and the
feedlot sector.20 Cow-calf operators raise steers and heifers
which are ultimately slaughtered for meat except for some bulls
and heifers that are retained for breeding purposes. The calves
they raise have a gestation period of about 9 to 11 months before
being born. They are raised with their mothers until they are
weaned, usually at 6 to 10 months.21
Stocker-yearling operators feed weaned calves on available
forage or graze them on wheat pasture and silage. These ani-
mals are ultimately placed on feedlots where they are fed on
high-energy rations such as corn and protein supplements, and
some roughage for about 6 months, after which they may weigh
between 900 and 1300 pounds or more and are between 15 and
24 months old.22 They are then sold for slaughter to the packing
houses.
All cattle are ultimately destined for slaughter to produce
beef, although not all cattle proceed through each of these
stages. For example, weaned calves weighing 600 pounds are
18. See Cattle and Beef- Impact of the NAFTA and Uruguay Round Agree-
ments on U.S. Trade, USITC Pub. 3048, Inv. No. 332-371, at 2-5, 4-3 (July
1997). (stating "[there were nearly 1.2 million operations with cattle in the
United States in 1996. Many of these operations are family owned and
operated.").
19. The U.S. Beef and Cattle Business Factsheet - January 2000, NCBA,
<http'I/ www.beef.org/ library/factsheets/fs industry.htm>.
20. Some cattle terminology may be helpful to better understand the indus-
try. Yearling"/ "stocker" - Weaned calf (5 to 10 months of age) put to graze on
pasture or forage until it has gained enough weight to go to a feedlot (12 to 20
months of age). "Feeder" - Animal that is put into a feedlot for feeding of fin-
ishing rations (e.g., grain) for 90 to 150 days. "Fed" cattle (synonymous with
"fat," "finished" and "slaughter" cattle) - Animal fed to slaughter weight in a
feedlot. "Non-fed cattle" - Animal raised to slaughter weight by grazing on grass
or pasture. "Cull" - Animal retained for breeding (e.g., beef cow or bull) that is
sold for slaughter when no longer productive; dairy cow that has ceased efficient
milk production. See Live Cattle from Canada and Mexico, USITC Pub. 3155,
Invs. Nos. 701-TA-386 and 731-TA-812-813 (Preliminary) at 1-4, 1-5, 1-6 (Febru-
ary 1999); See also Cattle and Beef Impact of the NAFTA and Uruguay Round
Agreements on U.S. Trade, USITC Pub. 3048 at 2-1, 2-2 (July 1997).
21. See USITC Pub. 3048, supra note 18, at 2-1.
22. See USITC Pub. 3048, supra note 18, at 2-1 - 2-2.
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often sold directly to feedlots and put on feed. 23 Many producers
operate "preconditioning lots." They purchase weaned calves
and put them in a highly intensive medical and nutritional pro-
gram for approximately 1-1/2 months, during which time the
calves gain between 125 and 150 pounds. Thus conditioned for
the stress of a feedlot environment, the calves are then sold by
the operators to the feedlots. 24 And, as much as 15 percent of
slaughter cattle are not fed in feedlots at all, but instead are
grown to slaughter weights on pasture and are called "non-fed"
cattle. 25 Further, cull cattle (beef cows and bulls that are no
longer efficiently reproductive, and dairy cows), which are usu-
ally sold directly by the cow-calf operator to the packers, consti-
tute about 20 percent of the total cattle slaughtered annually. 26
A large proportion of cattle producers are involved in more
than one stage of raising cattle. Cow-calf operators, for exam-
ple, may do their own backgrounding entirely or may do part of
the backgrounding before selling the cattle to another stocker/
yearling operator. Stocker/yearling operators, as well as a large
proportion of cow-calf operators, often will retain ownership in
some or all of the cattle they send to feedlot. Conversely, some
feedlots will acquire ownership in stocker cattle and set up toll
arrangements with a stocker/yearling operation; a packer also
may acquire feeder cattle and toll them out to a feedlot for fin-
ishing. There is, in short, a "significant degree of overlap be-
tween operations in all production stages.. ."27 The percentage
of cow-calf producers who retain ownership of their cattle from
birth to slaughter reached 32 percent in 1996.28 More recently,
in 1999, Cattle Fax reported that, on average, 72 percent of pro-
ducers surveyed retain ownership of cattle. 29 Thirty-six percent
of calves born in 1999 will be retained through the feedlot for
sale to the packers.30 Thus, although a large proportion of cattle
23. Petitioner's Prehearing Brief, Anti-dumping Duty and Countervailing
Duty Investigations Concerning Live Cattle from Canada, USITC Inv. 701-TA-
386 (Final), and 731-TA-812, (Final) at 10 (Sept.30, 1999).
24. Id.
25. See USITC Pub. 3048 at 2-2.
26. See Id. at D-15, Table D-19.
27. USITC Pub. 3155 at 9.
28. See USITC Pub. 3155 at 7, n. 26.
29. Cow/ Calf Focus, CA=rLE FAX, August 1999 at 3. The percentage of pro-
ducers that retained ownership ranged between 63 and 78 percent depending
on the region of the country.
30. Id. The percentage of calves retained through the feedlot ranged be-
tween 25 percent (in the Southeast region) and 51 percent (in the Midwest
region).
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may be sold two or three times between birth and slaughter, a
sizeable proportion are also owned by the same producer up to
the time of sale to the packer.
With respect to the economics of the industry, all cattle pro-
ducers, regardless of their particular operation, are directly af-
fected by the price of fat cattle sold to the packers. Adding to the
competitive pressures that cattle producers face is the perisha-
ble nature of their product. Cattle for slaughter must be sold at
their optimal weight in order to receive their best quality grades
and hence their best prices.3 ' The commodity nature of cattle
combined with its perishable nature makes the cattle market ex-
traordinarily sensitive to small changes in the amount of supply.
"It is the supply-side that most effects long-term cattle prices as
the production cycle moves through [its] phases .... "-32 Studies
by the U.S. Department of Agriculture establish that the market
for cattle is a national one, with price information rapidly dis-
seminated through various channels.33
Of the different kinds of producers, feedlot operators are in
the best position to control their costs by deciding how much
they can afford to pay for feeder cattle and still earn a profit on
their sales of the fed cattle. Feedlot operators also can "custom
feed" cattle, or fatten the feeder cattle for a fee, but not actually
purchase and take title to the cattle. Cow-calf operators, by con-
trast, have the least amount of control as they are primarily only
selling the cattle they raise. The packing industry that buys the
fed cattle from the feedlots to produce beef is highly concen-
trated. The three largest packers account for the vast majority
of the cattle slaughter market in the United States.34 Given the
highly fragmented nature of the cattle industry and the enor-
mous degree of concentration in the packing industry, cattle pro-
ducers are, not surprisingly, price takers.35
31. See Live Cattle from Canada, USITC Pub. 3255, Invs. Nos. 731-TA-812
(Final) at 11 (November 1999).
32. John C. McKissick, Beef Cattle Outlook and Marketing Strategies, De-
partment of Agricultural and Applied Economics, The University of Georgia,
(Jan. 20, 1998) <http'//www.ces.uga.edu/Agriculturelagecon/outlook/cattlel
Gacat.htm>.
33. USDAIGIPSA, Concentration in the Red Meat Packaging Industry at
p.3 (Feb. 1996).
34. See USITC Pub. 3255, supra note 30, at 11-2.
35. USITC, Pub.3255, Staff Report, at V-1.
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B. THE CATrLE CYCLE
The ebbs and flows of the cattle industry have followed a
pattern of expansion and contraction often referred to as "the
cattle cycle." The cycle is characterized by the accumulation and
liquidation of cattle inventories. Past cycles have generally oc-
curred in response to changes, or anticipated changes, in profits
(prices received for cattle and prices paid for feed). Cattle sup-
plies increase as operators expand their herds in response to in-
creasing prices so they will have more calves to sell. As the
supply increases, prices eventually peak and then begin to fall.
As prices decline, cow-calf operators liquidate their herds in or-
der to reduce the supply of cattle. 36
The cattle cycle reflects the limited ability of cattle produ-
cers to respond to changes in market conditions because of the
time required to raise the cattle until they are ready for sale to
the packing houses. The decision whether to retain a heifer for
breeding or send it to the backgrounders and feedlots, for exam-
ple, is made when the heifer is about 9 months old so that she
will have her first calf at two years. The calf itself has a gesta-
tion period of 9 to 11 months, and then 15 to 24 months of grow-
ing and feeding before it will be ready for sale to a packing
house. Thus, cow-calf operators expand or liquidate their herds
based on the market conditions they believe will prevail in two
or three years.
Several factors can influence the length and severity of the
cattle cycle. Higher market prices (profits) lead to increases in
cattle inventory and lower market prices (losses from oversup-
ply) lead to decreases in cattle inventory. The more longer the
period of profitability in cow calf operations, the longer the ex-
pansionary phase will be. The longer the period of losses that
are incurred, the longer will be the liquidation phase of the
cycle.
Many producers in the industry believe that the current cat-
tle cycle has not operated in the same manner as previous cy-
cles. Leo McDonnell, a Montana rancher, owner of Midland Bull
Test in Columbus, Montana, and President of R-CALF, puts it
this way:
If you compare where we are today [in 1998/99] with where we were at
the same point in the last cattle cycle, prices are considerably lower
than they should be. It's not normal. Other problems that the indus-
36. See USITC, Pub. 3048, at 2-7.
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try has to contend with today were present back then as well, but that
didn't stop prices from increasing when cattle supplies declined.
3 7
Numerous industry observers in 1996 and 1997 had pre-
dicted that the decline in the cattle inventory that began in 1997
would lead to price increases for cattle. For example, then-presi-
dent of the American Farm Bureau Federation Dean Kleckner
told the governor of Montana in July 1996:
My prediction is within two years ... we're going to see an all-time
high in fed cattle prices." He predicted prices will top the previous high
of about 85 cents a pound and could reach the pinnacle of $1 a
pound.... He said his forecast reflects the cyclical realities of supply
and demand in agriculture.
38
Similarly, the chairman of IBP, the nation's largest packer, told
a meeting of South Dakota ranchers in December 1996 that
"[it's just a short time until the cattle market is going to blow by
80 [dollars per 100 pounds] like a freight train."39 The Chief
Economist for the National Cattlemen's Beef Association wrote
in his 1996 Final Review: "With declining cattle numbers and
improving feed costs, cattle prices will generally post year-to-
year improvements for the next four or five years."40 P.J.
Rathwell, an agricultural economist and professor at Clemson
University, forecast the following:
The decrease in cattle inventory numbers will have a definite beneficial
impact on cattle prices this year and for the next several years. Three
factors carry the greatest weight in determining calf price: the price of
fed cattle, the price of corn, and the number of animals (inventory) in
the marketplace. All three of these factors now point toward better
times in the beef industry.
4 1
As late as January 1998, Cattle-Fax, a leading industry re-
source for cattle price and other essential market information,
forecast:
* Fed-cattle prices are expected to reach the mid-$70s in the
spring of 1998. Seasonal third-quarter pressure puts price
risk back to the mid- to upper-$60s, resulting in an annual
average fed-steer price in the $70 to $72/cwt. range.
37. ITC Hearing Transcript at 81.
38. Kleckner sights record prices, WEsTERN LivESTOCK REPORTER, July 10,
1996, at 1,6.
39. IBP CEO Says Canadian Cattle Not Imports, WESTERN LIVESTOCK RE-
PORTER, Dec. 18, 1996, at 1,6.
40. Chuck Lambert, National Cattlemen's Beef Association, 1996 Final Re-
view <http'/www.beef.org/library/factsheets/fs-finalreview.htm>.
41. P.J. Rathwell, January 1, 1997 Cattle Inventory: The Cycle is Broken,
Management Marketing Memo 334, <http://www.cherokee,agecon.clemson.edu/
mmm334.htm>.
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* After posting the biggest year-to-year advance since 1979,
feeder cattle and calf prices in 1998 will average about $5/cwt.
higher compared to 1997. Competition for noticeably tighter
supplies will be evidence, which will support a long-term, cyc-
lical rally extending into 2000.42
The U.S. Department of Agriculture also predicted increasing
cattle prices in its December 1997 Livestock, Dairy and Poultry
Situation and Outlook: "[Rieduced placements and large fed
cattle marketings through late winter will lead to falling inven-
tories and higher fed cattle prices beginning this spring and con-
tinuing through much of 2000."43
The industry's expectations, however, proved incorrect.
Cattle prices which had been $66.47 per hundredweight in 1995
fell to $64.76 in 1996 - the lowest since 1986. Prices recovered
in 1997 to $66.07 (the second-lowest since 1986), but then fell to
$61.05 in 1998. Meanwhile, the cattle inventory, which reached
a cyclical peak of 103.54 million head in 1996, had fallen to
99.74 million head in 1998.
Table 2 helps put both the price decline in 1998 and the
price trends during the last twenty years into context. Table 2
shows cattle inventories, imports of cattle, imports of beef and
veal converted to a cattle equivalent, and the changes in prices
for fed steers from 1978 to 1998, both on an actual basis and
adjusted for inflation. The table indicates that, as a general
matter from 1978 up to 1994, two or more years of declines in
cattle inventories typically were followed by increases in cattle
prices. For example, the inventory during the previous cycle
peaked in 1982 at 115.4 million head. Thereafter, the inventory
declined to the cycle's trough in 1990. The period of 1982 to
1990 saw only one instance of year-to-year price declines in 1985
and 1986, and indeed the decline in 1986 was so small - less
than one percent - as to be essentially flat. Thus, when the cur-
rent cycle's inventory peaked in 1996 and then declined for two
consecutive years in 1997 and 1998, the predictions that prices
would rebound in 1998 were understandable. The price decline
in 1998 is consistent with the view that the current cattle cycle
is not operating in normal fashion.
Even more troubling is the substantial widening of the gap
between actual prices and prices adjusted for inflation. From
42. Cattle-Fax, January, 1998.
43. USDA/ERS, Livestock, Dairy and Poultry Monthly December 1997
LDP-M-48 (Dec. 17, 1997), <http'/usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/reports/erssor/
livestocklldp-mbb/1997/livestock-dairyan.dpoultry_12.17.97.
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Table 2.
Comparison of U.S. Cattle Inventories, Imports of Cattle and
Prices for Nebraska Direct Steers 1100 lbs. 1978 - 1998
Cattle
Inventory Cattle Beef and
as of Jan 1 Imports Veal Imports*
- Thousand of Head -
1978 116,375 1,252.57 4,799.83
1979 110,864 731.83 5,472.53
1980 111,242 680.67 4,649.39
1981 114,351 659.05 4,603.69
1982 115,444 1,004.20 4,396.09
1983 115,001 920.72 4,141.57
1984 113,360 753.17 3,828.99
1985 109,582 835.14 4,098.77
1986 105,378 1,404.85 3,995.24
1987 102,118 1,200.00 4,351.65
1988 99,622 1,331.74 4,420.10
1989 96,740 1,458.28 4,035.88
1990 95,816 2,135.00 4,417.96
1991 96,393 1,938.93 4,484.21
1992 97,556 2,255.27 4,539.52
1993 99,176 2,499.05 4,503.20
1994 100,974 2,082.50 4,307.31
1995 102,785 2,786.25 3,741.44
1996 103,548 1,966.60 3,648.13
1997 101,656 2,048.36 4,042.74
1998 99,744 2,036.75 4,439.07
Nebraska Direct
1100 cwt
Steer Price
$ / cwt
53.01
68.56
67.64
64.42
65.34
63.63
66.79
59.75
59.25
66.28
71.19
73.86
78.56
74.21
75.24
75.94
68.56
66.47
64.76
66.07
61.05
Source: Data from USDA ERS Red Meat Yearbook and Agricultural Statistics. Data in Bold
denote year-to-year price decreases. *Beef and Veal imports converted from carcass weight
equivalent to head by dividing the average production of U.S. slaughter in pounds per head.
Steer Price adujusted for PPI using IMF International Financial Statistics 1999 Yearbook at
926-927.
1978 to 1989, actual cattle prices averaged about $8.12 per hun-
dredweight below inflation (using 1978 as the index). From
1991 through 1998, however, the average was $22.11 per hun-
dredweight - nearly three times the gap in the prior cycle. From
1994 through 1998, the average difference was $29.43 per
hundredweight.
Table 3 below shows the net trade position of the United
States in cattle and beef. The United States increased its ex-
ports of beef in the last twelve years, but still runs a significant
trade deficit on a weight basis. At the same time, imports of live
cattle have increased substantially and the trade deficit in cattle
has increased. Since imported cattle are ultimately slaughtered
and converted to beef, a significant percentage of increased ex-
ports of beef simply reflect the conversion of imported cattle.
1978 Fed Steer
Price Adjusted
for Inflation
$ / cwt
53.01
59.73
68.16
74.41
75.83
76.77
78.67
78.29
76.02
78.00
81.13
85.20
88.23
88.42
88.89
90.22
91.35
94.67
96.84
96.84
94.38
Price
Below
Inflation
(1978 = 0)
$ / cwt
8.83
0.52
9.99
10.49
13.14
11.88
18.54
16.77
11.72
9.54
11.34
9.67
14.21
13.65
14.28
22.79
28.20
32.08
30.77
33.33
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Table 3.
U.S. Imports and Exports of Live Cattle and Beef and Veal
Live Cattle Beef & Veal
Imports Exports Net Imports Imports Exports Net Imports
Head Thousands of Pounds, Carcass Weight
1987 1,200,481 130,698 1,069,783 2,293,360 611,090 1,682,270
1988 1,332,206 321,449 1,010,757 2,380,580 679,791 1,700,789
1989 1,459,415 169,140 1,290,275 2,175,351 1,061,939 1,113,412
1990 2,135,000 119,914 2,015,086 2,354,567 1,006,042 1,348,525
1991 1,939,054 310,962 1,628,092 2,406,496 1,188,370 1,218,126
1992 2,255,265 321,790 1,933,475 2,439,775 1,323,637 1,116,138
1993 2,499,046 153,416 2,345,630 2,401,332 1,275,045 1,126,287
1994 2,082,504 230,791 1,851,713 2,370,727 1,610,620 760,107
1995 2,786,245 94,548 2,691,697 2,103,473 1,820,814 282,659
1996 1,965,448 174,307 1,791,141 2,072,729 1,819,194 253,535
1997 2,046,352 282,344 1,764,008 2,344,225 2,058,530 285,695
1998 2,034,009 285,209 1,748,800 2,643,105 2,160,811 482,293
Source: Kansas State Livestock & Meat Marketing Web Site, httpJ/www.agecon.ksu.edu/
livestock/Livestock Databases/Trade Databases/montrade.xls.
C. PORTRAIT OF AN ECONOMIC AND HuMAN CRIsIs
Three long-terms trends have signaled growing problems
for the cattle industry. First, the prices that cattle producers
must pay for supplies, fuel, and other necessities have been
steadily increasing, while the prices they receive for their cattle
have either been declining or remained flat. Evidence of this
cost-price squeeze may be seen in USDA price indices for live-
stock farmers' prices paid and received seen below in Figure 1.
Although prices paid by livestock farmers have risen, prices re-
ceived by livestock farmers have remained well below what they
were in 1990-92.
Second, the producer's share of the beef retail dollar has
fallen from some 70 percent in the 1970s to below 50 percent in
1996, while the nominal farm-to-retail price spread has widened
from 40 cents per pound to over $1.40 per pound.44 In a word,
cattle producers over the past three decades have received an
ever-shrinking share of the retail dollar that consumers pay for
beef. Figure 2 shows the changes in the farm share of the retail
dollar for beef, the price the rancher has received for cattle, and
the price the rancher would have received had the farm retail
share remained at 1970 levels. Prices in Figure 2 are in con-
stant 1970 dollars.
44. See W. Hahn,et al., U.S. Beef Industry: Cattle Cycles, Price Spreads
and Packer Concentration, Economic Research Service, Technical Bulletin No.
1874, at 19, April 1999.
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Figure 1
Livestock Farm Index: Prices Received and Prices Paid
All Items, U.S., By Quarter
Percent (1990-92=100)
140
I Paid ReeveCd
1 3 0 ----------- ---------------------------
1 2 0 ---- -- ---- ---------- ------- ----- ---- ---- ------ --- ----- ---------.
110 ---------------------------
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Year USDANASSJYnuary 31,2=O
Source: USDA/National Agricultural Statistics Service, http:/Avww.usda.gov/nasslaggraphs/vskfarm.htm
Figure 3 shows the same illustration, but in actual dollars.
If a rancher in 1997 received the same percentage of the retail
dollar for beef as received in 1970, he would be receiving nearly
$25-30 more per hundredweight. This phenomenon accounts for
a substantial portion of the depressed prices received in the last
decade and for a major part of the price/cost squeeze exper-
ienced, as much as $10 billion per year. This price depression
can be seen in Table 4, which shows prices to farms for beef as
reported by USDA, and prices that would have been needed to
stay current with inflation. Prices are roughly one-third lower
than they should be.
Source for Figures 2 and 3: USDA Economic Research Service.
Data for 1970-1993 from Red Meat Yearbook at http://
usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/data-sets/livestock/94006/bf-
spread.wkl. Data for 1994-1999 downloaded from http://
www.econ.ag.gov/briefing/meatbrif/prspd.wkl. Data converted
to constant dollars using the BLS PPI for Food and Kindred
Products
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Figure 2
Choice Beef Values and Spreads - Farm Price vs. Retail Price
In Constant Dollars (1982=100)
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Third, the industry itself is in a state of long-term contrac-
tion, as fewer new producers enter the industry to replace aging
producers. The number of cow-calf operations, for example, has
declined from more than 2.2 million in 1967 to 1.8 million in
1976 to about 800,000 in 1998.45 According to Mary von Forrell,
a rancher in Wyoming:
The industry has an aging population .... [Tihe American Here-
ford Association reported that for a member with registered cattle in
production, the average age has increased to the age of 56. This is a
major concern.... Tihey are getting old, nobody is coming back to the
ranches. And when we lose people born and raised on the ranch, there
goes American production of agriculture.
4 6
Robert Bruner, a leader in the cattle industry in east Texas, as-
serts, "[wihen you lose an industry like this, you don't just re-
build it. The cattle industry takes generations to understand,
much less build."47
Ranches over a century old can no longer sustain a family.
Steven Anderson is the seventh generation of his family in Kan-
sas. The original homestead from the 1850s was lost by a rela-
tive in the last few years. Anderson says that "[alt the present
45. Live Cattle from Canada, USITC Pub. 3255, Inv. No. 731-TA-812, at 18,
Nov. 1999.
46. Petitioners' Prehearing Br., supra note 23, App. Vol. 2, Ex. 13.
47. Id. at App. Vol. 2, Ex. 18.
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Figure 3
Clice Beef Values and Spreads - Farm Price v,. Rea Prie
In Actual Doars
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time, I'm throwing in my labor for free. I don't carry health in-
surance; I can't afford it .... I basically live like a third class
citizen in a country that's ostensibly the most prosperous nation
in the world."48 George Cremer has struggled to keep his opera-
tion, homesteaded in 1909, in the family. His Montana neigh-
bors have been less successful:
Most of the ranches here started in the 1880's. Most of the young peo-
ple growing up in the area are leaving. ... Mhese ranches are at the
size now where one person can't make them work, yet the income won't
support more .... The property will most likely end up being sold.
4 9
Congressman Michael Simpson of Idaho reports, "Many of
the producers in my district are not even making enough to
cover the cost of production and are in jeopardy of losing their
generation owned family operations."50 Roy Stewart in New-
port, Nebraska is in partnership with his son. Together, they
are trying to buy out an operation that has been in the family
since 1898, but they lost $123 a head in 1997: "Buying the land
will be expensive. I don't know how we will manage."51 Doug
Tippet in Joseph, Oregon bought his father's cow-calf operation,
but he does not see the next generation staying in agriculture:
48. Id. at App. Vol. 2, Ex. 71.
49. Id. at App. Vol. 2, Ex. 9.
50. Live Cattle from Canada, Hearing transcript at 70.
51. Petitioners' Prehearing Br., App. Vol. 2, Ex. 34.
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Table 4.
Choice Beef Retail Value and Gross Farm Value
Gross Farm
Farm Value Adj Factor Value in
Gross at 1970 PPI for PPI for 1970 Adj.
Retail farm Share of Food Food For
price value Retail 1982=100 1970=100 Inflation
- cents / pound - cents / lb
99.9
106.2
116.6
139.7
143.8
152.2
145.7
145.9
178.8
222.4
233.6
234.7
238.4
234.1
235.5
228.6
226.8
238.4
250.3
265.7
281.0
288.3
284.6
293.4
282.9
284.4
280.2
279.5
277.1
287.8
70.3
76.7
85.0
106.9
101.5
108.6
94.4
97.3
126.1
163.4
161.9
154.5
155.5
151.8
158.6
142.2
140.0
157.6
169.4
177.6
188.9
178.4
180.9
183.7
165.9
159.5
156.4
159.2
148.0
157.2
70.2
74.6
81.9
98.1
101.0
106.9
102.3
102.5
125.6
156.3
164.1
164.9
167.4
164.4
165.4
160.6
159.3
167.5
175.9
186.6
197.4
202.5
199.9
206.1
198.7
199.8
196.8
196.3
194.7
202.2
43.79
44.49
46.94
56.48
64.37
69.83
69.63
73.24
79.92
87.25
92.40
97.87
100.00
101.00
105.40
104.60
107.30
109.50
112.60
118.70
124.40
124.10
123.30
125.70
126.80
129.00
133.60
134.50
134.30
135.14
1.0000
1.0160
1.0719
1.2898
1.4698
1.5947
1.5899
1.6725
1.8249
1.9924
2.1100
2.2348
2.2835
2.3064
2.4069
2.3886
2.4502
2.5005
2.5713
2.7106
2.8407
2.8339
2.8156
2.8704
2.8955
2.9458
3.0508
3.0714
3.0668
3.0860
70.3
71.4
75.3
90.6
103.3
112.0
111.7
117.5
128.2
140.0
148.2
157.0
160.4
162.0
169.1
167.8
172.1
175.7
180.6
190.4
199.6
199.1
197.8
201.6
203.4
206.9
214.3
215.8
215.4
216.8
Source: USDA Economic Research Service. Data for 1970-1993 from Red Meat Yearbook at
http'J/usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/data-sets/livestock/94006/bfspread.wkl. Data for 1994 - 1999
downloaded from http'Jwww.econ.ag.gov/briefing/meatbrif/prspd.wkl. PPI from Bureau of
Labor Statistics for "Food and Kindred Products.-
Is anyone going to be able to talk the kids into staying in ranching? I
don't think so. A lot of the young are leaving. [Wie work... 18 hours a
day, seven days a week and... right now we're not making a profit.5 2
Even in the best of times, profitability in the cattle sector is
generally characterized by relatively low profit margins, gener-
ally no more than 3 - 4 percent. Moreover, in many cases, re-
ported "profits" are what the operator has left before payment of
salaries to family members who have worked in the operation,
and coverage of the operation's fixed costs.
52. Id. at App. Vol. 2, Ex. 68.
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In the not-so-recent past, producers were prepared to deal
with down turns by relying on equity and other resources gener-
ated during the up turn in the cycle. According to the theory of
the cattle cycle, prices for cattle should increase as supplies de-
cline. This in fact is what happened in the 1980s, when the cat-
tle inventory fell from 109.6 million head in 1985 to 95.8 million
head in 1990, and prices climbed from $58 - 60 per cwt. in 1984-
85 to the mid-to-upper $70s in 1988-90. In the current cattle
cycle, however, while the liquidation phase had been in progress
since at least 1996, prices have not recovered appreciably. In-
deed, as discussed earlier, 1998 prices fell to 1996 levels, which
were among the lowest in recent years. The domestic industry
did not experience the rebound in prices and profits that would
normally be expected with smaller inventories. Many of the
rules that used to operate in the cattle industry and in farming
generally no longer appeared operable, as evinced by the story of
one South Dakota cattle and grain farmer:
At 75, Everett Myers... remembers the rule-of-thumb farmers lived
by in 1946 when he got out of the Navy and started farming: When
grain prices are down, livestock prices are up. That's not true any-
more, says Myers, who still helps out at the Redfield Livestock Auc-
tion. "You can't count on live-stock or grain or anything," Myers said.
"It's hard on the young people. There's no way they can make it." Gil-
bert Lutter, who owns the Redfield Livestock Auction, agrees that
times are tough. He sees it in the cattle trade. "The low prices are
hurting a lot of operators. It hurts our business to some extent. People
delay their marketing." Lutter estimated that the same grade of cattle
is selling now for $15 to $20 less a hundredweight than two years ago,
even as producers' expenses continue to rise.
53
House Democratic Leader Richard Gephardt confirms that
the same is true in states such as Missouri where cattle produ-
cers also raise other agricultural products:
Cattle-producing farms in Missouri are often small, diversified opera-
tions. In the past when prices on cattle were depressed, profits from
other farm products compensated for livestock losses. However, given
the current widespread farm crisis, the losses incurred by cattle opera-
tions have had no cover from other products. The result has been
greatly expanded debt, a drastic curtailment of expenditures by cattle
producers, and an extraordinary toll on Missouri cattle producers.
5 4
Cattle producers in Florida, which ranked twelfth in the na-
tion in 1999 in cattle inventory, likewise were experiencing sig-
53. L. Nixon, Old Rules No Longer Apply, ABERDEEN AMERmcAN NEWS, Aug.
5, 1998, at B3.
54. Letter from Richard A. Gephardt, House Democratic Leader, to Lynn
Bragg, Chairman US International Trade Commission 1 (Oct. 12, 1999).
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nificant financial difficulties. According to Carl Loop, president
of the Florida Farm Bureau:
Our producers have been losing huge amounts of equity. USDA figures
on cow-calf product cash costs and returns per bredcow for 1996 and
1997 ... show losses of $134.99/head in 1996 and $57.05/head in 1997
for the Southeastern United States. Factoring in fixed costs and wages
for the unpaid labor of family members translates into staggering
losses of $406.34/head in 1996 and $315.84/head in 1997. We know
from contact with our members that there have been substantial losses
being incurred since at least 1996 which has stretched the ability of
ranchers to stay in production. Many have been forced by banks to
liquidate part of their herds or to sell their land or take other steps to
reduce the banks' exposure in these times of depressed prices. We
have seen a significant number of producers, including reasonably
large producers, get out of cattle production in total or to a significant
extent in the last five years.5 5
U.S. Department of Agriculture statistics show that the cat-
tle industry sustained five consecutive years of financial losses
from 1994 through 1998 inclusive.56 The years 1996-1998 were
especially grim as prices for cattle plummeted, producers lost
billions of dollars in equity, and increasing numbers of individ-
ual operators were confronting economic ruin. The magnitude of
the losses in some instances were so great as to exceed the sales
price of the cattle.
USDA publishes data concerning profit and loss experience
of cow-calf operations.5 7 The data for 1990-1995 and 1996-1998
are summarized below in Tables 5 and 6. As shown, the industry
earned operating profits on total cash expenses (variable and
55. Letter from Carl B. Loop, Jr., President, Florida Farm Bureau Federa-
tion, to Lynn Bragg, Chairman US International Trade Commission 2 (Sept. 29,
1999).
56. See Petitioner's Prehearing Brief at 34, Table 2 (citing to USDA/ERS
Farm Costs and Returns Survey); USITC Pub. 3255, supra, at VI-2, VI-3, Ta-
bles VI-1 and VI-2.
57. See USDA/ERS. Farm Sector Performance-Program Overview, http'J/
www.econ.ag.gov/briefing/farmincome//fspprog.htm. "Under Congressional
mandate, USDA is required to develop annual estimates of the costs of produc-
ing crops and livestock. Estimates and forecasts of production costs are also
required by USDA for use in program adjustments and policy analyses. While
fulfilling these basic commitments, this project continues to bring cost esti-
mates into conformance with newly revised conceptual standards established
by the American Agricultural Economics Association Task Force on Commodity
Costs and Returns Accounting. This will be accomplished for specific commodity
estimates as adjustments are made in ERS farm-level surveys. Marketing and
storage costs and returns are incorporated into the accounts as data are ob-
tained through farm surveys. Resulting estimates are used to assess the rela-
tionship between total costs and returns, including costs of owner-supplied
factors of production." Id.
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fixed) from 1990 through 1993. In 1994 and 1995, cow-calf oper-
ators covered their variable costs.
Table 5.
Cow-Calf Costs and Returns 1990-1995
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
($/bred cow)
Total gross value of
production 441.59 438.23 413.56 430.18 389.21 331.92
Total variable cash
expenses 315.66 316.49 314.52 328.61 329.91 321.82
Gross value of prod'n less
variable cash exp. 125.93 121.74 99.04 101.57 59.3 10.1
Total fixed cash expenses 86.14 71.40 67.93 86.29 82.16 88.83
Total cash expenses 401.8 387.89 382.45 414.9 412.07 410.65
Gross value of production
less cash expenses 39.79 50.34 31.11 15.28 (22.86) (78.73)
Source: USDA/ERS, Farm Costs and Returns Survey http'J/www.econ.ag.gov/
briefing/farmincome/car/cowcalf3.htm (visited April 11, 2000).
In 1999, USDA's Economic Research Service revised its
methodology for calculating cow-calf costs and returns. The re-
sults for 1996 through 1998, shown below in Table 6, indicate
that cow-calf operators could not cover operating costs. When
the operator's total costs are factored in, the losses become even
more staggering.
Table 6.
Cow-Calf Costs and Returns 1996-1998
1996 1997 1998
$ per bred cow
Total gross value of production ................... 318.18 414.27 402.98
Total operating costs ............................ 430.51 444.73 405.97
Gross value of prod'n less total operating costs ..... (112.33) (30.46) (2.99)
Total allocated overhead ......................... 387.24 450.59 450.42
Total cost listed ................................ 817.75 895.32 856.39
Gross value of production less total cost listed ..... (499.57) (481.05) (453.51)
Source: USDA/ERS, Farm Costs and Returns Survey http'//www.econ.ag.gov/
briefing/farmincome/car/ cowcalf.htm (visited April 11, 2000).
A Cattle-Fax survey of cow-calf producers also confirmed the
lack of profitablity in that sector:
[Only 24% of cow/calf operators were profitable, compared to 45% in
1997. Forty percent of the respondents reported that their cow/calf op-
erations were unprofitable. Lack of profits in 1998 was related directly
20001
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to the loss of equity in the feeding and stocker sectors, resulting in
lower calf prices this past fall.5
8
Substantial financial losses have not been confined to the cow-
calf sector. In that same issue, Cattle-Fax reported:
Stocker operators did not fare much better in terms of profits in 1998.
Only 32% of the winter stocker operators and 22% of the summer
stocker operators reported that they were profitable. Thirty-nine per-
cent of the winter stockers and 53% of the summer stockers were un-
profitable.... For the year, summer stocker operators lost about $60
per head on average.
59
As for feedlots, in April 1999, Cattle-Fax reported that feedlot
operators had "endured 19 consecutive months of losses and
nearly $3 billion loss of equity since mid-1997. Cattle feeders
have been profitable in only 21 out of the last 63 months [dating
back to January 1994] (33%) in the cash market."60 Individual
losses have been staggering. One Wyoming feeder reports:
I'm 62 years old and I'm not very proud of the situation that I've gotten
myself into recently. After a lifetime building up this operation, I have
lost approximately $2,000,000 in equity over the past two to three
years.6
1
The situation is similar in Kansas. Mike Callicrate ac-
knowledges a million dollar loss in a single year at his feedyard
in St. Francis.62 Ivan Reimer, who feeds cattle in Meade, Kan-
sas says, "We absolutely took a bloodbath in the market...." He
adds:
The loss of equity these last two or three years has meant that we have
had to draw on a line of credit or get a loan with the bank just to keep
in operation. We have a line of credit we can't cover.
6 3
From Iowa, Farmers' Union President John Whitaker agrees:
"Last year [19981 was a devastating year in the cattle feeding
industry."64
Such an extended period of losses is not normal in this sec-
tor. According to Clarence Newcomb, chairman of the Cattle
Feeders Committee of the Colorado Cattlemen's Association:
This is an extended period of continuous losses in the feedlot segment
that is unusual in the course of the history of the various cattle cycles.
You could see two, three, four, five months, but normally we would re-
turn to profitability. To just go on and on and on like this, is totally
58. Special Edition, January Cow-Calf Survey Results, CATmE-FAX, Jan.
1999, at 1.
59. Id.
60. XXXI CATTLE-FAx UPDATE 13, April 2, 1999 at 1.
61. Petitioners' Prehearing Br., App. Vol. 2, Ex. 25.
62. Id. at App. Vol. 2, Ex. 49.
63. Id. at App. Vol. 2, Ex. 57.
64. Id. at App. Vol. 2, Ex. 31.
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contrary to historical cattle feeding practices, and it's just tearing the
heart out of some really good people.
65
The extended downturn outlasted the resources of a vast
proportion of producers. There was not a sufficient upturn in the
market from 1996 to 1998 that would have allowed producers to
retire debt and restore their equity position. According to John
E. Johnson, president of the First Western Bank in Sturgis,
South Dakota:
One of the things that you learn about the cow-calf business is that we
deal with cycles. And as a banker you have to finance on cycles. So
when you are in a down cycle, you know that you may grow some debt.
When you are in an up cycle, you hope that it is good enough that you
are going to be able to get back on track and maybe make some im-
provements in the operation. The problem is... that the cow-calf in-
dustry does not cycle the way that it has for the last 50 years. We've
got outside stimulus that is causing us to have problems. We believe
that we should have been back into a rising price [in 1998], we should
have been back into a position where our people were starting to elimi-
nate some short term debt. Instead, we continue to see increasing car-
ryover debt from the operating side.6 6
News accounts have reported on the substantial hardships that
domestic cattle producers have faced:
Montana farmers and ranchers say they face financial disaster unless
commodity prices increase of the government acts to support agricul-
ture .... Others expressed doubt that they or many of their neighbors
would be in business unless there's a dramatic increase in prices cou-
pled with key policy changes. 6
7
One agricultural economist reported in 1997:
Indications are that some other North Dakota beef cow producers are
not going to make it through the current economic crunch .... [I]f you
bring up the subject, individuals confirm that there are beef cow produ-
cers in their home communities under severe financial stress.
6 8
Fully 24 Members of the United States Senate, representing
17 States, wrote to the U.S. International Trade Commission:
"The crisis our cattle producers, their families and their commu-
nities are living through is very real."69 Indeed, as discussed
65. Id. at App. Vol. 2, Ex. 20.
66. Id. at App. Vol. 2, Ex. 4.
67. Farmers and ranchers say financial disaster around the corner, AGRi-
NEWS, June 5, 1998 at 18.
68. Harlan Hughes, Times, They Are Tough In North Dakota's Cow Coun-
try, THE MARKET ADVISOR, Oct. 16, 1997 <http: \ \www.ag.ndsu.nodak.edu>.
69. ITC Investigation; Letter to Lynn Bragg, Chairman U.S. International
Trade Commission (Oct. 5, 1999) from Senate Minority Leader Thomas A. Das-
chle (D-SD), Senator Robert C. Byrd (D-WV), Senator Ernest F. Hollings (D-
SC), Senator Max Baucus (D-MT), Senator Orrin G. Hatch (R-UT), Senator
Conrad Burns (R-MT), Senator Christopher "Kit" S. Bond (R-MO), Senator
Kent Conrad (D-ND), Senator Tom Harkin (D-IA), Senator Robert Bennett (R-
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below, the repercussions to the cattle producers are felt in many
ways that are not reflected on a profit and loss statement or in
USDA statistics. Thirty-one Members of the House of Repre-
sentatives, representing eight additional States, also wrote to
the International Trade Commission, reiterating, "The economic
crisis for our ranchers is real and is on-going."70
1. Inability to afford health insurance
Cattle producers who are unable to afford conventional
health insurance have either increased their deductibles to the
equivalent of catastrophic coverage, or have dropped the policies
altogether. Allen McIntyre, with the West River Health Serv-
ices Foundation in Hettinger, North Dakota, reports:
Right now there are some people that don't have insurance and others
that have the catastrophic plan, where they have the high deductible of
$5,000. Even with the catastrophic plan they are not coming in for
preventive medicine. Women aren't coming in for mammograms, and
we have a high level of breast cancer in this area. Since they do not
have insurance, they are not coming in for preventive care. This can
lead to a mountainous medical bill. In fact, some people have been
UT), Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell (R-CO), Senator Larry Craig (R-
ID),Senator Byron L. Dorgan (D-ND), Senator J. Robert Kerrey (D-NE), Sena-
tor Herbert H. Kohl (D-WI), Senator Paul Wellstone (D-MN),Senator Spencer
Abraham (R-MI), Senator John Ashcroft (R-MO), Senator Michael D. Crapo (R-
ID), Senator Michael B. Enzi (R-WY), Senator Tim Johnson (D-SD), Senator
Blanche L. Lincoln (D-AR), Senator Gordon Smith (R-OR), and Senator Craig
Thomas (R-WY). The following additional Senators wrote separately to the ITC
expressing their support for cattle producers in their states: Senator Ron
Wyden (D-OR); Senator Mike DeWine (R-OH); Senator Chuck Hagel (R-NE);
and Senator Robert G. Torricelli (D-NJ).
70. ITC Investigation; Letter to the Lynn Bragg, Chairman U.S. Interna-
tional Trade Commission (Oct. 21, 1999) from House Minority Leader Richard
Gephardt (D-MO), Congressman Ralph M. Hall (D-TX), Congressman James V.
Hansen (R-UT), Congresswoman Marge Roukema (R-NJ), Congressman Clay
Shaw (R-FL), Congressman Nicholas V. Lampson (D-TX), Congressman Wes W.
Watkins (R-OK), Congressman Peter A. DeFazio (D-OR), Congresswoman Ile-
ana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), Congressman Bill Barrett (R-NE), Congressman
Charles T. Canady (R-FL), Congressman Lincoln Diaz-Balart (R-FL), Congress-
man Doc Hastings (R-WA), Congressman Scott McInnis (R-CO), Congressman
John Mica (R-FL), Congressman-at-Large Earl Pomeroy (D-ND), Congress-
woman-at-Large Barbara Cubin (R-WY), Congressman George R. Nethercutt,
Jr. (R-WA), Congressman Marion Berry (D-AR), Congressman Merrill Cook (R-
UT), Congressman-at-Large Rick A. Hill (D-MT),Congresswoman Darlene Hoo-
ley (D-OR), Congressman Jerry Moran (R-KS), Congressman Max A. Sandiin
(D-TX), Congressman-at-Large John R. Thune (R-SD), Congressman Jim Tur-
ner (D-TX), Congressman Greg Walden (R-OR), Congresswoman Helen Che-
noweth-Hage (R-ID), Congressman Rush Holt (D-NJ), Congressman Mike
Simpson (R-ID), and Congressman Tom Udall (D-NM).
[Vol. 9:449
TRADE AND CATTYLE
taken right off the farm, and they have lost the whole farm because of
medical costs.
7 1
Many livestock and cattle associations have programs that
provide insurance to members. Jim Magagna, Executive Vice
President of the Wyoming Stockgrowers Association, says that
his Association's members have dropped some of the more im-
portant health insurance benefits, and particularly have
dropped benefits that they were providing to any hired labor.
"They have tried to keep their family benefits if at all possible.
Their financial picture does not allow them to do more."72
The Oklahoma Farmers Union, with over 100,000 members,
is one of the larger providers of insurance to rural families.
President Philip Klutts reports that his insurance sales staff
also see members trying to reduce premiums by lowering or
dropping coverage. 73 Kansas Cattlemen's Association co-
founder Michael Schultz observes the same pattern: "[Miany
ranchers have either lost their life insurance or had to go to cat-
astrophic coverage only."74
2. Inability to afford hired labor
Most cow-calf operators are family operations where a sig-
nificant portion of the work is by family members. Hired labor-
ers, both full-time and seasonal, will typically share the burden
on any sizeable operation. With less and less income, however,
many producers cannot afford even seasonal hired labor, which
increases the workload on the family.
Don Freiberger, a rancher in Alliance, Nebraska, put it this
way: "Since the market went down in 1994, the only way I have
been able to cover my production costs was to get rid of all the
paid labor."75 According to Carolyn Petik, who raises cattle with
her husband Jerry in Meadow, South Dakota:
Ranchers in this area can't afford to hire more help, so we are doing
things ourselves that we would otherwise hire an extra person to help
with. I'm exhausted at night, and my neighbors are too. You can't
measure statistically the degree of depression caused by overwork but
it's there.7 6
71. Petitioners' Pre-hearing Br., App. Vol. 2, Ex. 46 at 2-3.
72. Id. at App. Vol. 2, Ex. 24 at 3.
73. Id. at App. Vol. 2, Ex. 80 at 2.
74. Id. at App. Vol. 2, Ex. 26 at 3.
75. Id. at App. Vol. 2, Ex. 69 at 2.
76. Id. at App. Vol. 2, Ex. 6 at 1.
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Maury Kaercher, President of the Michigan Cattlemen's As-
sociation, reports the the inability to afford labor is actually forc-
ing herd cut-backs among the 550 members of his association:
[Farmers] struggle to find people to work on their farm but are unable
to give them fair wage because income has dropped dramatically in
agriculture, particularly within the livestock sector. They cannot af-
ford to pay somebody to come in and work even though their wives left
to work in town. As a result, they need to both work harder and reduce
the size of the operation by liquidating the herd.7 7
R-CALF's Vice-President Kathleen Kelley, who ranches
with her husband in Meeker, Colorado, points out the effects on
children in a ranch family:
[C]hildren are being drawn into doing more work. One woman ex-
pressed to me her concern about the safety of her children, in their
early teens, who have been drawn into helping out because this partic-
ular family could not afford to hire other help.78
3. Taking off-farm jobs to supplement income
Meanwhile, even as their workloads increase, family mem-
bers on a growing numbers of operations take off-farm and off-
ranch jobs, either to obtain health insurance benefits that are
otherwise unaffordable or to supplement the family income be-
cause the ranch income is insufficient. According to Horace Mc-
Queen, a Texas rancher and a former television agricultural
news broadcaster for some 35 years, "We've got capable folks
who are ranchers but who must get jobs working off the ranch to
provide any protection against illness."79
J. Peter Carey and Carolyn Carey in California describe
their niece and her husband: "He has taken a job as a buyer for
an auction yard. She runs the guest house, and they run the
ranch .... {T}hey are just working as hard as they can work,...
doing everything just to try to stay afloat."80 On the other side
of the country, in New Jersey, the story is all too familiar. John
Hargreaves, President of the New Jersey Beef Industry Council
reports that local cattle producers are "taking off farm work,
working in construction jobs, driving trucks or working night
jobs at factories. They take whatever they can."81 Richard
Tokash, speaking on behalf of the 2,600 members of the North
Dakota Stockman's Association, captures a concern shared as
77. Id. at App. Vol. 2, Ex. 51 at 3.
78. Id. at App. Vol. 2, Ex. 1 at 3.
79. Id. at App. Vol. 2, Ex. 7 at 5.
80. Id. at App. Vol. 2, Ex. 21 at 5.
81. Id. at App. Vol. 2, Ex. 81 at 2.
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far south as Texas, as far west as California, and as far east as
New Jersey:
It is important for this industry, and the U.S. economy as a whole,
.. for agricultural producers to be able to survive on their production
income. We can't have an industry living off town jobs. We can't man-
age the land that way.
8 2
4. Maintenance of property and equipment; investment in
breeding stock
Efforts to economize and reduce costs also mean putting off
purchases of new equipment such as tractors and balers.
Charles Klaseen, a Colorado rancher and Chairman of the
4,500-member Rocky Mountain Farmers Union observes:
Ranchers are not investing in new equipment and are not investing in
those necessary things to maintain their operations. I can speak to
that personally because I've got an old pickup... But I lost $139,000
last year from the operation and you just can't justify buying a $30,000
pickup .... As far as equipment, we just got a welder and we just weld
and weld....83
Congresswoman Helen Chenoweth sees an inability to per-
form once-routine maintenance in her home state of Idaho:
Some ranches are falling into disrepair and not because their owners
have lost interest in them; quite the contrary,... many ranchers can
no longer afford to... treat for weeds and purchase new equipment or
fix broken equipment and make other expenditures normally required
to operate a ranch.84
Florida cattle producer Dallas Townsend explains the conse-
quences of these kinds of cutbacks:
When confronted with decreased revenues, you look at whatever ex-
penses you can reduce .... There are the ones that you can control
such as fertilizers, feed for the cattle and health programs. Anytime
you start sacrificing in these areas, you lose productivity. If you are
forced to reduce your fertilizer cost in order to deal with lower prices
for your product, then productivity of that pasture is going to be less.
You're not going to grow as much grass. 85
Another disturbing trend is that many cattle producers are
not able to reinvest in their breeding stock. Mary von Forell,
who raises breeding bulls in Wyoming, reports:
In terms of the volume of business that we've done over the last few
years, that volume has dropped off significantly, about 40%. I am not
getting bids from my customers. It used to be that if a rancher had a
bull that was four or five years old, the bull would be sold. Many of our
82. Id. at App. Vol. 2, Ex. 32 at 3.
83. Id. at App. Vol. 2, Ex. 41 at 3-4.
84. Live Cattle from Canada, Hearing transcript at 55.
85. Petitioners' Pre-hearing Br. App. Vol. 2, Ex. 44 at 2.
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[customers] are trying to squeak another couple of years out of their
bulls now. The age of their bulls is increasing.
8 6
Carl Turner, an Angus breeder in Tennessee, sees the same
problem:
My customers for bulls are cow-calf operators producing for the com-
mercial or slaughter market. I know they are suffering financially be-
cause I see that they don't have the money they used to have to invest
in their genetics.
8 7
Veterinarian Max Thornsberry, who is also President of the
Missouri Cattlemen's Association, explains the importance of in-
vesting in genetics. "[Wihen you combine cross bred calves, [it
improves] the ability to withstand disease. . .." As a result of
lack of money to invest in breeding programs, he observes, "[t]he
quality of our cattle has suffered significantly."88
Herman Schumacher, an R-CALF Director, summarizes the
condition of hundreds of cow-calf operators that utilize his live-
stock auction services in Herried, South Dakota:
Five or six years ago, you had a producer in excellent shape, with a
strong breeding program, quality feeding, and first-rate equipment.
You had another producer, a good producer, paying attention to his
genetics, using good feeding techniques, and buying new model used
equipment regularly. You also had the marginal producer .... Now the
marginal producer is gone. The good producer has cut his expenses to
the core and is replacing no equipment and no longer upgrading his
genetics. The excellent producer is cutting back as well, keeping the
quality there for now but neither growing nor improving. I don't know
of any producer I would describe in excellent shape.89
5. Loss of equity and increased levels of debt.
As in many agricultural industries, cattle producers borrow
against the equity in their operation, or use credit, to finance
their expenses over the year, and ideally, paid down that debt
with each year's sales. Over a series of cattle cycles, ranch eq-
uity is built up. The ranch subsequently might be purchased by
a younger generation, or sold outside the family. Either way,
the ranch owners provided for their retirement years with a life-
time of work and savings.
This pattern no longer seems to apply. Senator Mike Enzi
of Wyoming commented about the situation facing many of his
ranching constituents: "As an accountant and a member of the
Senate Banking Committee, it's particularly disturbing for me
86. Id. at App. Vol. 2, Ex. 13 at 3.
87. Id. at App. Vol. 2, Ex. 15 at 1.
88. Id. at App. Vol. 2, Ex. 29 at 5-6.
89. Id. at Vol. 2, Ex. 2 at 7.
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to see the loss of equity... that was built up over lifetimes and,
in some cases, over generations."90 Congressman John R.
Thune spoke of the need to "restore profitability" to cattle produ-
cers in his home state of South Dakota. 9 1
Based in Iowa, James Schaben, President of the Livestock
Marketing Association, buys calves from as far as West Virginia,
Kentucky and other parts of the South for resale to local feeders.
He says the last few years have seen "the biggest flight" out of
the cow-calf sector he has seen in 20 years in the industry:
I've been in discussion with . . . folks who tell me they're {going}
through the equity in their operations pretty quickly. A lot of folks
have to take jobs off the farm, lay off hired help, eliminate health in-
surance or stop upgrading equipment. In some situations they've been
unable to maintain their land. You see all of that in this part of the
country, throughout the whole part of the greater Midwest....
These people have watched equity erode and erode. mhey've mort-
gaged and remortgaged and mortgaged again. And you're finding the
faction that are just throwing up their hands and saying, ". .. I'm 52
years old. I'm not going to waste everything I have .... I'm going to get
out now while I've got some equity left." It's been absolutely
horrible.9
2
For those who wait too long, the equity to support those retire-
ment years disappears. Rancher Tom Palmer in Malad, Idaho
shares a common story:
[My wife and I arelgetting up to about 60 years of age. We'd like to
retire, but there is no way .... My son would like to live here. But he
can't afford to live here and make nothing. We are working every day.
It's kind of hard to justify what you are doing.93
In California, Andy Peek handles sales of 400,000 cattle a
year between his livestock auction and video sales business. He
provides an overview of producers in the western part of the
country:
Some folks are trading equity for debt .... [We've watched a lot of
them get so deep in debt that they use up the value of their land just
trying to keep the cow herd together until times get better. They even-
tually end up losing not only the cow herd but the ranch as well.9 4
Kathleen Kelley has been involved in the crisis in the cattle
industry, and in agriculture generally, in her role as Vice Chair-
man of the National Commission on Small Farms. She explains:
Cattle operations are usually family-owned businesses that incorpo-
rate the family's home. Ranchers will go to any length to stay on the
90. Live Cattle from Canada, Hearing transcript at 33.
91. Id. at 54.
92. Petitioners' Pre-hearing Br. App. Vol. 2, Ex. 78 at 5.
93. Id. at Vol. 2, Ex. 43 at 2.
94. Id. at App. Vol. 2, Ex. 16 at 2.
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ranch and in their home. A protracted period of depressed prices such
as we have been experiencing since at least 1995, has pushed a large
number of ranchers to the breaking point. Families have tapped out
their lending ability at banks. Many have run up substantial credit
card debt to keep the ranch operating.
9 5
The crisis is not isolated to one or a few regions of the coun-
try. A South Dakota banker reports:
From discussions with my colleagues in the [American Bankers Associ-
ation], I know that ranchers across the country are using up their eq-
uity, increasing their debt loads. It doesn't make any difference
whether you are in the Southeast or the Midwest, the story is the
same. Never in the history of this country has there been as much
demand for Farm Service Agency guarantees.. 96
6. Individual stress
These and other repercussions exert enormous strains on
families, marriages, and the emotions and psyches of individu-
als. South Dakota rancher Nolan Seim offers this devastating
look into his community:
Our local vocabulary now includes words that we have very seldom
dealt with: domestic abuse, suicide, murder, marriage breakups and
nervous breakdowns. The people that I speak on behalf of, for the most
part, live at or below the poverty line.97
Texas Farmers Union president Wes Sims sees these same
tragic consequences:
Ranchers tend to blame themselves when the ranch fails. Many of the
ranchers I know have become very depressed. The younger ones are
under enormous economic stress. I see what I believe [are] lots of bro-
ken homes because of the stress. And ... in the last 12 months I've
had two individuals that I've known either all or most of my lifetime,
that committed suicide. Neither individual would have been the type
of individual you would ever have believed would have done something
like that. They were always optimistic or they had good solid charac-
ters, solid families. There [were] no other outside problems [except]
the stress from the inability to make a living.98
From South Dakota, a pastor wrote the International Trade
Commission about the concerns of his congregation:
One young rancher's wife called. . . asking for prayers concerning fi-
nancing for her parent's ranch. She began to sob as she explained how
serious the situation was. Also, I spent the best part of the day with
another rancher .... He shared how that recently he and his wife,
95. Id. at App. Vol. 2, Ex. 1 at 3.
96. Id. at App. Vol. 2, Ex. 4 at 2.
97. Id. at App. Vol. 2, Ex. 30 at 2.
98. Id. at App. Vol. 1, Ex. 16 at 4.
2000] TRADE AND CATTLE
working together in the field, broke down and wept because of the pres-
sures on them.
9 9
Senator Larry Craig of Idaho testified bluntly before the In-
ternational Trade Commission: "I must tell you that in my 54
years, I have never sensed the despair that [ranching] families
hold today. They see no future."100 Congressman Earl Pomeroy
of North Dakota added, "[tihe physical and emotional exhaus-
tion is plain to see on the face of too many of my constituents
.... "101 In Oregon, Congressman Greg Walden reports, "[a]
combination of longer hours working the ranch, second jobs in
distant locations and the financial insecurity that has resulted
from tough times has added significant stress to the people in
my district."10 2
In what has traditionally been a family business, one of the
sources of stress is for parents who feel they have not provided
for their children. Don Stiles, who ranches with his father and
a brother in Texas, relates:
I got out of the service in 1971 and came back home.... I remember
talking to my father. He said, "Remember one thing, son. People will
always eat." I had a conversation with him within the last two years
and he apologized for getting me back in the business. He said, "I
guess I made a mistake."..... I'm not ready to quit yet, but I'm
close.103
Richard Nielson, Vice President of the Utah Cattleman's Associ-
ation, worries about how his son will fare:
My son is planning on taking over the ranch when I retire, if he doesn't
starve to death first. He's working two other jobs because... [he] can't
live on what we can pay him.... It's a scary thing for a young man. I
hope I don't get arrested for child abuse for giving him the ranch. 10 4
7. Adverse effects on communities
The economic hardship endured by the cattle producers
have devastating impacts on the communities in which they live.
Dennis Olsen, a community organizer working in eastern Mon-
tana, explains:
One thing that's happening in connection with the ranching industry
problems is its effects on Main Street. Small towns are feeling it di-
99. Letter from Pastor Robert J. Cianci, Coal Springs Church of God,
Meadow, South Dakota, to the Honorable Lynn M. Bragg, Chairman US Inter-
national Trade Commission (Oct. 15, 1999).
100. Live Cattle from Canada, Hearing transcript at 35.
101. Id. at 44.
102. Id. at 66-67.
103. Petitioners' Pre-hearing Br. App. Vol. 2, Ex. 11 at 2.
104. Id. at App. Vol. 1, Ex. 52 at 8.
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rectly. Ranchers are not buying what they used to buy and small busi-
nesses are clearly feeling that pain. 105
According to Senate Democratic Leader Tom Daschle from
South Dakota, the effect of depressed prices for cattle and other
agricultural products has been "shops closed, entire neighbor-
hoods.. . boarded up, and schools cannot stay open."' 06 Fellow
South Dakota Senator Tim Johnson added, "[miembership in ru-
ral church and civic organizations fall. It unravels the whole
fabric of rural America."10 7 Senator Conrad Burns of Montana
sees the same crisis and asks, "[w]hat happens to our tax bases
in counties that rely on agriculture? Our public services, our
roads, our schools?"' 08 Senator Max Baucus of Montana, Sena-
tor Kent Conrad of North Dakota and Senator Craig Thomas of
Wyoming also testified before the ITC regarding the adverse ef-
fects of lower cattle prices throughout rural communities. 0 9
Businesses serving the cattle industry throughout the coun-
try are affected. Don Smith reports that his feed store in
Laneville, Texas is only open two days a week. 11° Ward Wil-
liams, with the Ogala Sioux Livestock and Landowners Associa-
tion, describes a western wear store in Jackson County, South
Dakota, that cannot meet the minimum $10,000 order require-
ment for Levis, because local patrons "just don't have the money
to buy clothes.""' Don Craig sees businesses closing around
Mena, Arkansas, a concentrated area of cattle production."12
Mary Dora Carlson, the Beef Chairman for Women Involved in
Farm Economics in Colorado, says:
It is so hard on the small towns and the locality because equipment
sales, the machinery sales, where you buy your tractors or combines or
105. Id. at App. Vol. 2, Ex. 36 at 2.
106. Live Cattle from Canada, Hearing transcript at 14.
107. Id. at 41.
108. Id. at 23.
109. Id. at 19 (Testimony of Senator Baucus: "[It is critical to note that any
negative impact on the industry as a result of unfair trade practices has the
potential of dealing a devastating blow to the industry. And when I sa[y] indus-
try, I mean the agricultural producer, the local businesses... the rural commu-
nity at large. .. ."); 30-31 (Testimony of Senator Conrad: "[W]e can anticipate
losing 30 percent of the ranchers in my state in the next 18 months if there is a
failure to act. That is the hard reality of what we confront. That would have
devastating consequences for my state."); and 27 (Testimony of Senator
Thomas: "I urge you to fully consider the harm that has been experienced by
Wyoming and the nation's cattle producers. It is vital to our economy.")
110. Petitioners' Pre-hearing Br., App. Vol. 2, Ex. 27 at 4.
111. Id. at App. Vol. 2, Ex. 37 at 2.
112. Id. at App. Vol. 1, Ex. 15 at 3.
[Vol. 9:449
20001 TRADE AND CATLE
hay balers or whatever, they just aren't selling like they should be.
And so they are suffering, the small towns.
1 13
J. Berry Harrison, who represents District 10 in the Oklahoma
Senate describes "[t]he denuding of the rural communities" in
his district:
Where we are losing businesses, we are almost losing entire communi-
ties, entire towns.... I have access to the sales tax receipts county by
county. This year sales taxes have been down in at least half the cities.
It varies according to the different communities. ... There is no doubt
that the counties in my senate district with the highest concentration
of cattle production have the worst performance compared with other
counties in my area.... You even see it in the rural hospitals. We
have communities where the hospitals are barely holding on because
people going through these hospitals don't have insurance to pay their
bills. 11
4
Leland Swenson, President of the National Farmers Union, of-
fers a broad perspective:
One of the biggest impacts can be readily seen as one looks at the rural
landscape.... The barbed wire fences that used to keep the cattle in
are sagging and there are fewer people. A windmill is turning but no
longer pumping water. One quarter of a mile down the road is where
the last dairy in the country used to be. Nearby are empty Harvestore
silos. ... Working at the feedyard are people who used to raise their
own cattle, but have gone out of business. . . . Scanning the horizon
further, one can see empty corrals and empty farmsteads. The particu-
lar scene is in central Kansas, but it could be in any state that has
depended on livestock production. 1 15
8. Ranching families at and below the poverty line
It is a remarkable irony that the tiny proportion of the U.S.
population that feeds the rest of the country is struggling to feed
itself. The plight of many of America's producers is perhaps best
described by Diana Oldfather, president of the Farmer's Market
Cooperative Development Committee in Missouri. The Commit-
tee in 1999 looked at the conditions of farmers and ranchers in a
nine county area: Phelps, Gasconade, Osage, Pulaski, Crawford,
Dent, Texas, Miller and Maries. The survey covered 10,000
farmers and ranchers that run cattle in the area. The review
showed that 44 percent of the families live off farm income
alone. All of these families were below the poverty line. Accord-
ing to Oldfather:
113. Id. at App. Vol. 2, Ex. 48 at 3.
114. Id. at App. Vol. 2, Ex. 62 at 3.
115. Live Cattle From Canada, USITC Pub. 3255, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-386 and
731-TA-812 (Oct.1999) (Leland Swenson, President, National Farmers Union,
testifying in support of the Petition to Impose Antidumping Duties on Imports
of Live Cattle from Canada).
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The 10,000 farmers in all these counties produce $240 million worth of
agricultural sales, yet they are all starving because of the prices they
receive ... Working on this project is difficult. It's devastating to even
talk to and interview these people. They are literally standing at the
food bank and welfare lines, they are collecting checks and subsidies
from the government. And they are humiliated; they are devastated;
they are losing their homes; you see it everywhere. Hunger relief agen-
cies are popping up more and more. And the people just come in
droves. 1
16
In South Dakota, Nolan Seim observes the same crisis:
Our local food pantry has seen a tremendous increase in
need over the last several years. It would seem a bit ironic that
those who produce this nation's food cannot afford to feed their
own families .... We are the forgotten 2% of this nation's popu-
lation upon whose labor and production 25% of our nation's jobs
depend. 117
Sheila Bickle in Montana speaks to the commitment and drive of
this same fraction of the U.S. population:
I don't think anyone owes agriculture a living at all. And I don't think
the true producers want to be handed a living. In this country, you
have less than 2% of the population able to feed not only our popula-
tion but a large part of the world. Yet within the last two to three
years, I'm seeing that we are becoming serfs of the land.1 18
In sum, a vitally important sector of the American economy
and a critical source of protein and nutrition for consumers both
here and around the world has producers who do not earn
enough from the product they sell to put food on their own din-
ner table. We turn next to the efforts to address the industry's
many problems.
III. USING TRADE RULES AND MECHANISMS
TO IMPROVE THE CATTLE
INDUSTRY'S CONDITION
Various groups in the cattle industry have pursued a vari-
ety of efforts to improve the industry's condition. The National
Cattlemen's Beef Association (NCBA) and the American Farm
Bureau Federation, for example, have identified as a high prior-
ity the use of trade negotiations and dispute settlement to open
foreign markets and remove barriers to U.S. cattle and beef
products. Producer associations, both within the cattle industry
and in other agricultural sectors, are advocating legislation re-
quiring country-of-origin labeling of imported beef at the retail
116. Petitioners' Pre-hearing Br., App. Vol. 2, Ex. 19 at 2.
117. Id. at App. Vol. 2, Ex. 30 at 3.
118. Id. at App. Vol. 2, Ex. 59 at 1.
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level. Also, USDA's Agricultural Marketing Service is request-
ing comment on a change in current regulations governing the
official grading of imported beef carcasses, including an option to
require country of origin labeling on the beef cuts after
fabrication in the United States. 119 Federal and state legisla-
tion has been enacted to require mandatory price reporting for
purchases of cattle by packers. One group of feedlot operators
and their cattle producers have sued certain packers, alleging
antitrust violations arising from packer concentration. Finally,
a large coalition of cattle and farmer associations and individual
ranchers and producers supported the filing of antidumping and
countervailing duty petitions on imported live cattle that were
believed to be sold at unfairly low prices.
One common element to these efforts is their focus on rules
and mechanisms governing trade and competition, whether in
international or domestic markets. Trade negotiations and dis-
pute resolution have proved effective in reducing barriers to U.S.
exports of beef and cattle-related products, as evidenced by the
overall increase in U.S. exports during recent years. Neverthe-
less, together with antitrust litigation, these tools do not work
quickly and therefore are unlikely to yield immediate relief to
the cattle industry.
Country of origin labeling is a regulatory, legislative and
political issue which will either be adopted in some form or not.
A recent report by the U.S. Department of Agriculture on coun-
try of origin labeling, which is discussed further below, presents
some of the competing policy questions that Congress will have
to address. 120
Of all of these alternatives, the antidumping and counter-
vailing duty laws are among the procedures currently in force
which provide the possibility of obtaining relief in the short-term
from economic harm caused by unfairly priced imports. That
119. See USDA, Agricultural Marketing Service [Docket Number LS-99-211
Request for Public Comments on the Official Grading of Imported Beef, Lamb,
Veal and Calf Carcasses Under the Authority of the Agricultural Marketing Act
of 1946, 65 Fed. Reg. 4780 (Feb. 1, 2000). USDA's advance notice of proposed
rulemaking requested comment on three options: (1) discontinue the official
grading of imported carcasses; (2) revise the grading regulations to require that
the country of origin mark is retained on the component cuts after fabrication of
an imported carcass that is federally graded; or (3) rise the grading regulations
to eliminate the requirement that a country of origin mark be applied to im-
ported carcasses. Id. Note that the proposal to extend the country of origin
labeling requirement would apply only to component cuts of imported carcasses,
and not to imported fabricated beef (e.g., hamburger).
120. See discussion infra at section III.D.
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the cattle industry was ultimately unsuccessful in obtaining the
kind of relief from unfair imports which other industries such as
steel routinely receive raises the question of how well-suited
these laws are to addressing the cattle industry's problems.
A. PREVIOUS EFFORTS TO ASSIST THE DOMESTIC CATTLE
INDUSTRY: THE MEAT IMPORT ACTS OF 1964 AND 1979
AND NEGOTIATION OF VOLUNTARY EXPORT
RESTRAINTS
Before examining the various tools that have recently been
used in attempts to help the cattle industry, it is worth examin-
ing the tools that have been used in the last 40 years when the
cattle industry was in distress. In 1964, Congress passed the
Meat Import Act setting in place quotas on imports of beef and
beef products, lamb and mutton. The quotas were based on the
average annual importation of meat for the 5-year period ending
on December 31, 1963.121 The impetus for the quotas was the
depressed state of the cattle industry:
For some time the Committee on Finance has been concerned with the
serious plight of the domestic cattle industry. This industry has been
caught in the crossfire of rising production costs and decreased product
prices....
[A] number of factors contribute to the present depressed condition of
the domestic cattle industry. They include-
(a) increases in the number of head of cattle
(b) increases in the size of beef animals
(c) increases in the availability of alternative meat products;
(d) increases in the number of domestic animals slaughtered;
(e) capital gains treatment on proceeds from sale of breeding stock;
and
(f) imports of foreign beef.1 2 2
The Finance Committee observed that from 1956 to 1963, an-
nual imports of foreign beef had grown from 200 million pounds
(carcass weight) to 1.7 billion pounds, while annual domestic
consumption during the same period had increased some 3 bil-
lion pounds. "Thus, foreign beef accounted for one-half of the
total increased domestic use of beef over the 8-year period 1956-
63."123 The Committee went on to find that although most do-
121. S. REP. No. 88-1167, (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3070.
122. Id. at 3071.
123. Id. at 3071. Based on the data in the Finance Committee report, it
appears that the market share for imported beef increased from about 1.3 per-
cent in 1956 (total consumption of 15.7 billion pounds, of which imported beef
equaled 200 million pounds) to more than 9 percent in 1963 (18.6 billion pounds
consumed, of which imports equaled 1.7 billion pounds). Id. During the same
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]TRADE AND CATTLE
mestic beef was used for table cuts and most imported beef was
used for manufactured beef (e.g., hamburger), nevertheless "im-
ported beef competes directly in the marketplace with domestic
cow and bull beef, and indirectly with grain fed, table grade
beef."124 Another table in the report showed that "at the very
time imports of beef were sharply rising, domestic beef prices
were drastically falling."125
This price data strongly suggests that imported meat has played an
important part in creating the distressed market conditions in the cat-
tle industry. The pressure on domestic prices of low-priced, foreign-
imported beef discourages sale of domestic livestock and encourages
their return to the range where they produce new calves and add more
weight, thus intensifying the problems confronting the American cat-
tlemen.... On the basis of the information presented to the committee,
... your committee has concluded that beef imports have contributed
heavily to the depressed conditions in the livestock industry and that
remedial legislation is warranted. 1
26
The remedy was imposition of quotas which were set at an
adjusted base quantity. The base quantity (725.4 million
pounds) would be increased or decreased annually according to a
formula based on increases/decreases in the estimated domestic
commercial production for that year and the preceding two years
in comparison with the average annual domestic production dur-
ing 1959-1963. The quotas were "triggered" when imports were
expected to exceed 110 percent of the adjusted based quantity.
The Secretary of Agriculture was required to publish the esti-
mated quantity that would trigger the imposition of a quota, as
well as the quantity of meat that, but for the law, would enter
the United States.' 2 7
period, the United States imported an average of 895,000 head of cattle each
year, although the trend in imports was increasing in the later years as well.
Between 1953 and 1956, for example, cattle imports never exceeded 315,000
head. But between 1957 and 1963, imports were never fewer than 663,000
head, and topped a million in 1958, 1961 and 1962. The Committee report does
not specify what proportion of the imports consisted of stockers, feeders or fed
cattle. Id at 3072. Interestingly, the Committee did not comment on the in-
crease in imports of live cattle.
124. Id. at 3073.
125. Id. at 3073 (citing Tariff Commission Report on Beef, June 1964).
126. Id. at 3074.
127. S REp. No. 96-465, at 2 (1979), reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2657.
The law also permitted the President to suspend the quotas or increase it above
the adjusted base quantity in the event of overriding economic or national se-
curity interests, supplies of domestic beef and veal will not meet demand at
reasonable prices, or trade agreements have been entered into which assure the
policy of the act will be carried out. Interestingly, the Finance Committee re-
port comments on the apparent failure of voluntary restraints by other trading
20001
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In 1979, Congress amended the Meat Import Act to modify
the method for establishing quotas to "stabilize U.S. beef and
veal production and prices at levels adequate to provide a fair
return to domestic producers of beef and veal" and "to provide
reasonable access to the U.S. market for imported beef and
veal." 128 In the report that accompanied the legislation, the
Senate Finance Committee reviewed the operation of the 1964
Act:
In the first 14 full years that the Meat Import Act has been in effect,
actual meat imports have exceeded the adjusted based quantity level
eleven times and have exceeded the trigger level six times (but only
barely in three of these six instances). In seven instances the Presi-
dent proclaimed the required quotas, but in six of those instances sus-
pended them in view of overriding economic interests or short supply,
and in the seventh instances (1976) he increased the quota level, again
in view of overriding economic interests, to a level equal to the trigger
level. 12
9
The Committee's report also recounted that the Executive
Branch had negotiated a series of agreements with major-meat
exporting countries limiting meat imports.' 30 The agreements
established import restraints that were intended to maintain
U.S. imports at levels just below the Meat Import Act's trigger
level.' 3 ' "Foreign governments have apparently preferred
agreed restraints at this level to forestall unilateral quotas at
the lower level of the adjusted base quantity. Each country was
also thereby assured a defined equitable share of the total re-
straint level." 132
In the meantime, the cattle industry was once again facing
difficulties. A period of expanding domestic per capita consump-
tion of beef from the late 1960s to 1973, despite rising prices and
competition from other meats, had made the industry both pros-
perous and optimistic. Producers expanded their herds. But,
beginning in 1973, domestic per capita beef consumption de-
partners to sufficiently reduce the volume of imports, and the subsequent per-
ceived need for imposition of quotas. 1964 USCAAN at 3071.
128. 1979 USCAAN 2654-55.
129. Id. at 2657-2658.
130. Id. at 2658. These agreements had been negotiated under the author-
ity of Section 204 of the Agricultural Act of 1956, which authorized the Presi-
dent to negotiate agreements with foreign governments limiting exports to and
imports into the United States of agricultural commodities and products.
131. Id. at 2658.
132. Id. at 2658. In 1978 and 1979, the total level of the restraint program
was well above the trigger level, although still below projected imports in the
absence of the agreements, because the President had determined there would
otherwise be a shortage of meat at reasonable prices. Id.
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clined. Cattle prices declined as well because of oversupply. "In
1976, prices were only 5 percent higher than those received at
the outset of the period of herd expansion in 1967. The cost of
production of beef, however, had nearly doubled between 1967
and 1976."133
As a result of low prices, climbing costs of production, and an oversup-
ply of cattle, producers began to liquidate herds. In 1976, production of
beef and veal reached an all time high of 27 billion pounds. These high
levels of production continued in 1977 and early part of 1978.'34
The Finance Committee went on to observe that the large
variations in beef and veal production and prices was severe
both for producers and consumers. It had been generally
agreed, for example, that "the domestic beef industry as a whole
had been seriously hurt in 1974-1978."135 "Faced with low
prices and sharply rising costs, many producers, large and
small, were forced out of the industry or went deeply into debt to
ride out the cycle .... [W]ith prices remaining low, a massive
herd liquidation has occurred, and with a record slaughter of
cows, a period of sharply rising prices was in store for the
consumer."136
The Committee also observed that imports played an "im-
portant role" in the cattle cycle:
According to studies undertaken by the U.S. International Trade Com-
mission, imports have supplied about 7 percent of U.S. consumption of
beef in most years since the Meat Import Act because effective.... In
1978, however, domestic production declined and prices roe and im-
ports supplied 8.4 percent of consumption.... [From January to March
1979].. prices continued to rise rapidly and imports supplied 11 per-
cent of consumption (an increase of 33 percent from year-earlier levels)
as domestic production declined 10 percent. The Department of Agri-
culture has projected that imports of beef during 1979 will be
equivalent to 10 to 12 percent of U.S. consumption.
13 7
133. Id. at 2661.
134. Id. at 2661.
135. Id. Interestingly, in 1977, cattle and beef producers filed a petition
under Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974, seeking temporary relief from im-
ports of cattle and beef. Relief was denied because the International Trade
Commission determined there was insufficient evidence that increased imports
of cattle and beff were a "substantial cause" or serious injury to the industry.
USITC, Live Cattle and Certain Edible Meat Products of Cattle, Inv. No. 201-25,
Report to the President Under Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974, USITC
Pub. 834 (Sept. 1977).
136. 1979 USCAAN 2661.
137. Id. As with the 1964 Act, Congress' focus was on imports of beef, not
cattle. The International Trade Commission had issued a section 332 report in
1977, at the request of the Finance Committee, that examined the conditions of
competition in the U.S. cattle and beef markets. With regard to cattle imports,
the ITC reported that between 1967 and 1976, cattle imports had fluctuated
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Under the 1964 Act, the quotas moved in the same direction
as domestic production of beef. "[T]he adjusted base quantity
increases in any year when domestic beef and veal production is
estimated to increase and decreases when such production is es-
timated to decline." 138 This was problematic since it meant that
increases and decreases in imports magnified the effects of the
swings in the industry, "which results in consumers periodically
paying very high prices and producers periodically suffering se-
vere losses, causing many of them to leave the industry."139
Congress' response was to introduce a countercyclical factor
based on per capita U.S. commercial domestic cow beef produc-
tion which would "remove the destabilizing effect of imports
under the present law on the U.S. market."140
Under the bill, any limitation proclaimed by the President would per-
mit more imports in times of low U.S. production and rising prices,
thus increasing U.S. supply and having a price retarding effect benefi-
cial to consumers; less imports would enter in times of high U.S. pro-
duction and falling prices, thus decreasing U.S. supply and having the
effect of maintaining U.S. prices to avoid severe losses to domestic pro-
ducers.... Added stability in the beef and veal industry should pro-
vide an economic climate which encourages investment in cost-
reducing technology, improvements in productivity, better breeding
stock, pasture improvements, better machinery and equipment and
better veterinary programs. Because of increased efficiencies which
can be attained by the domestic industry ins a more stable price and
production environment, improvement in the quality, certainty of sup-
ply, and price of beef will benefit the consumer.
14 1
Thus, during the period from 1964 through 1994, Congress
and the Executive Branch used quotas in conjunction with a se-
ries of bilateral agreements with major meat-exporting coun-
tries to assist the domestic cattle and beef industry. The quotas
were intended not to exclude beef imports, but rather to control
the flow of imports so that they would not magnify the more
considerably. "Imports in 1967 amounted to about 740,000 head of cattle; from
1968 to 1973, about 1 million head a year entered the U.S. market. Imports
dropped sharply in 1974 and 1975, a period of sharply declining cattle prices in
the United States. By 1975, approximately one-third as many head of cattle
were imported as in 1972. In 1976, imports rose to almost 973,000 head, a level
comparable with that of the late 1960's and early 1970's." USITC, Conditions of
Competition in U.S. Markets Between Domestic and Foreign Live Cattle and
Cattle Meat Fit for Human Consumption, Inv. No. 332-85, USITC Pub. 842 (No-
vember 1977) at 79. The majority of the imports (almost 80 percent) consisted
of stocker and feeder cattle between 200 and 699 pounds from Mexico. Id.
138. 1979 USCAAN 2655.
139. Id. at 2661.
140. Id. at 2661-62.
141. Id. at 2662.
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harsh effects of the cattle cycle both with respect to producers
and consumers.
B. USE OF TRADE AGREEMENTS TO LIBERALIZE MARKETS FOR
BEEF
The United States also has used trade agreements to open
foreign markets to U.S. beef exports, as well as open the U.S.
market to imports.
1. U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement and the North
American Free Trade Agreement
The United States phased out its import restrictions on cat-
tle and beef with respect to Canada through the United States -
Canada Free Trade Agreement (CFTA), which entered into force
in 1989. The CFTA prohibited the United States from introduc-
ing, maintaining, or seeking quantitative restrictions on meat
imports from Canada, hence making the Meat Import Act no
longer applicable to Canada. 142 The CFTA also provided for the
reciprocal phase out of duties over a 10-year period on imports of
live cattle and fresh, chilled or frozen beef and veal. 143 How-
ever, beef and veal were subject to accelerated duty elimination:
fresh or chilled beef and veal carcasses received a duty of "Free"
effective April 1, 1990; duties on frozen carcasses and other
fresh/chilled and frozen cuts were variously reduced to zero ef-
fective July 1, 1991 and July 1, 1993.'4 With the entry into
force of NAFTA on January 1, 1994, these free rates of duty ap-
plied to Mexico as well as to Canada.145
2. The Uruguay Round Agreements
The Uruguay Round Agreements saw a number of agree-
ments and changes in U.S. law with respect to cattle and beef.
Countries agreed to reduce tariffs, for example, although mem-
bers are granted an implementation period to meet specific re-
quirements for Agriculture. 146 The implementation period is six
years for developed country Members and ten years for develop-
142. See USITC, Cattle and Beef- Impact of the NAFTA and Uruguay Round
Agreements on U.S. Trade, USITC Pub. 3048 (July 1997) at 4-3.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See Id.
146. See WTO, Article 18:6 of the Agreement on Agriculture.
2000]
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ing country Members. 147 No reduction commitments are re-
quired for least-developed developing country Members. 148
Perhaps the most significant change coming to U.S. law
coming out of the URA was the repeal of the Meat Import Act,
which was replaced with a system of tariff-rate quotas on im-
ports from non-NAFTA countries. The in-quota amounts agreed
to under the URA were 15 percent higher than what the Meat
Import Act had allowed. 149
The Uruguay Round negotiations also included a U.SJKo-
rea Record of Understanding providing for access to the Korean
beef market; Japanese duty reductions applicable to beef; and
reductions in subsidies and other government incentives for cat-
tle and beef exports.' 50 The United States also entered into a
side agreements with Argentina and Uruguay for each to ship
up to 20,000 metric tons annually of fresh, chilled or frozen beef
to the United States.15 '
3. Assessing the success of trade negotiations in opening
foreign markets to U.S. cattle producers
One indicator of the relative success of trade negotiations
and agreements for cattle and beef is to examine the levels of
exports. USDA statistics indicate, for example, that U.S. ex-
ports of beef have increased from about $1.99 billion and 425
thousand metric tons in 1993 to $2.326 billion and 714 thousand
metric tons in 1999.152
Recent trends in global trade in beef and cattle nevertheless
indicate that trade flows remain relatively constricted, save for a
limited number of markets such as the United States. The
Third Annual Report on The International Markets for Meat,
published in 1997, gives some idea of both how limited interna-
tional trade in beef actually is and how very open the U.S. mar-
ket is to imports, relative to other markets. The United States
was the leading importer of beef in the world in 1997 with a
forecast of 1.034 million metric tonnes (MT), while other more
populous trading partners such as the EC imported only a fore-
147. See WTO, Article 18:6 of the Agreement on Agriculture.
148. See WTO, Article 18:6 of the Agreement on Agriculture.
149. USITC Pub. 3048 at 6-1.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. USDA/FAS, Status of Meat and Product Exports in 1999, <http'J/
www.fas.usda.gov/dlp/circular/1999/99-10LP/UStrade/tabl&2.pdf>. See also
Table 3, supra.
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casted 380,000 MT. 153 Conversely, the EC enjoyed a substantial
trade surplus in beef in 1997, with a forecast of 910,000 MT in
exports.154 Only a relative handful of countries had any signifi-
cant imports of beef and veal. 155 More recent data from USDA's
Foreign Agricultural Service indicates that these trends are con-
tinuing. In 1999, the United States imported 1.3 million metric
tons of beef and veal (carcass weight equivalent), while other
more populous countries and regions imported far less, includ-
ing the European Union (323,000 MTs); Brazil (54,000 MTs);
and China (6,000 MTs).156 While the United States exported
1.056 million metric tons that same year, the EU exported
810,000 MTs, Brazil exported 550,000 MTs, and China exported
36,000 MTs.157 Indeed, many countries continue to maintain
significant tariffs on cattle and beef, as seen in Table 7.
4. Current negotiations
More recent efforts to improve U.S. cattle and beef produ-
cers' access to foreign markets include the United States-Can-
ada Record of Understanding (ROU) regarding agricultural
trade, which was signed in December 1998. The purpose of the
agreement was to promote more open and fairer bilateral trade
in the full spectrum of agricultural products. 158  Of particular
relevance to the cattle industry was that portion of the agree-
ment expanding the so-called "Northwest Cattle Project" that fa-
cilitates imports of U.S. feeder cattle into Canada. 159 To qualify
153. See International Bovine Meat Agreement, The International Markets
for Meat, Aug. 1997, Third Annual Report (Geneva), Table 1, at 8.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 56.
156. See USDA/FAS, FAS Online, Livestock Tables, http://
www.fas.usda.gov/dlp/circular/ 2000/00-031p/livestock.html#Beef and Veal (vis-
ited April 11, 2000). Figures are preliminary.
157. Id. Figures are preliminary.
158. Record Of Understanding Between The Governments Of Canada And
The United States Of America Regarding Areas Of Agricultural Trade, Depart-
ment of Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, <http'//www.cfia-acia.agr.ca/eng-
lish/corpaffr/ internationallrecorde.shtml>.
159. The Northwest Cattle Project, the implementation of which was an-
nounced on October 1997, was a trade agreement between the United States
and Canada that would waive specific animal-health testing requirements to
facilitate the cross-border shipment of U.S. live cattle to Canada. The project
initially covered the states of Montana and Washington. See C. Lambert and G.
Weber, Live Cattle Trade Agreement with Canada, (JanJFeb. 1998) <httpJ/
www.beef.orgNCBA>. The first load of U.S. cattle were shipped in November
1997 to a Canadian feedlot. See Pilot Working, BEEF BusINEss BuLLETIN, No. 5
(National Cattlemen's Beef Association) Dec. 5, 1997, at 4. The initial results
did not meet expectations, as Canadian health restrictions continued to be per-
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Table 7.
Selected Bound and Applied Tariff Rates on Cattle and Beef
Bound tariff rate/ Applied tariff rate/
Bound tariff fresh, chilled, fresh, chilled, frozen
Country rate/live cattle* frozen beef** beef**
Brazil 0.0 % 55% 13-15%
China*** 18% 32.5 - 40% 45%
Colombia 70% 108% 20%
Guatemala 15% 63% 0% for in-quota; 30% for
over-quota
Hungary 40% 71.7% 15% for under EU-quotal
25% for under GATT-
quota/77.5% for other
Indonesia 40% 50% Not available
Japan V 38,250 - 63,750 / 50% 45%
head (depending on
weight)
Korea 40% 40% 42%
Mexico 37.5% 45% 20-25%
Singapore 10% Not reported. Not reported.
Thailand 30% 50% Not reported.
Venezuela 40% 25% Not reported.
*HTS 0102.90
** HTS 0201A10202.
*** China is not yet a member of the WTO and thus does not have "bound rates."
Source: Bound tariffs: USDA/FAS, FAS Online Country Information, WTO Tariff
Schedules available online at www.fas.usda.gov/scriptsw/wtopdfDwtopdf-frm.idc.;
Applied rates: USDA/FAS Annual Livestock Attache Reports for 1999, available
online at http'//www.fas.usda.gov/scriptsw/attacherep/default.htm.
to export feeders to Canada, states must be officially free of bo-
vine brucellosis and tuberculosis and be classified by Canada as
low risk for bluetongue. 160 As of December 1999, six states -
Alaska, Hawaii, Idaho, North Dakota, Montana and Washington
ceived as too strict, thus discouraging Canadian feedlots from participating.
NW Pilot Project, BEEF Bus. BuLL., No. 21, (National Cattlemen's Beef Associa-
tion) May 1, 1998, at 5. During the initial months, fewer than 1,000 head of
U.S. feeder cattle had been shipped, prompting the president of the National
Cattlemen's Beef Association to write to the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture, urg-
ing him to work with the Canadian government to make the project effective.
NW Pilot Project, BEEF Bus. BuLL. No. 23, (National Cattlemen's Beef Associa-
tion) May 15, 1998, at 5. Regulatory adjustments by Canadian authorities led
to increases in exports the following year of approximately 51,000 feeders. See
Exports to Canada Increase, BEEF Bus. BuLL., Vol. 22, Issue 25 (National Cat-
tlemen's Beef Association) May 14, 1999, at 5. It was also reported that the
United States and Canada had agreed in December 1998 to expand the pro-
gram to 26 states. Id.
160. Record Of Understanding Between The Governments Of Canada And
The United States Of America Regarding Areas Of Agricultural Trade, at an-
nex 2 Department of Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, <http'f/www.cfia-
acia.agr.ca/english/corpaffr/ internationallrecorde.shtml>.
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- had been approved for participation in the program. In the
1998-99 season, 51,009 head of U.S. feeder cattle were imported
under the project, compared to 1,000 head the previous year. In
the first eight weeks of the 1999-2000 season (which began on
October 1), U.S. feeder cattle exports to Canada totaled 92,972
head. The Northwest Cattle Project (renamed the Import Re-
quirements for Restricted Feeder Cattle Program) benefits U.S.
feeder cattle producers by providing access to a broader market.
Canadian feedlot operators, in turn, benefit from an additional
source of feeder cattle.
Other trade negotiation efforts in which the cattle industry
has a stake include the Free Trade Area of the Americas and
renewed talks on agriculture within the WTO. 16 1 These negoti-
ations are in their early stages and will hopefully contribute to
the finding of solutions. 162
C. USE OF DISPUTE REsoLUTION TO OPEN FOREIGN MARKETS
Use of dispute settlement mechanisms provided for in inter-
national trade agreements have been another means by which
the United States has attempted to open foreign markets and
eliminate barriers to exports of U.S. cattle and beef products.
Since the implementation of the Uruguay Round Agreements
and the establishment of the WTO's Dispute Settlement Mecha-
nism, there have been approximately one dozen disputes that
are directly or indirectly related to trade in cattle and beef. Ta-
ble 8 summarizes the various proceedings.
161. Work towards a Free Trade Area of the Americas began on December
11, 1994, when President Clinton and the 33 other democratically-elected lead-
ers in the Western Hemisphere met in Miami, Florida for the first Summit of
the Americas, agreeing to conclude negotiations no later than the year 2005.
On April 18-19, 1998, President Clinton and his 33 counterparts initiated the
Free Trade Area of the Americas negotiations at the Summit of the Americas
meeting in Santiago, Chile. Nine negotiating groups were established, includ-
ing groups on agriculture, and market access. See Request for Public Comment
Regarding Negotiations Toward a Free Trade Area of the Americas, 64 Fed. Reg.
72715 (Dec. 28, 1999). The objectives of these groups is to negotiate, inter alia,
the reduction and elimination of tariffs and non-tariff barriers within the West-
ern Hemisphere.
162. See Agricultural Trade Symposium, 9 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1 (Win-
ter 2000).
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Table 8.
WTO Consultations/Dispute Settlement Proceedings Involving
Cattle and Beef Products
Dispute Summary of Dispute Status
Korea-Measures The dispute involves testing and inspection Bilateral agreement
Concerning the Test- requirements with respect to imports of reached whereby
ing and Inspection of agricultural products into Korea. The Korea adopted com-
Agricultural Products measures are alleged to be in violation of mon international
(WT/DS3 and WT/ GATT Articles III or XI, Articles 2 and 5 of shelf-life standards
DS41) (US) (April the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosani- for beef and other
1995 and May 1996) tary Measures (SPS), TBT Articles 5 and 6 products.
and Agriculture Article 4. WTO considers case
to still be pending
consultaitons due to
the fact that the
bilateral agreement
did not cover steril-
ized milk products,
which were part of
the original com-
plaint.
Hungary-Export Dispute alleges that Hungary violated the Hungary's commit-
Subsidies in Respect Agreement on Agriculture (Article 3.3 and ment to eliminate the
of Agricultural Prod- Part V) by providing export subsidies in export subsidies
ucts (WT/DS35) respect of agricultural products not speci- expires 2001.
(Argentina, Australia, fled in its Schedule, as well as by providing General Council
Canada, New Zea- agricultural export subsidies in excess of granted the waiver.
land, Thailand and its commitment levels.
US) (March 1996) Panel was requested on 9 January 1997
and established on 25 February 1997.
On 30 July 1997, Australia, on behalf of all
the complainants, notified the DSB that
the parties to the dispute had reached a
mutually agreed solution, which required
Hungary to seek a waiver of certain of its
WTO obligations.
EC-Measures Affect- US requested a panel on 25 April 1996. A Ban on hormone
ing Meat and Meat panel was established on 20 May 1996. treated beef and beef
Products (Hormones) Panel found that EC ban on imports of by-products remains;
(US WT/DS26) (April meat and meat products from cattle treated US authorized to,
1996) with any of six specific hormones for and did, suspend con-
growth promotion purposes was inconsis- cession on various
tent with Articles 3.1, 5.1 and 5.5 of the products including
SPS Agreement. beef and beef by-
On 24 September 1997, the EC notified its products.
intention to appeal certain issues of law Case is discussed
and legal interpretations by the Panel. The infra.
Appellate Body, inter alia, upheld the
Panel's finding that the EC import prohibi-
tion was inconsistent with Articles 3.3 and
5.1 of the SPS Agreement, but reversed the
Panel's finding that the EC import prohibi-
tion was inconsistent with Articles 3.1 and
5.5 of the SPS Agreement. The Appellate
Body report and the Panel report, as modi-
fied by the Appellate Body, were adopted
on 13 February 1998.
On 16 April 1998, EC requested that the
"reasonable period of time" for implementa-
tion of the recommendations and rulings of
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the DSB be determined by binding arbitra-
tion, pursuant to Article 21.3(c) of the
DSU. The Arbitrator found the reasonable
period of time for implementation to be 15
months from the date of adoption (i.e. 15
months from 13 February 1998).
Paskistan-Export Dispute concerns a Notification enacted by Consultations pend-
Measures Affecting the Ministry of Commerce of Pakistan ing.
Hides and Skins prohibiting the export of, inter alia, hides
(WT/DS107/1) (EC) and skins and wet blue leather made from
(November 1997) cow hides and cow calf hides. EC contends
that this measure limits access of EC
industries to competitive sourcing of raw
and semi-finished materials.
Australia-Subsidies US requested panel on 11 June 1998 in Panel determined
Provided to Produ- respect of prohibited subsidies allegedly that Australia had
cers and Exporters of provided to Australian producers and failed to withdraw
Automotive Leather exporters of automotive leather, which the prohibited subsi-
(US-WT/DS126/1) allegedly involve preferential government dies and thus had not
(May 1998) loans of about A$25 million and non- taken measures to
commercial terms and grants of about comply with the
A$30 million. Panel was established on 22 Panel's recommenda-
June 1998. The Panel found that the loan tions. US may
from the Australian Government is not a request to suspend
subsidy contingent upon export perform- concessions.
ance within the meaning of Article 3.1(a) of
the SCM Agreement, but that the pay-
ments under the grant contract are subsi-
dies within the meaning of Article 1 of the
SCM Agreement, which are contingent
upon export performance within the mean-
ing of Article 3.1(a) of that Agreement.
Panel report was adopted on 16 June 1999.
Slovak Republic- Dispute concerns concerns measures ia- Consultations pend-
Measures Concerning posed by the Slovak Republic with respect ing.
Importation of Dairy to the importation of dairy products and
Products and the the transit of cattle. Switzerland contends
Transit of Cattle that these measures have a negative
(WT/DS133/1) (Swit- impact on Swiss exports of cheese and
zerland) (May 1998) cattle. Switzerland alleges that some of
these measures are inconsistent with Arti-
cles I, III, V, X and XI of GATT 1994,
Article 5 of the SPS Agreement, and Article
5 of the Import Licensing Agreement.
US-Certain Meas- This dispute concerns certain measures im- Consultations pend-
ures Affecting the posed by the US state of South Dakota and ing.
Import of Cattle, other states, prohibiting entry or transit to
Swine and Grain Canadian trucks carrying cattle, swine, and
from Canada (WT/ grain. Canada contends that these meas-
DS144/1) (Canada) ures adversely affect the importation into
(September 1998) the United States of cattle, swine, and
grain originating in Canada. Canada
alleges violations of the SPS Agreement;
the TBT Agreement; the Agreement on
Agriculture; and Articles I, Il, V, XI and
XXIV:12 of GATT 1994. Canada also makes
a claim of nullification or impairment of
benefits accruing to it under the cited
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Agreements. Canada invoked Article 4.8 of
the DSU for expedited consultations in
view of the perishable nature of the goods
in question.
Japan-Tariff Quotas Dispute concerns management of the tariff Consultations pend-
and Subsidies Affect- quotas for leather and the subsidies alleg- ing.
ing Leather (WT/ edly benefiting the leather industry and
DS147/1) (EC) (Octo- "Dowa" regions in Japan. EC contends the
ber 1998) system leads to a situation that deters
foreign companies from establishing in
Japan for purposes of importing leather
directly. The EC also contends that subsi-
dies which were granted are specific and
that the total value of these different
subsidy programmes is liable to cause seri-
ous prejudice to its interests. The EC
alleges violations of the Import licensing
Agreement and the Subsidies Agreement.
Argentina-Measures
on the Exports of
Bovine Hides and
Import of Finished
Leather (WT/DS155)
(EC) (December 1998)
This dispute concerns measures taken by
Argentina on the export of bovine hides
and the import of finished leather. The EC
alleges that the de facto export prohibition
on raw and semi-tanned bovine hides
(implemented in part through authoriza-
tion granted by the Argentinian authorities
to the Argentinian tanning industry to
participate in customs control procedures of
hides before export)is in violation of GAT'T
Articles; X: 1 (which outlaws de jure export
prohibitions and measures of equivalent
effect); and X:3(a) (which requires uniform
and impartial administration of laws and
regulations) to the extent that personnel of
the Argentinian Chamber for the tanning
industry are authorized to assist Argen-
tinian customs authorities. The EC also
claims that the "additional value added
tax" of 9 per cent on imports of products
into Argentina; and the "advance turnover
tax" of 3 per cent based on the price of
imported goods imposed on operators when
importing goods into Argentina; are in
violation of GATT Article 111:2 (which pro-
hibits tax discrimination of foreign prod-
ucts which are like, directly competitive or
substitutable to domestic products).
EC requested establishment of a panel on 3
June 1999. Panel was established on 26
July 1999.
Matter is pending
before the panel.
Korea-Measures This dispute concerns (1) an alleged Matter is pending
Affecting Imports of Korean regulatory scheme that discrimi- before the Panel.
Fresh, Chilled and nates against imported beef by inter alia,
Frozen Beef (WT/ confining sales of imported beef to special-
DS161/1) (US) (Feb- ised stores, limiting the manner of its
ruary 1999) display, and otherwise constraining the
opportunities for the sale of imported beef
and (2) allegations that Korea imposes a
markup on sales of imported beef, limits
import authority to certain so-called
"super-groups" and the Livestock Producers
Marketing Organization ("LPMO"), and
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provides domestic support to the cattle
industry in Korea in amounts which cause
Korea to exceed its aggregate measure of
support as reflected in Korea's schedule.
U.S. contends these restrictions apply only
to imported beef, thereby denying national
treatment to beef imports, and that the
support to the domestic industry amounts
to domestic subsidies that contravene the
Agreement on Agriculture.
U.S. requested a panel on 15 April 1999,
and a Panel was established on
26 May 1999.
US-Countervailing Concerns initiation of a countervailing duty Consultations pend-
Duty Investigation investigation by the US with respect to live ing.
with respect to Live cattle from Canada. Canada contends that
Cattle from Canada initiation was is inconsistent with US obli-
(WT/DS167/1) (Can- gations under the Subsidies Agreement,
ada) (March 1999) including that the written application filed
with the US Department of Commerce was
not made by or on behalf of the domestic
industry, and that there was not, sufficient
information provided with respect to the
measures or actions alleged to be subsidies,
for purpose of initiating an investigation
under the SCM Agreement; and that the
measures or actions alleged to be subsidies
either are not, in law or fact, subsidies
within the meaning of the Subsidies Agree-
ment, or do not confer more than a de
minimis level of countervailing subsidy.
Canada also believes that this initiation of
investigation is inconsistent with US obli-
gations under the Agreement on Agricul-
ture relating to "due restraint".
EC-Protection of Dispute concerns alleged lack of protection Consultations pond-
Trademarks and Geo- of trademarks and geographical indications ing.
graphical Indications for agricultural products and foodstuffs in
for Agricultural Prod- the European Communities. US contends
ucts and Foodstuffs that EC Regulation 2081/92, as amended,
(WT/DS174/1) (US) does not provide national treatment with
(June 1999) respect to geographical indications and
does not provide sufficient protection to
pre-existing trademarks that are similar or
identical to a geographical indication. US
considers this situation to be inconsistent
with the EC's obligations under the TRIPS
Agreement.
Source: WTO, "Overview of the State-of-Play of WTO Disputes," available online at
www.wto.org/wto/disputee-14febOO.doc.
Some disputes, such as the United States' dispute with Ko-
rea, have resulted in resolution of the problem and opening of
the market. In that case, the United States had complained
about Korean regulations regarding the testing and inspection
of agricultural products, including beef. Under the agreement
reached by the two countries, Korea agreed to adopt common in-
ternational shelf-life standards for beef and other products.
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Perhaps the best known of the disputes concerning beef has
also possibly been the most frustrating from the cattle and beef
industry's perspective: the dispute with the European Union
over its ban on imports of hormone-treated beef. The European
Union ("EU") adopted a directive on livestock production which,
effective January 1, 1989, banned the use of growth promoting
hormones in livestock production. The ban also applies to meats
and meat products imported into the EU on or after January 1,
1989. The ban had effectively eliminated most U.S. red meat
and meat product exports to the EU, costing the industry an es-
timated $97 million per year.163
Following the entry into force of the WTO Agreement on the
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures ("SPS
Agreement") on January 1, 1995, the United States instituted in
May 1996 formal dispute settlement proceedings under the
WTO's Dispute Settlement Understanding ("DSU").164 The
legal crux of the dispute was the scientific validity of the ration-
ale for the ban, namely, purported concerns that use of growth-
promoting hormones in cattle could harm humans who consume
the beef that is produced. The EU also had a political concern,
namely, the growing unpopularity of so-called genetically-modi-
fied food among European consumers and farmers. Of course,
the political concern would not be a sufficient legal basis to keep
the ban in place if the panel found it to be inconsistent with the
EU's obligations under the SPS Agreement.
In August 1997, the WTO panel issued its report, which
found that the hormone ban was indeed not based on scientific
evidence, a risk assessment, or relevant international stan-
dards. Consequently, the ban contravened the EU's obligations
under the WTO SPS Agreement. 165 Indeed, scientific evidence
presented during the panel process showed that beef growth
hormones do not present any quantifiable human health risk. 166
163. See USTR, 1996 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOR-
EIGN TRADE BARRIERS 98 (1996); see also Implementation of WTO Recom-
mendations Concerning EC-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones); Notice of the imposition of 100 percent ad valorem duties on cer-
tain articles", 64 Fed. Reg. 40638, 40639 (July 27, 1999).
164. See USTR, 1997 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOR-
EIGN TRADE BARRIERS 105 (1997). Canada initiated a second WTO case
against the EU restrictions in October 1996. Id.; see also 64 Fed. Reg. . supra
note 156, at 40639.
165. See EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones)-
Report of the Panel, August 18, 1997, WT/DS26/R/USA.
166. USTR, 1999 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN
TRADE BARRIERS 112 (1999).
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The EU appealed the panel decision to the WTO Appellate Body.
On January 16, 1998, the Appellate body affirmed the panel's
finding that the hormone ban was not consistent with the EU's
obligations under the SPS Agreement. 167 The DSB subse-
quently adopted the Panel and Appellate Body reports in Febru-
ary 1998.
Having established that the EU's ban was inconsistent with
the SPS Agreement, there remained the issue of implementa-
tion. The EU requested four years to implement the DSB recom-
mendations to bring itself into compliance with the SPS
Agreement. The United States objected that it could not agree
to such a long period for implementation. The matter was thus
referred to a WTO arbitrator, who determined that the reason-
able period for implementation was 15 months, which period
would expire on May 13, 1999.168
At the DSB meeting on 28 April 1999, the EU informed the
DSB that it would consider offering compensation in view of the
likelihood that it may not be able to comply with the recommen-
dations and rulings of the DSB by the deadline of May 13,
1999.169 The United States, in accordance with Article 22 of the
DSU, requested authorization from the DSB to retaliate against
the EU and its member states by suspending tariff concession on
imports totaling $202 million. 170 The EU, pursuant to Article
22.6 of the DSU, thereupon requested arbitration as to the level
of suspension of concessions requested by the United States, and
the DSB referred the issue to the original panel for arbitration.
The arbitrators issued their report on July 12, 1999. The report
concluded that the level of nullification suffered by the United
States to be equal to US$116.8 million. 171 Effective July 29,
1999, the United States imposed 100 percent ad valorem tariffs
on selected imported products from 14 of the EU member states.
167. See EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) -
Report of the Appellate Body, AB-1997-4, WT/DSU26/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998).
168. See 64 Fed. Reg. at 40639.
169. See, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones)-
Status Report of the European Communities- Addendum, May 11, 1999, WT/
DS26/17/Add.4.
170. See, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones)-
Recourse of the United States to Article 22.6 of the DSU, May 11, 1999, WT/
DS26/19. Canada also requested authorization to impose its own retaliation on
imports from the EU equaling CDN$75 million in value. Id.
171. See, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) -
Recourse to Arbitration under Article 22.6 of the DSU , Decision of the Arbitra-
tors, July 12, 1999, WT/DS26/ABR. The level of nullification suffered by Canada
was CDN$11.3 million.
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The level of trade affected by the action equaled $116.8 mil-
lion.172 The increased tariffs remain in place as the EU, in ef-
fect, elected to pay the penalty for not conforming its directive to
meet the requirements of the SPS Agreement.
From the perspective of an industry such as cattle, which is
in need of immediate or short-term relief, the Beef Hormone
case illustrates a number of shortcomings in the dispute settle-
ment system. First is the simple factor of time. In cases in
which a dispute is not resolved at the consultation stage, the
proceedings can last several years. In this case, the proceeding
was initiated in May 1996. The EU appealed the Panel's deci-
sion; proposed a period for implementation of four years (possi-
bly anticipating that the United States would reject it and
request arbitration), went through arbitration over how long the
period for implementation should be, and then went through ar-
bitration again over the issue of the amount of retaliation to be
authorized. The issue, of course, is not whether the EU (or any
WTO member) should be able to exercise its rights, but simply
recognizing that dispute settlement can be very lengthy and
thus unlikely to offer immediate relief to a long-suffering
industry.
The second lesson is that even when the complaining party
prevails on every ruling, there is no guarantee that the foreign
market will be opened. The EU appears more willing to have
100 percent tariffs imposed on certain of its exports to the
United States than it is to remove the ban. Thus, the ban on
imports of beef containing growth hormones remains in place
and the U.S. cattle industry is not much better off than when the
process began.
D. MANDATORY COUNTRY-OF-ORIGIN LABELING
Federal law requires most imports, including many food
items, to bear labels informing the "ultimate purchaser" of their
country of origin. 173 The Federal Meat Inspection Act also re-
quires imports of beef and other meats to be clearly labeled as to
their country of origin.174 However, country of origin labeling is
172. See 64 Fed. Reg. 40639.
173. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. §1304(a) ("[Elvery article of foreign origin... im-
ported into the United States shall be marked in a conspicuous place as legibly,
indelibly, and permanently as the nature of the article.., will permit in such
manner as to indicate to an ultimate purchaser in the United States... the
country of origin of the article.")
174. See 21 U.S.C. §620(a) (requiring imported meat to be "marked and la-
beled as required by. .. regulations for imported articles").
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not required for imported meat or meat products that are fur-
ther processed in the United States. As well, beef produced from
imported cattle that are slaughtered in the United States also
requires no designation as to the country of origin of the
cattle.175
On February 1, 2000, USDA's Agricultural Marketing Ser-
vice (AMS) published a notice requesting public comment on offi-
cial grading of imported beef.176 AMS stated that it is
considering several options, including revising the grading regu-
lations to require that the country of origin mark be retained on
the component cuts after fabrication of an imported carcass that
is Federally graded. 177 Thus, insofar as imported carcasses are
concerned, it appears that country of origin labeling up to the
retail level could be achieved through rulemaking rather than
legislation.
Nevertheless, legislation also has been introduced in Con-
gress to require country-of-origin labeling on certain meat prod-
ucts at the retail level.' 78 Supporters of country of origin
labeling have in large measure been groups and associations of
farmers and ranchers who produce cattle, the raw material
product. Proponents of country of origin labeling identify con-
sumers' right to know and improved marketing among the rea-
sons for supporting such measures. 179 As to the latter point,
175. See MANDATORY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN LABELING OF IMPORTED FRESH
MUSCLE CUTS OF BEEF AND LAMBi (USDA/FSIS, January, 2000) at 9 [hereinafter
COUNTRY OF ORIGIN LABELING].
176. Requests for Public Comments on the Official Grading of Imported
Beef, Lamb, Veal and Calf Carcasses Under the Authority of the Agricultural
Marketing Act of 1964, 65 Fed. Reg. 4780 (2000). [Under current regulations,
imported carcasses of beef and other meat products are eligible for grading (i.e.,
'prime", "choice", etc.) provided that they are in compliance with all applicable
standards and are marked with the country of origin. The National Cattle-
men's Beef Association had submitted a request in June 1999 that USDA dis-
continue the official grading of imported beef carcasses. Other groups,
including the American Meat Institute, the National Meat Association, and the
Canadian Embassy, had submitted letters endorsing the continuation of official
grading of imported carcasses]. Id.
177. See id.
178. See, e.g., H.R. 1144, 106th Cong. (1999). Several bills mandating coun-
try of origin labeling on various livestock products were introduced in the 105'
Congress as well. None of the bills were passed. Instead, the Conference Re-
port accompanying the Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Admin-
istration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1999 directed USDA to
conduct a study on the potential effects of mandatory country of origin labeling
of imported fresh muscle cuts of beef and lamb. See COUNTRY OF ORIGIN LABEL-
ING, supra note 168, at 5.
179. See, e.g., Country of Origin Labeling, 1999: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. On Livestock an Horticulture of the House Comm. on Agriculture, 106th
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they contend that labeling will increase revenues for American
grown or raised food and will thus put more money in producers'
pockets.
Opposing groups include many members of the beef process-
ing and distribution sector, including packers and retailers.
They counter that country-of-origin labeling bears no relation to
food safety and would not raise U.S. commodity prices. They ar-
gue that it would impose excessive and costly regulatory bur-
dens on retailers and others in the marketing system and on
consumers, be difficult to enforce, and-by imposing new non-
tariff trade barriers-undermine ongoing U.S. efforts to reduce
other countries' trade barriers and expand international mar-
kets for U.S. products.180
The Conference Report which accompanied the Agriculture,
Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Re-
Cong. (1999). "Oregon's cattlemen do not want foreign beef to be passed off as a
U.S. product and feel strongly that consumers need to know what they are eat-
ing and feeding their families." Id. At 10 (statement of Hon. Greg Walden, Rep-
resentative from the State of Oregon). "NCBA believes that through country-of-
origin labeling we can improve our ability to market U.S. beef and ensure that
we are getting the full value for resources we are spending to promote our prod-
uct." Id. At 48-49 (statement of George Swan, President, National Cattlemen's
Beef Association).
We feel that it is important to change the current practice of allowing
cattle to be imported into the United States and then when processed,
carry the USDA inspection label. This misleads consumers into think-
ing they are buying a U.S.-produced product.... We also believe that it
is important that beef produced in the United States should be able to
proudly display the American flag and be labeled as such. This gives
consumers the knowledge they need to make decisions as to where
their food is produced.
Id. At 50 (statement of Dean Kleckner, President, American Farm Bureau
Federation).
180. See, id.,
Using country-of-origin labeling as protectionist trade policy will
clearly invite retaliation from key trading partners.... [Wlith certain
exceptions, country of origin has never been a significant factor in meat
purchasing decisions of American consumers.... If country-of-origin
labeling requirements were imposed, AMI believes that the cost would
exceed any quantifiable benefit.
Id. At 87-88. (statement of Patrick Boyle, President and CEO, American Meat
Institute).
[There is just simply no evidence that existing requirements fail to
protect the food safety for products in the United States as they appro-
priately should ..... As to consumers' right-to-know, we believe the
overriding consumers' right-to-know is that the products they are of-
fered for sale and they are buying are safe products regardless of
where they come from.
Id. At 83-85 (statement of Timothy Hammonds, President and CEO, Food Mar-
keting Institute).
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lated Agencies Appropriations Act, 1999 directed the U.S. De-
partment of Agriculture to study and report on the potential
effects of mandatory country of origin labeling of imported fresh
muscle cuts of beef and lamb until those products reach the ulti-
mate consumer.181 FSIS issued its report in January 2000. The
report identifies a variety of costs that implementation of a la-
beling requirement would entail, including the cost of segregat-
ing and preserving imported product identity, the direct cost of
labels, enforcement costs, and market disruption costs. FSIS
also estimates that there would be efficiency losses and lost busi-
ness costs associated with segregating product by country of ori-
gin. "Some firms may choose to avoid imported cuts in order to
avoid incurring the costs of segregation and control systems for
imported meat cuts, and the penalties of non-compliance." 18 2
Presumably, those firms would instead purchase domestically-
produced beef, although USDA does not acknowledge this
possibility.
As to benefits, the report's Executive Summary states:
Although some circumstantial evidence suggests the possibility that
consumers in the United States distinguish domestic beef... from im-
ported beef... , there is no direct or empirical evidence to suggest that
a price premium engendered by country of origin labeling will be large
or persist over the long term. Indeed, if consumers do distinguish
goods depending on their country of origin, strong incentives exist for
industries to act without government intervention, i.e., on a voluntary
basis.
There is no evidence that the market for providing such information
has failed. There is, therefore, no economic efficiency argument for
mandatory country of origin labeling for products to the point of retail
sale. however, some have argued that there is a "benefit" to consum-
ers' right to know but, at this time, that benefit is not quantifiable.
1 8 3
FSIS acknowledges that in certain countries such as Japan and
France, studies show consumers are willing to pay a premium
for domestic beef versus imported beef.184 However, "differences
found in France and Japan are relevant to the United States
only to the extent that United States consumers' preferences are
like preferences of French and Japanese consumers." 85
FSIS observes that "[elven if consumers cannot taste any
difference between domestic and imported products," they might
nevertheless pay a premium for domestic product "just because
181. See COUNTRY OF ORIGIN LABELING, supra note 168, at 1.
182. Id. at 2.
183. Id. at 2-3.
184. Id. at 18.
185. Id. at 18.
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they are domestic products." 18 6 Of course, if the consumer has
no way of knowing whether the beef he or she is purchasing is
domestic or imported in the first place, the question arises how
they would be able to associate taste differences to the product's
origin as opposed to some other reason, such as the breed of the
animal or whether the animal was grass or grain-fed.
FSIS' finding that there are no measurable or quantifiable
benefits to country of origin labeling is also curious given the
very contrary findings by agencies such as the Federal Trade
Commission about the value of "Made in the USA." In this re-
gard, the FTC published in December 1997 a notice in the Fed-
eral Register recounting its "comprehensive review of 'Made in
USA' and other U.S. origin claims in product advertising and
labeling."187 The FTC had historically required that a product
must be wholly domestic or all or virtually all made in the
United States to substantiate an unqualified "Made in USA"
claim. In May 1997, the FTC issued Proposed Guides for the
Use of U.S. Origin Claims, under which a marketer could make
an unqualified U.S. origin claim if there was a reasonable basis
substantiating that the product was substantially all made in
the United States. The Proposed Guides also included two "safe
harbors" under which an unqualified U.S. origin claim would not
be considered deceptive.' 8 8 The FTC received 1,057 comments
representing 1,165 commenters, including 963 individual com-
menters, 24 members of Congress, and two consumer
organizations. l8 9
The consumer commenters overwhelmingly opposed the proposed
Guides and generally supported an "all or virtually all" standard or
advocated a specific percentage, usually 90% or, more often, 100%.
Many commenters stated that " 'Made in USA' means what it says' or
expressed similar sentiments. Several commenters asserted that
changing the current standard would confuse consumers wishing to
buy American products, leaving them unable to determine whether a
product was truly made in the United States. Individual consumers
also stated that they buy American products to support fellow Ameri-
186. Id. at 18.
187. "Made in USA" and Other U.S. Origin Claims, 62 Fed. Reg. 63,756
(1997).
188. See id. One safe harbor encompassed products that were last substan-
tially transformed in the United States and whose U.S. manufacturing costs
constituted 75 percent of total manufacturing costs. The second safe harbor
applied to products that had undergone two levels of substantial transforma-
tion in the United States (that is, the product's last substantial transformation
occurred in the United States and the last substantial transformation of each of
its significant inputs took place in the United States). See id.
189. See id. at 63,757.
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cans and expressed concern that lowering the standard would lead to a
loss in American jobs. 1 90
The FTC also noted:
An overwhelming number of consumers told the Commission... that
they prefer buying U.S.-made goods; they want to be able to rely on a
simple and clear standard; and, they feel very strongly that the current
standard should be retained. The comments also underscore the fact
... that consumer awareness of the globalization of the economy has
not necessarily changed consumers' beliefs about those products actu-
ally labeled "Made in USA."1 9 1
The FTC's experience certainly appears to differ from the tenta-
tive finding by FSIS that "some circumstantial evidence sug-
gests the possibility that consumers in the United States
distinguish domestic beef and lamb from imported beef and
lamb... ."192 FSIS' suggestion that producers are free to distin-
guish imported and domestic goods on a voluntary basis' 93 over-
looks the fact that the packers and processors, who buy the
cattle from the feedlots and deliver the beef to the supermar-
kets, oppose labeling requirements in the first place. Several
packers are importers of cattle and carcasses from Canada and
thus would not have an incentive to distinguish imported beef
from domestically-produced beef.
Finally, FSIS identifies various possible implications for in-
ternational trade arising from mandatory country of origin la-
beling. FSIS notes that Article IX, Marks of Origin, of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (1994) "allows
imported products to be labeled with their specific country of ori-
gin at the time of import so long as the marking requirement
does not seriously damage the imported products, materially re-
duce their value, or unreasonably increase their costs."194 FSIS
then states: "If mandatory labeling requires a label with the
word 'imported,' rather than a specific country of origin, it might
be challenged as not qualifying as a 'mark of origin,' and, there-
fore, constituting a prohibited restriction."195
In fact, Article XI contains no prohibition on identifying
products as "imported." It simply requires that any marking re-
quirements applied to imports from one country be "no less
favorable than the treatment accorded to like products of any
190. Id. at 63,758.
191. Id. at 63764-65.
192. COUNMY OF ORIGIN LABELING, supra note 168, at 2-3.
193. Id. at 3.
194. Id.
195. Id.
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third country."1 96 FSIS' analysis raises a concern about FSIS'
familiarity with international trade rules.
As well, the WTO Committee on Rules of Origin is currently
working on proposals to establish uniform rules for identifying
the country of origin for meat of bovine animals among other
products. The Tenth Report of the Technical Committee on
Rules of Origin to the Committee on Rules of Origin identified
several proposals, including:
" the country in which the animal was born;
" the country in which the animal was fattened from a weight of
330 kg or less to a weight of 450 kg. or more or the country in
which the animal was born;
* the country in which the animal was fattened for 6 or more
months before slaughtering; or the country in which the
animal was born; and
" the country in which the animal was born and raised; or the
country in which the animals was fattened for at least 3
months.197
The Technical Committee's work makes clear not only that
mandatory country of origin labeling is consistent with WTO ob-
ligations, but also that pending alternatives include identifying
the country in which the animal was born from which the meat
was then produced.
FSIS also expresses concern that mandatory country of ori-
gin labeling "could have a potentially damaging effect on United
States exports of beef.., if countries that import United States
beef reciprocate with equal or even more stringent mandatory
country of origin meat labeling."198 According to Representative
Helen Chenoweth-Hage, however, some 32 countries already
have mandatory country of origin labeling requirements, includ-
ing countries that are major export markets for U.S. beef.199
FSIS' failure to take such existing requirements into account
196. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11,
T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, art. X (1).
197. See G/RO/22/Add.1, Tenth Report of the Technical Committee on Rules
of Origin to the Committee on Rules of Origin (13 March 1998) at 80.
198. COUNTRY OF ORIGIN LABELING, supra, at 3.
199. See Country of Origin Labeling, 1999: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Livestock and Horticulture of the House Comm. on Agriculture, supra note
172 at 13. "And America is sort of behind the 8-ball when it comes to country-of-
origin meat labeling, because there are exactly 32 other countries that already
require country-of-origin meat labeling, including Argentina, Brazil, Bosnia,
Chile, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Hungary, Indonesia, Israel, Korea,
Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, the Arab countries, Venezuela ..... " Id. at 13
(statement of Helen Chenoweth-Hage, Representative from the State of Idaho).
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similarly raises concerns about the extent of FSIS' actual famili-
arity with the interface between country of origin labeling re-
quirements and international trade issues.
E. EFFORTS TO RESTORE COMPETITION TO THE U.S. MARKET
1. The Packers and Stockyards Act
Prompted by the Federal Trade Commission's investigation
into the amount of control exercised by the Nation's five largest
meat packing and livestock and meat marketing firms, the Pack-
ers and Stockyards Act ("P&S Act") was enacted on August 15,
1921200 to secure the free and unburdened flow of livestock
across the nation from producers to consumers by regulating the
business of stockyards and their participants. 20 ' Motivated in
part by concern over exorbitant charges, duplicate commissions,
and deceptive pricing practices, "all made possible by collusion
between the stockyards management and the commission men,
on the one hand, and the packers and dealers on the other," Con-
gress established a regulatory scheme to be administered by the
Secretary of Agriculture. 20 2 The purpose of the P&S Act is "to
assure fair competition and fair trade practices, to safeguard
farmers and ranchers.. .to protect consumers... and to protect
members of the livestock, meat, and poultry industries from un-
fair, deceptive, unjustly discriminatory and monopolistic prac-
tices.." 2o3 The P&S Act enumerates several different practices
as unlawful for packers to be engaged in, including engaging in
unfair, unjustly discriminatory, or deceptive practices; making
or giving undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any
particular person or locality; and selling or transferring to, or
buying or receiving from, any other person any article for the
purpose or with the effect of manipulating or controlling prices,
or of creating a monopoly in the acquisition of, buying, selling, or
dealing in, any article or of restraining commerce. 204
Although concentration in the packing industry declined af-
ter the 1920s, it has increased sharply in the last several years.
In 1998, some four packing companies accounted for 81 percent
of fed cattle and 33 percent of cull cattle slaughter in the United
200. Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921, 7 U.S.C. §181.
201. SeeStafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495, 514 (1922).
202. Id. at 515; see 7 U.S.C. § 228(a).
203. H.R. REP. No. 85-1048 at 2 (1957), reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5212, 5213.
204. See 7 U.S.C. §192.
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States.205 Particular practices that are of concern include use of
forward contracts which does not contain a firm base price, and
packer-owned feedlots where the cattle are not sold in an open,
public market.20 6 Another practice is the conditioning of sales
on the non-reporting of prices.20 7
Concerns about concentration and integration focus on the
effects on prices and the price discovery process. The structure of
an industry (e.g., number and size distribution of firms) is influ-
enced by the supply of its inputs, demand for its products, and
nature of its production technology. Structure in turn influences
competitive behavior and performance of the industry. Firms in
a concentrated processing industry that utilize a specialized in-
put such as meat animals may be able to reduce prices paid to
suppliers of those animals.208
Some observers fear that increases in vertical integration
and coordination may amplify the potential for exercise of mar-
ket power. There is concern that large packers may use vertical
coordination arrangements as a means of blocking their smaller
competitors from sources of supply, or as a mechanism for dis-
criminating among livestock sellers. At the least, vertical coor-
dination arrangements reduce the prevalence of open-market
transactions, thereby restricting the availability of market infor-
205. USITC Pub. 3255, supra, at IV-1.
206. See, e.g., The Western Organization of Resource Councils, Petition for
Rule-making on Captive Supply Procurement Practices under the Packers and
Stockyards Act, at 1, (visited at 3/18/2000). <http'J/www.usda.gov/gipsa/lateadd/
petition.pdf> USDA's analysis of the WORC petition concluded as follows:
The team finds no compelling evidence to suggest that anything other
than basic economic conditions determined the general price level of
the fed cattle market. After weighing the economic arguments supplied
by WORC, commentors (supporting and opposing), and other informa-
tion assembled by the team, we could not definitively conclude that
spot prices were affected or manipulated by captive supplies. The eco-
nomic evidence does not indicate the use of captive supplies is a viola-
tion of the Act. Therefore, we conclude that promulgating the rules
suggested by the petition is unwarranted.
USDA, Grain Inspection and Packers and Stockyards Administration, Packers
and Stockyards Program, Review of Western Organization of Resource Councils
(WORC) Petition for Rulemaking, at iv, <httpJ/www.usda.gov/gipsa/lateaddl
worchmpg.pdf>.
207. See GIPSA Release No. 61-98, USDA To Investigate Non-Reporting of
Price in Livestock Sales, <http'J/www.usda.gov/gipsaI newsinfo/release/61-
98.htm>.
208. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Grain Inspection, Packers and Stock-
yards Administration, Concentration in the Red Meat Packing Industry, Intro-
duction, February 1996.
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mation.20 9 Many of these same observers believe that USDA
has not been adequately enforcing the provisions of the Act.210
2. Mandatory Price Reporting
Another effort to restore competitiveness to the cattle and
beef industry entails legislation at the state and federal levels to
mandate reporting by packers of the prices they pay for cattle,
including formula and forward contract prices, as well as negoti-
ated purchases. For example, in 1999 Congress passed the Live-
stock Mandatory Reporting Act.2 11 The law directs the
Secretary of Agriculture to establish a program of live cattle
price information reporting that will-
(1) provide timely, accurate, and reliable market information;
(2) facilitate more informed marketing decisions; and
(3) promote competition in the cattle slaughtering industry.212
Section 941 of the law requires the Secretary of Agriculture to
publish proposed regulations to implement the provisions of the
law within 90 days of enactment. 213 The legislation become law
on October 22, 1999, which means that the deadline for publish-
ing proposed regulations expired in January 2000. The Depart-
ment of Agriculture published its notice of proposed rulemaking
on March 17, 2000.214
209. Id. Some industry observers argue that livestock prices are lower due
to increased efficiency and lower costs realized by large packers, and by vertical
coordination arrangements, and that these gains more than offset any adverse
effects of large market shares and higher concentration levels. They argue that
without the economies of scale, consumer prices would be higher, livestock
prices would be lower, and fewer animals would be sold.
210. See Testimony of Herman Schumacher, Herried, South Dakota, Before
the Senate Agriculture Committee, Livestock Issues, <http'J/www.senate.gov/
-agriculture98hear.htm.
211. See Livestock Mandatory Reporting Act of 1999, Pub.L. 106-98, H.R.
1906, Title XI. <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?cl06:1:./temp/
-cl06rrcwG5:e166638>.
212. Id. at §222.
213. See id. at §941(b).
214. See USDA, Agricultural Marketing Service [No. LS-99-18], Livestock
and Grain Market News Branch: Livestock Mandatory Reporting, 65 Fed. Reg.
14562 (Mar. 17, 2000). The current price reporting system is voluntary. "Mar-
ket News relies upon voluntary cooperation from the livestock, red meat, grain
and wool industry." Id. at 14652. "The proposed rule would require the report-
ing of market information by certain livestock packers and livestock product
processors and importers who annually slaughter an average of 125,000 cattle
or 100,000 swine, or slaughter or process an average of 75,000 lambs. Import-
ers who annually import an average of 5,000 metric tons of lamb are also re-
quired to report." Id. The reporting requirements include the "details of all
transactions involving purchases of livestock .... This program is intended to
provide information on pricing, contracting, for purchase, and supply and de-
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3. Use of Antitrust Law
Another effort to address the cattle industry's difficulties is
the use of antitrust laws. Cattle producers have filed an anti-
trust case against meat packers in an attempt break up packer
concentration. Pickett vs. IBP215 concerns issues of packer con-
centration and anticompetitive marketing, with the plaintiff
representing 10 cattle producers from across the United
States.216 The producers filed the lawsuit in July 1996 against
IBP, the largest of U.S. beef packers with an estimated 38 per-
cent market share, alleging that the company was in violation of
the antitrust provisions of the Packers & Stockyards Act
(P&SA).217 The plaintiffs contend that packer concentration
permits anticompetitive market manipulation to occur. The
plaintiffs' principle request is for injunctive relief. Plaintiff pro-
ducers want IBP to cease and desist activities that, they claim,
continue to lead to violations of the antitrust provisions of the
Packers & Stockyards Act [P&SAI, such as market-price control
and "captive supply."218 Their secondary request is for compen-
sation to producers for said violations. Finally, plaintiffs also
have asked that the court rule this a "class-certified" case so all
cattle producers-in all segments of the production chain-will
be entitled to damages from IBP.219 The court certified the mat-
ter as a class action in April 1999.220
During the pendency of the motion to certify the class, the
U.S. Department of Agriculture and Secretary of Agriculture
mand conditions for livestock, livestock production, and livestock products, that
can be readily understood by producers, packers, and other market partici-
pants.... In some instances, mandatory reporting will provide new informa-
tion which has never been reported under the existing voluntary reporting
program. AMS anticipates that this information will provide the basis for
newly published market news reports not previously provided for under volun-
tary reporting, including reports covering . . . forward contract and formula
marketing arrangement cattle purchases [and] packer-owned cattle...." Id. at
14652-53.
215. Pickett v. IBP, Inc., 182 F.R.D. 647 (M.D. Ala. 1998).
216. Id. They are Henry Lee Pickett of Alabama; Sam Britt of New Mexico;
Mike Callicrate of Kansas; Patrick Goggins of Montana; Paul Horton and David
Smith of Oklahoma; Lovell Blain, Jim Bower and Stayton Weldon of Texas; and
Johnny Smith of South Dakota. Id.
217. Id.
218. "Captive supply" refers to cattle that are purchased in non-spot market
transactions, e.g., pursuant to formula contracts or forward contracts, or where
the cattle are owned by the packer during feeding.
219. Factual and procedural background outlined on Cattlemen's Legal
Fund <http'J/www.nobull.net/legal>.
220. See Memorandum and Order, Pickett v. IBP, Inc., 182 F.R.D. 647 (M.D.
Ala. 1998) (No. 96-A-1103-N).
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Dan Glickman were invited to file an amicus curiae brief on the
propriety of class certification and other issues. On May 29,
1998, Glickman responded with a brief, noting that P&SA sec-
tions 209 and 210 were meant to allow for private action in dis-
trict court. USDA's brief further stated that plaintiffs filing
such action have routinely sought injunctive relief in addition to
monetary remedies, and that there can be no question that
plaintiffs selected the proper, and only, forum open to them.
Further, USDA provided that legal precedent and the intent of
Congress clearly allowed injunctive relief.221 The case is still
pending. Thus, as with trade negotiations and dispute settle-
ment, resort to the antitrust laws is a longer-term approach.
IV. EFFORTS TO RESTORE FAIR TRADING CONDITIONS
TO THE U.S. CATTLE MARKET THROUGH
TRADE REMEDY LAWS
The issue of the impact of trade flows in cattle and beef on
the domestic cattle industry has been examined on numerous
occasions. In 1977, for example, cattle and beef producers filed a
petition under Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974, seeking
temporary relief from imports of cattle and beef.222 Relief was
denied because the International Trade Commission determined
that imports were not a substantial cause of serious injury to
the domestic cattle industry.223 Beginning in 1977, the Interna-
tional Trade Commission conducted four general fact-finding in-
vestigations under section 332 of the Tariff Act of 1930
concerning competition and conditions of trade in the cattle and
beef sector.224
One group of domestic cattle producers began their own re-
search into the volumes of imports of cattle and beef, and the
impact those imports were having on the industry during the
nadir of domestic prices in 1996-98. Those producers, who
221. Curt Anderson, Cattlemen To Proceed In Fed Lawsuit, AP National
Story, June 2, 1998.
222. See Live Cattle and Certain Edible Meat Products of Cattle, USITC
Pub. 834, Inv. No. 201-25, (Sept. 1977).
223. See id. at 5.
224. See Conditions of Competition in the U.S. Markets Between Domestic
and Foreign Live Cattle and Cattle Meat for Human Consumption, USITC Pub.
842, Inv. No. 332-85, (1977); The Competitive Position of Canadian Live Cattle
and Beef in U.S. Markets, USITC Pub. 1996, Inv. No. 332-241 (1987); Live Cat-
tle and Beef: U.S. and Canadian Industry Profiles, Trade and Factors of Com-
petition, USITC Pub. 2591, Inv. No. 332-328 (1993); Cattle and Beef: Impact of
the NAFTA and Uruguay Round Agreements on U.S. Trade, USITC Pub. 3048,
Inv. No. 332-371 (1997).
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formed an organization called the Ranchers-Cattlemen Action
Legal Foundation ("R-CALF"), concluded that imports of live
cattle from Canada and Mexico were likely being sold in the
United States at dumped and subsidized prices, and were a
cause of economic injury to domestic producers.
On October 1, 1998, R-CALF filed petitions requesting im-
position of antidumping and countervailing duties on imports of
live cattle from Canada and imposition of antidumping duties on
imports of live cattle from Mexico. 225 Eliminating dumped and
subsidized imports of live cattle from the U.S. market would
either raise prices of Canadian and Mexican cattle or result in a
reduction of the supply of cattle in the United States. Either
way, relief was likely to help restore domestic prices to profitable
levels or at least reduce the level of losses. Ultimately, the in-
vestigations resulted in findings of (1) dumping of live cattle
from Canada; (2) de minimis subsidies on live cattle from Can-
ada; (3) no reasonable indication of material injury, or threat of
material injury, to a domestic industry by reason of dumped im-
ports of live cattle from Mexico; and (4) no material injury or
threat of material injury by reason of dumped imports of live
cattle from Canada. Thus, the investigations were terminated
and the industry ultimately was denied relief.
Although the investigations were unsuccessful, they are
nevertheless instructive for policy makers to examine because
they reveal various policies and practices in the current admin-
istration of the laws which make them ill-suited to providing ef-
fective relief to the cattle industry. Assuming that the trade
remedy laws should be equally effective for all industries, in-
cluding highly fragmented, agricultural industries such as cat-
tle, we examine the laws' shortcomings (as administered) and
offer policy prescriptions and legislative amendments to help
make them more effective for future cattle petitions.
A. OVERVIEW OF THE ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING
DUTY LAws
Antidumping and countervailing duty investigations will re-
sult in the imposition of remedial duties on imports where it is
determined that the imports subject to investigation (1) are be-
225. See Petition Requesting Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Im-
ports of Live Cattle from Canada; Petition Requesting Imposition of Antidump-
ing Duties on Imports of Live Cattle from Canada; Petition Requesting
Imposition of Antidumping Duties on Imports of Live Cattle from Mexico, dated
October 1, 1998.
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ing sold or are likely to be sold in the United States at less than
fair value ("LTFV") prices (i.e., dumping) and/or are benefiting
from countervailable subsidies; and (2) a domestic industry is
materially injured or threatened with material injury, or the es-
tablishment of a domestic industry is materially retarded, by
reason of the imports subject to investigation. 226 The investiga-
tions proceed simultaneously before two federal agencies: the
Office of Import Administration in the U.S. Department of Com-
merce ("Commerce"), which is responsible for determining
whether the imports are being dumped and/or subsidized; and
the U.S. International Trade Commission ("ITC"), which deter-
mines whether an industry is materially injured or threatened
with material injury, or the development of an industry is mate-
rially retarded, by reason of the dumped and/or subsidized
imports.227
Investigation must complete five stages before Commerce
will issue an antidumping duty order or countervailing duty or-
der: (1) initiation/standing; (2) preliminary injury determina-
tion by the ITC; (3) preliminary determination of dumping or
subsidy by Commerce; (4) final determination of dumping or
subsidy by Commerce; and (5) final injury determination by the
ITC. 228 The process typically begins with the filing of a petition
simultaneously with both Commerce and the ITC by a domestic
"interested party,"229 on "behalf of a domestic industry."230
Commerce determines whether the petition meets the stat-
utory requirements and whether it has been filed by or on behalf
of a domestic industry, and must make its determination within
20 days after filing. If Commerce determines that the petition
does not allege all the elements necessary or information reason-
ably available to the petitioner supporting the allegations, and/
or if the petition has inadequate industry support, then the case
226. See 19 U.S.C. §§1671, 1673.
227. See Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. §1677 (1-2) (1999).
228. For ease of presentation and organization, we discuss the ITC's prelim-
inary and final injury determinations in the cattle investigations together in
Section VII, infra.
229. The statute identifies seven categories of interested parties, including
the governments of the foreign countries in which the subject merchandise is
produced; the foreign manufacturers, producers or exporters, or U.S. importers,
of the subject merchandise; U.S. manufacturers, producers or wholesalers of the
domestic like product; labor unions or recognized group of workers that are rep-
resentative of the domestic industry; and trade or business associations or other
associations, a majority of whose members is composed of interested parties
who manufacture, produce or wholesale the domestic like product. See 19
U.S.C. §1677(9).
230. 19 U.S.C. §1671a(b)(1), 19 U.S.C. §1673a(b)(1).
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will terminate. 231 An affirmative finding initiates the investiga-
tion and the case moves forward at the International Trade
Commission. 232
In the second stage, the ITC must determine within 45 days
of filing whether there is "a reasonable indication" that a domes-
tic industry is materially injured or threatened with material in-
jury, or the establishment of an industry is materially retarded,
by reason of imports of the subject merchandise. 233 Although
Commerce's deadline for determining whether to initiate does
not expire until 20 days after filing, the ITC immediately begins
its investigation. An affirmative determination by the ITC
means that the case proceeds at Commerce, while a negative
preliminary injury determination terminates the case.
In the third stage, Commerce preliminarily determines
whether merchandise is being sold in the United States at less
than fair value or is benefiting from a countervailable subsidy.
An affirmative determination results in suspension of liquida-
tion of the entries of the subject imports. 234 Thereafter, during
the pendency of the investigation, an importer must post a cash
deposit, bond or security on the subject merchandise in an
amount equal to the dumping margin or subsidy rate.235 The
importer, faced with increased liability due to the margins,
either may pay the foreign producer a higher price or, if the im-
231. See 19 U.S.C. § 1671a(c)(3), 19 U.S.C § 1673a(c)(3). On June 29, 1999,
a coalition of domestic crude oil producers filed antidumping and countervailing
duty petitions on imported crude oil from Iraq, Mexico, Saudi Arabia and Vene-
zuela. There, the Department of Commerce ultimately dismissed the petitions
for lack of adequate industry support. See Dismissal of Antidumping and Coun-
tervailing Duty Petitions: Certain Crude Petroleum Oil Products From Iraq,
Mexico, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela, 64 Fed. Reg. 44,480 (1999). This was the
first time that a petition was dismissed by Commerce for reasons of inadequate
industry support since the implementation of the industry support provisions
as part of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act.
232. See 19 U.S.C. §1671a(c)(2), 19 U.S.C §1673a(c)(2).
233. See 19 U.S.C. §1671b(a)(1), 19 U.S.C. §1673b(a)(1). If Commerce ex-
tends the deadline for initiation because it is polling the industry or otherwise
determining industry support, then the ITC's deadline for the preliminary in-jury determination is also extended to a maximum of 65 days after the filing of
the petition. See 19 U.S.C. §1671b(a)(2)(A)(ii), 19 U.S.C. §1673b(a)(2)(A)(ii).
234. See 19 U.S.C. §1671b(d), 19 U.S.C. §1673b(d). Suspension of liquida-
tion means that imports of subject merchandise can be cleared through cus-
toms, but the final duties to be collected on said goods will not be quantified or
assessed until the question of dumping or subsidy is resolved. The importer is,
however, required to post a cash deposit, bond or some other security to guaran-
tee against potential future liability. The value of the security is based on the
preliminary dumping or subsidy margin. See 19 U.S.C. §1671b(d), 19 U.S.C.
§1673b(d).
235. See 19 U.S.C. §1671b(d), 19 U.S.C. §1673b(d).
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porter is related to the foreign producer, may try to raise the
selling price in the United States. In either case, the imported
product no longer has the same price advantage vis-A-vis the do-
mestic product. Depending on the size of the preliminary mar-
gin, the liability may be prohibitive and the imports simply stop
entering the U.S. market. Thus, the preliminary affirmative de-
termination is frequently the first point in time when the domes-
tic industry obtains relief in the market from unfairly-low priced
imports. If the dumping margin or subsidy rate is below a de
minimis level, then the preliminary determination is negative
and there is no suspension of liquidation. 236 However, the in-
vestigation does not terminate.
In the fourth stage, Commerce proceeds to verify the infor-
mation submitted by the foreign respondents. These are, in es-
sence, supposed to be reasonably detailed audits of the
responses and the respondent's records that were used in pre-
paring the responses. The parties have an opportunity to submit
legal briefs and argument before Commerce issues its final de-
termination in which the margins may change. An affirmative
determination means that the ITC will proceed to its final injury
determination while a negative determination terminates the
investigation.
The final stage of the investigation is the ITC's final injury
phase. The ITC typically begins issuing revised questionnaires
and collecting data after Commerce makes its preliminary deter-
mination. Parties have the opportunity to comment on the draft
questionnaires, prepare briefs and present argument and testi-
mony at a formal public hearing before the ITC. The ITC then
votes and makes its determination. An affirmative decision re-
sults in issuance by Commerce of the antidumping and/or coun-
tervailing duty order, while a negative determination ends the
case.
Complete antidumping investigations typically take one
year to complete, while countervailing duty investigations usu-
ally require less time.237
236. See 19 U.S.C. §1671b(b)(4)A, 19 U.S.C. §1673b(b)(3). In an antidump-
ing investigation, a margin that is below 2 percent is deemed de minimis. See
19 U.S.C. §1673b(b)3. In a countervailing duty investigation involving imports
which are not from a developing country, the threshold is 1 percent. See 19
U.S.C. § 1671b(b)(4)A.
237. See generally 19 U.S.C. §1671, 19 U.S.C. §1673.
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B. LIVE CATTLE FROM CANADA AND MEXIcO: DETERMINING
INDUSTRY SUPPORT FOR THE PETITIONS
The first substantial obstacle that the cattle industry en-
countered in the antidumping and countervailing duty cases
was demonstrating industry support for the petitions. The
sheer size of the industry in terms of the numbers of producers
combined with the lack of any accessible central database of pro-
ducers led Commerce to conclude that it would have to poll the
industry. This resulted in a costly and time-consuming exercise
that was exacerbated by a conservative approach to calculating
industry support that imposed significant costs on the
petitioner.
1. Statutory Elements for Determining Industry Support
The statute requires that, for an investigation to be initi-
ated, the petition itself or in combination with other producers
or producer groups must account for at least 25 percent of total
domestic production and at least 50 percent of that portion of the
domestic industry expressing support or opposition to the
petition:
For purposes of this subsection, the administering authority [Com-
merce] shall determine that the petition has been filed by or on behalf
of the industry, if-
(i) the domestic producers or workers who support the petition ac-
count for at least 25 percent of the total production of the domestic like
product, and
(ii) the domestic producers or workers who support the petition
account for more than 50 percent of the production of the domestic like
product produced by that portion or the industry expressing support
for or opposition to the petition ... 238
If the petition does not contain information establishing in-
dustry support that accounts for more than 50 percent of produc-
tion of the domestic like product, the statute requires Commerce
to poll the industry or use other information to determine indus-
try support.239 Where the industry is comprised of a large
number of producers, Commerce may determine industry sup-
port using any statistically valid sampling method to poll the
industry.240 The Statement of Administrative Action to the
238. 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(c)(4)(A).
239. See 19 U.S.C. §1673a(c)(4)(D). If there is opposition to a petition, pro-
ducers that are related to foreign producers of the subject merchandise will be
excluded, and producers that import the subject merchandise may be excluded,
for purposes of determining industry support.
240. See 19 U.S.C. §1673a(c)(4)(D)(ii).
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Uruguay Round Agreements Act adds that, when sampling is
required, "a primary source of information for Commerce will be
information contained in the petition and placed on the record
by domestic interested parties."241
2. Petitioner's Efforts to Demonstrate Industry Support
The first place Commerce will look to determine if the in-
dustry support requirement is satisfied is the petition itself.
Collecting information on industry support with respect to the
cattle industry presented a number of challenges for the peti-
tioner. For example, the domestic cattle industry has in excess
of one million producers and is highly fragmented and decentral-
ized. Most cattle producers keep the precise numbers of cattle
which they own or sell confidential. Consequently, while there
are cattle producers' trade associations in virtually every state
in the country, such associations do not typically collect or main-
tain detailed information about the numbers of cattle which
their members own or sell. Although R-CALF's petitions con-
tained information on some 6,000 individual producers and 46
trade associations that supported the cases, they were not able
to determine at the time of filing the total value or number of
cattle represented by those supporters. 242
Petitioner requested that, to the extent Commerce was not
able to satisfy itself from the face of the petition and petition
amendments that the industry support requirements had been
satisfied, that Commerce then employ a statistically valid sam-
pling method to poll the industry. R-CALF proposed that Com-
merce use a simple random sample. R-CALF also proposed that
Commerce conduct the sample by telephone, and estimated that
a sample of 900 producers would yield statistically valid results
(i.e., support, oppose, neutral).243
Commerce determined it could not conduct such a random
sample because it did not have access to a sufficient database of
individual producers. R-CALF therefore continued to collect sig-
natures and letters from individual ranchers and associations.
By the time Commerce finally determined to initiate all three
investigations, R-CALF had submitted 13 supplements to the
petitions which contained signatures from more than 30,000
241. SAA at 192, reprinted in H. Doc. 103-316, v. 1 at 862 (1994).
242. See Petition at 8.
243. See Petition at 8-12.
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ranchers and farmers producing cattle and letters of support
from some 124 trade associations. 244
3. Commerce's Analysis of Industry Support
(a) Measuring Production
Commerce encountered numerous challenges as it endeav-
ored to determine industry support. The imports within the
scope of the petitions included all beef cattle and calves used to
produce beef for human consumption, including steers, heifers,
calves, beef cows and culls. Specifically excluded from the scope
were dairy cows and purebred cattle used for breeding
purposes. 245
The first issue was how to measure production of a compet-
ing domestic like product that corresponded to the imports
within the scope of the petitions. Normally, Commerce deter-
mines industry support using an annual production or sale fig-
ure for the industry as a denominator. In the cattle industry,
however, a cow may be sold more than once in any 12-month
period (e.g., from a cow-calf operator to a backgrounder and from
a backgrounder to a feedlot) and thus could be counted in the
production of more than one operation. Defining "production" as
the processing/sale of live cattle over a one-year period would
result in total production being exaggerated by multiple counts
of the same cattle.246
The petitioner had proposed as alternative measures of U.S.
production on a 12-month period: (1) the number of calves born
in U.S. cattle operations in a year, or (2) the number of cattle
slaughtered in a year.247 Commerce declined to follow these
proposals because of concern that either measure would give dis-
proportionate weight to one particular sector of the industry at
the expense of the other sectors (i.e., number of calves born
would give too much weight to cow-calf operators while the
number of cattle slaughtered would give too much weight to
feedlots). 248
244. R-CALF, Eighteenth Supplement to the Petition Requesting Imposi-
tion of Countervailing Duties on Live Cattle from Canada and Fifteenth Sup-
plements to the Petitions Requesting Imposition of Antidumping Duties on
Imports of Live Cattle from Canada and Mexico, at Exhibit C (Dec. 21, 1998).
245. See Petition at 13-15.
246. See Petition on Live Cattle from Canada and Mexico: Determination of
Industry Support, Dep't Comm., A-122-833 (Dec. 1988) [hereinafter Industry
Support Memo].
247. Id. at 4.
248. See id. at 5.
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Instead, Commerce determined to use USDA cattle inven-
tory statistics as a proxy for production. "Reliance on inventory
figures, which represent a snapshot of the industry at a given
moment in time, obviates the risk of over-counting due to multi-
ple sales of given cattle in a 12-month period. An inventory ap-
proach also accords the views of each segment of the U.S. live
cattle industry a fair and proportionate weight."249
(b) Polling the Industry
The sheer size of the industry in terms of the numbers of
producers presented a second challenge. Given the large
number of producers, a comprehensive examination of all indi-
vidual producers within the statutory deadlines was not feasi-
ble.250  Commerce also noted that it did not have a
comprehensive list of all such producers so that it would be able
to contact them. The only known database was maintained by
the U.S. Department of Agriculture, which was proscribed by
law from sharing the information with Commerce without the
consent of the individual producers. 251 Consequently, the USDA
database also was not available to develop a random sample.
Commerce decided to poll trade associations of cattle produ-
cers, including national, regional, state and local chapters of cat-
tle producer associations or associations which had many cattle
producer members, such as the National Cattlemen's Beef Asso-
ciation, the National Farmers Union and the American Farm
Bureau Federation, Women in Farm Economics (WIFE), and the
National Farmers Organization. 252 "By focusing on associa-
tions, we could effectively canvass the country and obtain a rea-
sonable measure of opinions with respect to the petitions by a
broad segment of the industry."253
The decision to use trade associations also raised a number
of questions. The petitions contained signatures from thousands
of individual producers, many of whom either (1) did not belong
to any associations; (2) belonged to associations which did not
249. Id. Ultimately, the cattle inventory denominator was adjusted to con-
form to the scope of the petition by excluding dairy cattle and purebred cattle
used for breeding. See id. at 6.
250. See id.
251. See Industry Support Memo, supra note 238, at 6, n. 15 (citing 7 USC
§2276, Chesapeake Bay Fdn. V. USDA, 11 F. 3d 211, 217 (DC Cir. 1993).
252. See id. at 7, n. 17, 12. Altogether, Commerce polled 237 associations.
See id. at Appendix 2. NCBA requested that Commerce rely on the responses of
its affiliated state associations in lieu of its own response. See id. at 12.
253. Id. at 7.
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take a position on the petitions; or (3) belonged to associations
which opposed one or more of the petitions. Commerce "consid-
ered that it would be appropriate to give weight to such views,
provided that we could account for the overlap that would arise
if these individual producers belonged to associations that also
expressed their views." 25 4
Ultimately, Commerce conducted a telephone survey of a ran-
dom sample of 150 individual producers and determined that,
measured on the basis of head of cattle, 46 percent of individual
producers belonged to no association at all.2 5 5 Altogether, Com-
merce had expressions of support from individual producers
which accounted for over 5.8 million head of cattle with respect
to the Canadian petitions and nearly 3.4 million head of cattle
with respect to the petition on Mexico. 256 Commerce reduced
these headcounts reported by individual producers by 54 percent
on the assumption that 54 percent were represented by trade
associations.
A second issue was overlapping memberships among state
associations and among national associations and other associa-
tions. Petitioner had pointed out that there could be some de-
gree of common membership in certain of the associations.
"Overlap would arise where a given cattle producer belonged to
more than one association within a given state; also a county
organization might belong to a state association, which might
belong to a national association, such that an individual pro-
ducer might be counted at several different levels of organiza-
tion."25 7 There was also the related question of how Commerce
should resolve conflicting positions between individuals and as-
sociations (e.g., individual supported the petitions while associa-
tion opposed).
Petitioner proposed a methodology for counting overlapping
association votes such that an individual's vote would not be
overriden by an association to which that individual is a mem-
ber, and a local, regional or state association's vote would not be
overriden by the national association, where the positions con-
flict.258 Commerce partially adopted this approach with respect
to resolving conflicts between a state association and its affili-
254. Id. at 7, n. 16.
255. See id. at 13.
256. See Industry Support Memo, supra note 238, at 13.
257. Id. at 7-8.
258. Letter from Petitioner's to William Daley, Secretary of Commerce, 8
(Nov. 6, 1998) [hereinafter Letter].
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ated local association by including the cattle numbers of both
associations in its calculation. 259
Commerce never directly addressed the issue of conflicting
positions between individual producers and associations. How-
ever, its decision to reduce the headcounts of individual produ-
cers supporting the petitions by 54 percent based on the
telephone poll in effect resulted in deciding against giving
weight to the vote of individual producers which conflicted with
an association's position. As noted, Commerce simply assumed
that 54 percent of the individual supporters were represented
by associations.
(c) Estimating the Inventory of the Intertribal Agriculture
Council
One of the associations that early on expressed support for
all three petitions was the Intertribal Agriculture Council
("IAC"), an organization of 84 American Indian Tribal Govern-
ments which control some 82 percent of the 56 million acres of
Indian land in the contiguous United States.260 IAC estimated
that its member tribes accounted for some 7.5 - 7.7 million head
of cattle.261
Although Commerce generally accepted the estimates of
cattle inventories provided by all other associations (provided
they did not exceed the inventory total for the state), Commerce
did not accept IAC's estimate:
In its initial response... the IAC provided an estimate of 7.5 million
head of cattle.... This figure was based on the results of a survey of
cattle on Indian lands conducted by the Bureau of Indian Affairs,
which yielded an estimate of slightly under 1.5 million head of cattle.
The IAC adjusted this figure by a multiplier of 5, noting that BIA had
been found to have greatly underestimated the head of cattle on reser-
vations in Montana, and that such undercounting should be inferred to
have taken place on other Indian lands....
rThe record does not support the contention that the extent of un-
dercount found in Montana is typical of the extent of undercount on
Indian lands in other states....
However, the IAC and petitioner have provided other census data that
allow for a reasonable estimate of the number of head of cattle on In-
dian lands. These data are (1) the acreage of Indian grazing lands in
each state... and (2) the average number of head of cattle per acre in
each state .... 2
62
259. See Industry Support Memo, supra note 238, appendix 6 at 8.
260. See id. at 14. The IAC's members also control about half of the Native
Corporation lands in Alaska. See id.
261. See Affidavit of Gregory E. Smittman, Executive Director of IAC.
262. Industry Support Memo, supra note 238, at 14-15.
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Commerce adjusted the resulting total by adding the number of
cattle found to have been undercounted in the survey for Mon-
tana, but made no other adjustments to the state totals to allow
for possible undercounting. 263 Commerce then multiplied this
sum by 82 percent, the ratio of Indian lands accounted for by the
IAC's member tribal governments and arrived at a figure of 3.3
million - less than half IAC's own estimate. 264
(d) Estimating the Inventory of the Livestock Marketing
Association
The Livestock Marketing Association (LMA) is an associa-
tion of livestock auction and terminal markets, video auctions
and commission firms as well as cattle dealers and buyers
throughout the United States. In its letter of support for the
three petitions, LMA estimated that its members accounted for
approximately half of all the cattle marketed each year (i.e., ap-
proximately 36-40 million).265
Commerce's Industry Support Memo confirmed that whole-
salers meet the statutory definition of domestic interested party
and thus their views must be taken into account in determining
industry support, and that LMA's members are wholesalers
within the meaning of the statute. "It is plain that LMA alone
could have filed a petition on behalf of the U.S. cattle
industry."266
There still remained the issue of how to count the cattle that
LMA's members handled. Petitioner had proposed two alterna-
tives. First, Commerce could have simply used the volume of
marketings and added it to other support figures (taking into
account possible double-counting). That approach would have
conformed to the plain language of the statute to include whole-
salers in the standing calculation. Second, Commerce could
have elected to treat LMA as a proxy for the cow-calf operators,
backgrounders and feedlots whose product LMA's members help
market. Under such an approach, petitioner noted, LMA's in-
ventory figures would have to be adjusted upward to take ac-
count of the fact that not all cattle are marketed every year.
Since LMA accounted for about half of all marketings, Com-
merce could have treated LMA as representing about half of all
the cattle in its measure of total applicable inventory (i.e., the
263. See id. at 15, n. 32.
264. See id. at 15-16.
265. See id. at 16.
266. Id. at 17.
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denominator). Using this approach, LMA would have accounted
for about 46 million head of cattle.267
Instead, Commerce determined to consider LMA's role with
respect to inventory not otherwise accounted for by producers
taking a position (support, oppose, neutral) with respect to the
petitions. 268 "Of the total inventory of cattle within the defini-
tion of domestic like product as of January 1, 1998, which is ap-
proximately 86,611,354 head, we have obtained expressions of
support, opposition, or neutrality accounting for over 65 percent
with respect, for example, to the Mexican petition, leaving over
26,000,000 head of cattle unaccounted for."269 Commerce ob-
served that since LMA accounts for half of all sales of cattle, it
would be reasonable to infer that LMA would be involved in the
sale of half of the cattle unaccounted for in Commerce's poll, or
about 13 million head. Commerce adjusted this figure further
downward to account for the fact that "only about 37 percent of
cattle inventory is sold in a given year."270 Commerce acknowl-
edged that this figure included only the sales of slaughter cattle
and not the sales of calves, yearlings or feeders and that it con-
sequently conservatively understated the amount of inventory
that LMA's members would sell in a 12-month period.271 Thus,
Commerce ultimately determined that LMA accounted for about
5 million head of cattle for the Mexico petition and 4.5 million
head for each of the Canadian petitions - about 10 percent of the
amount that petitioner's approach had yielded. 272
(e) Issues arising from the industry support determination
The industry support issue could have been far more easily
resolved had USDA been legally permitted to share its database
of producers with Commerce. Commerce could have then used
that database to do a random sample within the first 40 days
after the filing of the petition.
Since that option was not available, however, Commerce
proceeded to poll the industry by using trade associations. This
was a reasonable decision, but was made more costly and time-
consuming than necessary by the conservative approach that
Commerce adopted in assessing the responses of the associa-
267. See Letter, supra note 250, at 8-9.
268. See Industry Support Memo, supra note 238, at 18.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. See id. at 18, n. 37.
272. See id. at 18.
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tions. For example, Commerce had conducted a telephone sur-
vey of randomly selected producers which indicated significant
overlap among associations in certain key states such as Mon-
tana, South Dakota, North Dakota, Iowa and Kentucky. Com-
merce "conservatively assumed a very high degree of overlap in
associations supporting the petitions and no overlap in associa-
tions opposing the petitions."27 3 For many states (e.g., Florida,
Nebraska, Oklahoma and Texas), for purposes of assessing sup-
port for the petitions, Commerce included only the largest asso-
ciation, while in those same states, Commerce included all
associations that expressed opposition.27 4 Commerce's method-
ology made no allowance for counting the support from individ-
ual producers whose associations opposed the petition (e.g., by
reducing the number of association cattle by the number of the
individual's cattle). Commerce's methodology thus likely un-
dercounted supporters while overcounting those in opposition.
It also disenfranchised individual producers who supported the
petition but belonged to associations which either took no posi-
tion or which opposed the petition.
As to R-CALF's two largest supporting associations, Com-
merce scrutinized the cattle inventory estimates provided by the
IAC, but largely performed no similar examination of any other
association's inventory estimate.27 5 Commerce's estimate of cat-
tle accounted for by LMA's members greatly reduced the totals
which would otherwise have been reasonable and supportable
for Commerce to have adopted. It bears noting that had Com-
merce adopted petitioner's proposals for estimating the cattle ac-
counted for by LMA, then LMA alone would have provided
support sufficient to meet the statutory industry support
requirements.
It is understandable that Commerce would adopt such a
conservative approach in anticipation of legal challenges by re-
spondents to its industry support determination. Indeed, the
Government of Canada subsequently requested consultations
and the establishment of a dispute settlement panel with regard
to Commerce's decision to initiate the countervailing duty inves-
tigation.27 6 It nevertheless establishes troubling precedents
273. Id. at 12 (emphasis added).
274. See Industry Support Memo, supra note 238, appendix 9 at 2.
275. Where an association's estimate of its members' cattle inventory ex-
ceeded the USDA figures for that state, Commerce required the association to
refigure its estimate. See id. at 8, n. 19.
276. See United States - Countervailing Duty Investigation with respect to
Live Cattle from Canada, March 19, 1999, (WT/DS167/1) <www.wto.org/wto/
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that are likely to make it harder, not easier, for a similarly frag-
mented industry to demonstrate industry support in a future
case. Such an outcome runs contrary to the Congressional con-
cerns about the costs to producers (particularly small ones) of
pursuing trade remedies. 277
C. COMMERCE'S COUNTERVAILING DUTY INVESTIGATION
Foreign governments subsidize the industries in their coun-
tries when they provide financial assistance that benefits the
production, manufacture or exportation of goods. Subsidies can
take many forms, such as direct cash payments, credits against
taxes, and loans at terms that do not reflect market conditions.
While subsidies are beneficial to the industry or firm receiving
them, they also can cause trade distortions and harm to indus-
tries in other countries by, for example, enabling the subsidized
industry to increase its production and export of a particular
product when, in the absence of the subsidy, it would not have
been able to do so. Subsides which lead to trade distortion thus
induce increased investment in the exporting country in the sub-
sidized industry while also inducing disinvestment in the indus-
try in the importing country which is unable to compete with the
subsidized imports.
1. The Statute
The statute defines a countervailable subsidy as a govern-
ment practice which provides a financial contribution, provides
any form of income or price support within the meaning of Arti-
cle XVI of the GATT 1994, or makes a payment to a funding
mechanism to provide a financial contribution, or entrusts or di-
rects a private entity to make a financial contribution if provid-
ing the contribution would normally be vested in the
government and the practice does not differ in substance from
practices normally followed by governments. The "contribution"
dipustee-14febOO.doc>. Canada contended that the initiation of the investiga-
tion is inconsistent with US obligations under the Subsidies Agreement, includ-
ing, inter alia, that the petition filed with the US Department of Commerce was
not made by or on behalf of the domestic industry. See id.
277. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 40-100, 172-73 (1987). "Committee members
have received many complaints about the costs and complexities of seeking
statutory relief and are aware of a number of small firms which have not even
tried to seek relief because they... find the process to be too cost prohibitive."
Id. at 173.
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must be provided to a person and a benefit is thereby
conferred. 278
A countervailable subsidy also must be "specific." According
to the statute, a subsidy is specific if it is (1) an export subsidy,
(2) an import substitution subsidy; or (3) a specific domestic sub-
sidy as a matter of law or fact.279
A domestic subsidy is specific to an enterprise or industry or
group thereof as a matter of law if the program expressly limits
access to the subsidy. A subsidy is specific to an enterprise or
industry or group thereof as a matter of fact if one or more of the
following factors exist:
(1) The actual recipients of the subsidy, whether considered on an en-
terprise or industry basis, are limited in number.
(2) An enterprise or industry is a predominant user of the subsidy.
(3) An enterprise or industry receives a disproportionately large
amount of the subsidy.
(4) The manner in which the authority providing the subsidy has exer-
cised discretion in the decision to grant the subsidy indicates that an
enterprise or industry is favored over others.
280
In evaluating a subsidy under these factors,28 ' Commerce
will consider the extent of diversification of economic activities
within the jurisdiction of the authority providing the subsidy,
and the length of time during which the subsidy program has
been in operation. In addition, a domestic subsidy is also spe-
cific if it is limited to an enterprise or industry located within a
geographical region within the jurisdiction of the authority pro-
viding the subsidy.28 2
In addition to these requirements, Commerce will "disre-
gard any de minimis countervailable subsidy. [A countervail-
able subsidy is de minimis if] the aggregate of the net
countervailable subsidies is less than 1 percent ad valorem or
the equivalent specific rate for the subject merchandise." 2 3 In
the cattle case for example, a 1 percent ad valorem subsidy rate
would be roughly equivalent to C$41 million as the Canadian
278. See 19 U.S.C. §1677(5)(B).
279. See 19 U.S.C. §1677(5A).
280. 19 U.S.C. §1677(5A)(D).
281. The countervailing duty statute implements all of the definitions and
requirements found in Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.
See, Agreement Establishing the World Trade Agreement, Annex 1A, Agree-
ment on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Part I.
282. See 19 U.S.C. §1677(5A)(D)(iv).
283. 19 U.S.C. § 1671b(b)(4)A.
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cattle industry annually averages nearly C$410 billion in total
sales.28 4
2. R-CALF's Subsidy Allegations
R-CALF alleged in its petition that the federal and provin-
cial governments of Canada were providing Canadian cattlemen
tens of millions of dollars in subsidies through 34 programs
ranging across nearly all the provinces in Canada, and varying
in size and scope. Chief among the alleged subsidies was the
Canadian Wheat Board's control of feed barley exports and the
resulting artificially depressed prices of feed barley in Canada.
Other alleged subsidies included cattle-specific loan programs
(e.g., Alberta Feeder Associations Guarantee Program), grant
programs (e.g., Net Income Stabilization Account; Saskatche-
wan Beef Development Fund), other programs such as the Beef
Industry Development Fund and the Canada-Alberta Beef In-
dustry Development Fund; range improvement programs such
as the Alberta Public Grazing Lands Improvement Program and
the Saskatchewan Crown Land Improvement Policy; programs
that had previously been found countervailable in other investi-
gations, such as the Technology Innovation Program Under the
Agri-Food Agreement, the Feed Freight Assistance Adjustment
Fund and the Western Diversification Program; tax rebates and
programs under which the government provided goods or serv-
ices (e.g., Saskatchewan Livestock and Horticultural Facilities
Incentives Program; Prairie Farm Rehabilitation Community
Pasture Program); and Provincial Crown Lands Programs.28 5
Commerce ultimately determined that 13 of the 34 pro-
grams alleged in the petition conferred countervailable subsi-
dies. 28 6 However, the actual amount of the benefit, when
allocated across the whole of Canadian cattle industry, totaled
less than the de minimis cut off of one percent. 28 7 Consequently,
Commerce issued a negative determination.
284. Commerce, Countervailing Duty Investigation of Live Cattle from Can-
ada, Calculations for Final Determination, Public, at p.3 (10/12/99)
285. See Petition 29-109.
286. See Final Negative Countervailing Duty Determination; Live Cattle
From Canada, 64 Fed. Reg. 57,041-57,047 (1999).
287. See id. at 57,040; Commerce, Countervailing Duty Investigation of Live
Cattle from Canada, Calculations for Final Determination, Public, at p.2 (10/12/
99).
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3. Narrow Interpretation of the Countervailing Duty Laws
May Close Avenues of Relief for Domestic Industries
It is ultimately, of course, within the Department of Com-
merce's mandate to decide cases, interpret and administer the
countervailing duty laws of the United States. Certain policy
interpretations made years before the Live Cattle from Canada
case was filed have substantially reduced the reach of the law to
numerous government subsidies that are likely trade-distorting.
(a) The Specificity Test as Applied to Agriculture
The countervailing duty investigation of live cattle from
Canada is illustrative of the limited effectiveness of the counter-
vailing duty law with respect to agricultural products in general
and to the live cattle industry in particular. For example, the
specificity test in the countervailing duty statute is intended to
"function as an initial screening mechanism to winnow out only
those foreign subsidies which are truly broadly available and
widely used throughout an economy."288 Thus, the provision of
public roads, water and electricity as part of new industrial
zones is not a countervailable subsidy.28 9 The policy question
then arises whether the "specificity" test should be interpreted
so that agriculture is an industry and hence broad-based agri-
cultural subsidies are within the reach of the countervailing
duty law. This question was one which arose during the cattle
case.
The issue of the impact of foreign agricultural subsidies on
the ability of U.S. farmers and ranchers to compete both in for-
eign and domestic markets has long been a significant concern
to Congress. In 1988, for example, Congress included among the
trade negotiating objectives of the United States in the GATT
Uruguay Round trade negotiations "creating a free and more
open world agricultural trading system by resolving questions
pertaining to export and other trade-distorting subsidies . .."29o
The issue of agricultural subsidies has continued to be a
source of substantial contention in current trade negotiations.
Agricultural subsidies are in fact a central focal point for the
United States in the Next Round of WTO negotiations. On the
eve of the recent Seattle Ministerial United States Trade Repre-
288. Statement of Administrative Action at 929 (emphasis added).
289. See Certain Steel Structural Shapes from Luxembourg, 47 Fed. Reg.
26,331, 26,333 (Dep't Commerce 1982) (prelim.).
290. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, §1101(a)(7)(C), 19
U.S.C. §2901.
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sentative Barshefsky called for "eliminating, and prohibiting in
the future, all export subsidies, and substantially reducing
trade-distorting domestic supports."291 The WTO Seattle Minis-
terial in December 1999, failed to achieve the objective of start-
ing a new round of multilateral trade negotiations in substantial
measure because certain WTO members, including the EU, Ja-
pan, Korea and others, resisted sweeping agricultural reform
commitments within the agenda.292
The purpose of the specificity test and the concerns about
agricultural subsidies, taken together, might lead one to con-
clude that the countervailing duty law would be an effective
means for domestic agriculture to obtain relief from subsidized
imports. However, since at least 1983, Commerce has taken the
position that the agricultural sector constitutes "more than a
single group of industries within the meaning of the Act."29 3
Subsequent pronouncements have similarly provided that Com-
merce "will not consider a domestic subsidy program specific
solely because it is limited to the agricultural sector."294 Rather,
the subsidy must be specific as to a particular subset of the agri-
cultural sector. Consequently, government programs that
broadly support agricultural production are not typically action-
able under the countervailing duty law.
291. Ambassador Charlene Barshefsky, Toward Seattle: The Next Round
and America's Stake in the Trading System, Address Before the Council on For-
eign Relations (October 19, 1999), in <http://www.ustr.gov/speeches/in-
dex.html>. Congressional leaders have also highlighted the importance of this
issue. See The Administration's Preparations for the 1999 World Trade Organi-
zation Ministerial Before the House Comm. on Agriculture, 106' Cong. 2 (1999)
(opening remarks of Rep. Larry Combest, Chairman, Committee on
Agriculture).
292. EU member states in Seattle did not display a commitment to agricul-
ture reform, which was "quite evident" in their rejection of the draft language
laying out the terms for future agriculture negotiations in the WTO, Barshefsky
charged. This must change because agriculture will be the heart of new negotia-
tions in the WTO. "If you can't get agreement on an agriculture text, there's no
reason to move forward," she said. "The U.S. and EU will work closely to try to
"arrive at greater commonality" in this area, even if they do not come to a full
agreement."
Barshefsky Urges EU to Scale Back Agenda for WTO Round, INSIDE U.S. TRADE,
December 24, 1999, at 3 (quoting U.S. Trade Representative Charlene
Barshefsky).
293. Fresh Asparagus from Mexico, 48 Fed. Reg. 21,618, 21,621 (Dep't Com-
merce 1983) (final neg. determination).
294. Countervailing Duties, 63 Fed. Reg. 65,348 , 65,357 (Dep't Commerce
1998) (final rule). The courts have upheld this interpretation. See also Roses
Inc. v. United States, 15 Ct. Int'l Trade 465, 474 (1991) ("While there is room for
debate on the meaning of the statutory words, Commerce's interpretation is
within the realm of acceptable definitions.").
2000]
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Whether Commerce's interpretation is a sound one is open
to debate. On the one hand, the interpretation essentially views
"agriculture" as a sector that is distinct from "manufacturing."
Presumably, subsidies which generally benefit the manufactur-
ing base of a country's economy (e.g., change in the tax law to
allow accelerated depreciation of plant and equipment) would
not be regarded as specific.295
On the other hand, in developed countries, agriculture is a
very small part of the overall economy. The USDA 1997 Census
of the Agriculture, for example, reported that the United States
had 1.911 million farms and 1.042 million operators in total,
(less than one percent of the entire workforce). 296 In Canada, as
of 1996, there were 387,550 farm operators altogether and
276,548 farms.297 Commerce's interpretation that a sector of
the economy which employs such a small percentage of the
workforce is not a "specific group of industries" is difficult to rec-
oncile with the instruction that only those subsidies which are
"truly broadly available" and "widely used throughout an econ-
omy" should be found non-specific. 298 As well, the interpretation
ensures that the law will not be used to address what are widely
recognized as trade distorting subsidies, and that the affected
industries will therefore have to go to other fora.
295. As well, the United States provides various subsidies to agriculture
such as the emergency loans and grants in the 1998 farm bill. The concern is
expressed in some quarters that such subsidies could make U.S. agricultural
exports the target of foreign countervailing duty investigations were the Com-
merce Department to impose duties on every imported agricultural product
which benefited from some foreign subsidy that was "generally available" to ag-
riculture in that country. However, such "emergency" subsidies would not be
actionable if they qualify as "Green Box" domestic support measures in the
WTO Agreement on Agriculture (i.e., no or minimal trade-distorting effects or
effects on production). See Statement of Administrative Action at 716 and 937.
296. See USDA, 1997 Census of the Agriculture, Highlights of Agriculture:
1997 and 1992 (visited Mar. 9, 2000) <http'J/www.nass.usda.gov/census/cen-
sus97/highlights/usasum/us.txt>.
297. See Statistics Canada, Profile of Farm Operators Classified by Occupa-
tion and Sex, 1991 and 1996, Canada (visited Mar. 9, 2000) <httpJ/
www.statcan.ca/english/censusag /apr26/ canl.htm> and see Statistics Canada,
Farm Population, 1991 and 1996, Canada (visited Mar. 9, 2000) <httpJ/
www.statcan.ca/english/censusag/apr26/can3.htm>,
298. See Statement of Administrative Action at 929, 930 ("The specificity
test was intended to function as a rule of reason and to avoid the imposition of
countervailing duties in situations where, because of the widespread availabil-
ity and use of a subsidy, the benefit of the subsidy is spread throughout the
economy. Conversely, the specificity test was not intended to function as a loop-
hole through which narrowly focussed subsidies provided to or used by discrete
segments of an economy could escape the purview of the CVD law.") Id. at 930
(emphasis in original).
532 [Vol. 9:449
TRADE AND CATTLE
In the cattle case, Commerce's interpretation of specificity
proved important with regard to the National Insurance Stabili-
zation Act (NISA). NISA allows agricultural producers to set
aside funds to cover cyclical downturns in their income. The ini-
tial portion of the producer's deposit is matched by the federal
government, plus an additional amount may be deposited by a
producer without matching government contributions. 299 NISA
is a $200 million national program available in all provinces.300
Most agricultural products are eligible and qualifying commodi-
ties vary by province.30 1 Because of Commerce's specificity in-
terpretation, the program would be actionable only if cattle
producers were disproportionate users of the program and the
program was thus de facto specific.30 2 Based on the program's
compensation pattern, Commerce rejected this claim and found
"that NISA assistance is not limited to a specific enterprise or
industry, or group of enterprises or industries. Therefore, we
determine that assistance received by cattle producers under
the NISA program is not countervailable."303 Use of the coun-
tervailing duty provisions of the trade law are therefore much
more difficult for any agricultural industry as all broadly avail-
able foreign agricultural subsidy programs are exempted from
the scrutiny of the law.
(b) "Uncreditworthiness" in the Context of a Fragmented
Industry
Government loans to foreign producers can be a subsidy if
they are issued on terms inconsistent with commercial consider-
ations.30 4 Pursuant to Section 771(5)(E)(iii) of the Tariff Act of
1930, as amended, 30 5 Commerce will find that a countervailable
benefit has been conferred if:
(ii) in the case of a loan, if there is a difference between the amounts
the recipient of the loan pays on the loan and the amount the recipient
would pay on a comparable commercial loan that the recipient could
actually obtain on the market...
(iii) in the case of a loan guarantee, if there is a difference, after adjust-
ing for any difference in the guarantee fees, between the amount the
299. See Live Cattle from Canada, 64 Fed. Reg. 57,040, 57,054 (Dep't Com-
merce, 1999) (determination).
300. See AGRICULTURE AND AGRI-FOOD CANADA, 1998-99 REPORT ON PLANS
AND PRIORITIES 32 (1998).
301. See 64 Fed. Reg. 57,054.
302. See id.
303. See id.
304. 19 U.S.C. §1677(5)(B).
305. 19 U.S.C. §1677(5)(E)(iii).
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recipient of the guarantee pays on the guaranteed loan and the amount
the recipient would pay for a comparable commercial loan if there were
no guarantee by the authority ....
In order to select a comparable commercial loan, Commerce will
normally place primary emphasis on similarities in the struc-
tures of the loans (e.g., fixed interest rate v. variable interest
rate), the maturities of the loans (e.g., short-term v. long-term),
and the currencies in which the loans are denominated. 30 6 If
however Commerce finds that the company receiving a govern-
ment-provided long-term loan was "uncreditworthy", then Com-
merce will calculate an adjustment to raise the benchmark
interest rate to reflect the increased risk.307 In the case of the
cattle industry, however, subsidy theory met a practical prob-
lem: namely, how does one show that some 100,000 plus Cana-
dian ranchers are "uncreditworthy"?
In conducting a creditworthy analysis Commerce commonly
examines three, non-exclusive factors:
Current and past indicators of a firm's financial health calculated from
that firm's financial statements and accounts,
The firm's recent past and present ability to meet its costs and fixed
financial obligations with its cash flow, and
Future financial prospects of the firm including market studies, eco-
nomic forecasts, and projects or loan appraisals. 30 8
Commerce examines the financial performance of a company for
a number of years prior to the target year.30 9 If the company's
306. Countervailing Duties, 62 Fed. Reg. 8,818, 8,849 (Dep't Commerce
1997) (notice).
307. See id. at 8849-50.
308. See Customs Duties, 19 C.F.R. §351.505(a)(4)(i) (1999). For a more de-
tailed discussion of the Department's creditworthiness criteria, see, Certain
Steel Products from France, 58 FR 37,304, 37,306 (Dep't Commerce 1993) (de-
termination); Certain Steel Products from the United Kingdom, 58 Fed. Reg.
37,393, 37,395 (Dep't Commerce 1993) (determination).
309. Steel Wire Rod from Venezuela, 62 Fed. Reg. 55,014, 55,019 (Dep't
Commerce 1997) (determination).
[SIDOR's] financial picture in the three years prior to 1991 was erratic....
SIDOR's real revenue growth was negative in 1988 and 1989, and, after making
an adjustment for inflation, the company's profit margin was negative in each of
the three years preceding 1991. According to Venezuelan commercial bankers,
this is a key factor in evaluating a company's ability to meet its debt obligation.
See Memo Re: Meetings with Commercial Bankers at 3. While the bankers also
stated that they would lend to Venezuelan companies with a debt-to-equity ra-
tio of up to 300 percent, they further indicated that a key factor would be
whether the company had survived the crises of the economy. This cannot be
said of SIDOR. The company's own projections at the time made clear that
without the [Government of Venezula's] conversion of SIDOR's external debt,
the company would not have been able to meet its debt obligations. See SIDOR
[Verification Report] at Exhibit 21 and the "Equityworthiness" discussion
above.
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financial performance is such that the company in question
would not have been able to obtain commercial financing at com-
monly available interest rates then it is deemed "un-
creditworthy. 3 10 For uncreditworthy companies, Commerce
uses as the discount loan rate applied to loans given to the com-
pany, the highest long-term fixed interest rate commonly avail-
able to firms in the country plus an amount equal to 12 percent
of the prime rate.3 1 1
In order to sustain an uncreditworthiness allegation, the
Department has "established a policy . . . that an un-
creditworthy allegation must be made on a company-specific ba-
sis." 3 12 Central to Commerce's requirement is that the
investigation of "uncreditworthiness" creates an additional and
heavy administrative strain on its resources. 3 13 When allega-
tions are made for large, publicly traded entities, such as a steel
company or some other manufacturing company, financial per-
formance data is readily available. It is therefore normally not
difficult for petitioners to examine public records such as SEC
filings, corporate press releases, corporate annual reports or
similar sources of information which disclose information about
a company's profit and loss record. "Company specific" informa-
tion is therefore available and the potential creditability of peti-
tioner's allegations can be accurately determined before complex
investigations are initiated without undue strain on
Commerce. 3 14
However, as there are over 100,000 Canadian farms that
raise beef cattle, and given that the industry is not concentrated,
it was quite simply impossible for the petitioner to compile com-
pany-specific information with respect to a significant or repre-
sentative number of cattle producers. Furthermore, it was
310. Countervailing Duties, 62 Fed. Reg. 8,818, 8,850 (Dep't Commerce
1997) (notice).
311. See e.g., Certain Steel Products From Brazil, 58 Fed. Reg. 37,295,
37,298 (Dep't Commerce 1993) (determination); Grain-Oriented Electrical
Steel From Italy, 59 Fed. Reg. 18,357, 18,358 (Dep't Commerce 1994)
(determination).
312. Fresh and Chilled Atlantic Salmon from Norway, 56 Fed. Reg. 7,678,
7,683 (Dep't Commerce 1991) (determination).
313. Countervailing Duties, 63 Fed. Reg. 65,348, 65,368 (Dep't Commerce
1998) (final rule).
314. As an example, in Structural Steel Beams, Commerce stated "Petition-
ers have also alleged that Kangwon was uncreditworthy from 1991 through
1998. Based upon the information provided by petitioners, including financial
ratios, we are initiating an investigation of Kangwon's creditworthiness for the
years 1991 through 1998." Structural Steel Beams from the Republic of Korea,
64 Fed. Reg. 42,088, 42,090 (Dep't Commerce 1999) (notice).
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particularly difficult to obtain company-specific financial infor-
mation in this industry because most farms/ranches are not pub-
licly owned and, therefore, are not required to publish their
financial statements. On the other hand, industry data were
available, were representative of the industry of a whole, and
established a reasonable basis to conclude that Canadian cattle
operations were "uncreditworthy" for purposes of applying Com-
merce's countervailing duty regulations and practice.
The Commerce Department recognized this dilemma and
provided that alternative information could be submitted which
showed that the Canadian cattle industry, in general, was un-
able to obtain long-term financing from commercial sources.
315
In the absence of company-specific information, petitioner
placed on the record reasonably available industry-wide evi-
dence of industry-wide uncreditworthiness. 316 Canadian statis-
tics showed that home market cattle prices had been below the
cost of production for the last 12 months prior to the filing of the
petition and both home market and export prices had been be-
low the cost of production from January through August
1998.317 Furthermore, the losses incurred by the Canadian cat-
tle industry were persistent on a national basis over several
years. Consider the following:
(1) A 1995 Special Issue of the Canadian Journal of Economics,
"Farms, Farm Families, and Farming Communities," showed
that in 1991, low income cow-calf operations in Ontario had neg-
ative net returns, and average income operations were margin-
ally profitable.3 18
(2) Over the period 1994-1996, the Canadian cattle industry as a
whole suffered deep and persistent losses, as shown by Statistics
Canada data:
315. Live Cattle from Canada, 63 Fed. Reg. 71,889, 71,892 (Dep't of Com-
merce 1998).
316. Original Petition at p.40-42 and Table 6b.
317. Id.
318. See Original Petition Exhibit 16b at p. 19 0 .
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Average Canadian Cattle Farm Revenues Operating Expenses,
Depreciation and Losses
1994 1995 1996
C$/farm)
Cattle Farms
Farm revenues 122,130 129,267 119,894
Operating expenses 113,246 120,495 111,875
Net cash income 8,884 8,773 8,019
Depreciation 18,417 19,996 18,632
Profit (loss) (9,533) (11,223) (10,613)
Note: Data provided by Statistics Canada for "Average Farm Revenues, Operating
Expenses and net Cash Income per Farm by Farm Type," only include farm
revenues, operating expenses and net cash income. To calculate depreciation,
Statistics Canada's on-line statistical database was consulted to obtain the ratio of
depreciation to operating expenses.
Thus, at least over the period 1994-1996, the Canadian cat-
tle industry on a national basis suffered substantial losses.
Moreover, on a regional basis, producers in every major cattle-
producing region were unprofitable during at least fiscal year
1998. Thus, there was evidence on which Commerce could have
easily concluded that the industry as a whole would not receive
long-term loans from normal commercial sources. It follows,
therefore, that a substantial portion of the individual producers
were uncreditworthy on a company-specific basis.
Commerce declined to accept this methodology and rejected
petitioner's uncreditworthiness allegation. 319 Specifically, Com-
merce stated: "[Tihe petitioner has not provided specific evi-
dence indicating that the current financial condition of the
Canadian cattle industry will continue into the future or any
other information directly supporting the conclusion that the in-
dustry has been unable to obtain long-term commercial financ-
ing."320 "Specific" and "direct" evidence, however, is typically
not available when analyzing a fragmented foreign industry
such as the Canadian cattle industry. It is also open to question
as to how petitioner could or should have known that it had to
show the Canadian industry's poor financial condition would
"continue into the future" when all precedent showed that Com-
merce examined financial data retrospectively. The current in-
terpretation of the uncreditworthy requirement of the statute
seems to prevent a fragmented domestic industry from receiving
proper redress for the benefits given to its foreign competi-
319. See Live Cattle from Canada, 63 Fed. Reg. 71,892.
320. Id.
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tors. 32 ' Use of the trade laws is thus rendered even more diffi-
cult for fragmented industries such as the cattle industry.
4. The Administration of the International Trade Law Creates
Inherent Dilemmas which Impede the Ability of
Domestic Industries to Receive Redress
Administering the international trade law presents a di-
lemma for the Department of Commerce. They are instructed by
the Congress to both investigate and then adjudicate the laws.
In their role as investigator, Commerce must aggressively
gather the facts of a case, yet as the adjudicator of the law Com-
merce would seemingly have to play a more neutral role. The
balance that must be struck between these dual roles is difficult
and becomes even more challenging when the Department in-
vestigates a fellow sovereign under the countervailing duty
laws. These difficulties all were exhibited in the Live Cattle
from Canada case.
The petitioning domestic industry does not have discovery
rights under the international trade law. Unlike civil lawsuits,
the interests that harmed industries seek to protect cannot be
enforced by direct requests for information, mandatory disclo-
sure of documents or depositions of critical witnesses. Petition-
ers assemble a case from publicly available information, the
constructed case attempts to provide information regarding the
nature and quantity of the unfair trading act which is then
given to Commerce. Sources for data include public laws or de-
crees, public budgetary data showing government outlays, com-
pany financial reports, research reports on companies, etc.
While highly probative, such information rarely tells the whole
story and direct information from the foreign parties involved in
the case must be analyzed. Petitioners, however, cannot directly
ask for any documents from the foreign party. Rather, Com-
merce is empowered with the investigatory authority and thus
has the responsibility to request and analyze information.
A petitioner's role, after presenting a plausible case to Com-
merce, is to examine the information provided and point out in-
consistency, provide suggestions for additional information
requests, as well as how such information fits within the law.
As active as petitioners are and can be under the law, the inves-
321. Had Commerce chosen to follow petitioner's logic the workload would
not have been great. For example, they could have sampled producers in order
to substantiate or reject an uncreditworthiness allegation based on actual re-
sponses to questionnaires.
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tigation and the discovery power is controlled by Commerce. In
administering the law, however, Commerce must also adjudi-
cate the dispute before it. In that role Commerce should seem-
ingly be, as all good judges are, neutral and objective in its
examination of the facts. This can obviously cause an internal
dilemma. If Commerce is a zealous and aggressive investigator,
the conduct of the investigation can color and shape the ultimate
decision in a case; the zealous investigator may in effect taint
the neutral judge. If, on the other hand, Commerce attempts to
be as neutral as possible, then the collection of factual data may
be impeded by a determined foreign party. In turn, without true
and complete facts the decision made by Commerce may be cor-
rupted. This internal conflict is made even more difficult when
the foreign party is a foreign, sovereign government. In such a
setting all the deferences that are traditionally granted to for-
eign sovereigns, and best left to a conflict of laws course, also
enter into play.3 2
2
322. When Congress passed the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 implement-
ing the changes to U.S. trade law that were agreed upon in the Tokyo Round
GATT negotiations, Congress added to the antidumping and countervailing
duty laws a provision requiring verification of foreign responses to antidumping
and countervailing duty questionnaires. Congress explained the reason for the
provision, stating "Numerous complaints have been made regarding the current
practices on verification of information submitted.., in antidumping and coun-
tervailing duty proceedings, particularly information submitted by foreign gov-
ernments." S. Rep. 96-249, at 98 (emphasis added). One example from this
period illustrating inappropriate deference is the case of ASG Industries Inc., v.
United States, 610 F.2d 770 (C.C.P.A. 1979). In that case domestic float glass
manufacturers petitioned the Treasury Department for the imposition of a
countervailing duty on imports of float glass from West Germany alleging that
German manufacturers received benefits under various government programs.
See id. Treasury initially determined that imports of float were indeed benefit-
ing from West German government subsidies. See id. at 773. Treasury later
reversed its position because: "Ithe German Government has advised the
Treasury Department that these benefits have the effect of offsetting disadvan-
tages which would discourage industry from moving to and expanding in less
prosperous regions." See 610 F.2d at 780. The Customs Court affirmed Treas-
ury's determination. See ASG Industries, Inc. v. U.S., 82 Cust. Ct. 1 (1979). On
appeal the appellate court found that Treasury's determination lacked an ade-
quate factual basis. Id. at 775. In the Court's words, "the statement that '[tihe
German Government has advised the Treasury Department that these benefits
have the effect of offsetting disadvantages which would discourage industry
from moving to and expanding in less prosperous regions' is totally inade-
quate.... [Tihe statement that Treasury was 'advised' is hardly a factual basis
supporting the conclusion that there was no bounty or grant." Id. at 778. The
Court stated that Treasury's finding of "no net benefit" to the foreign manufac-
turer "must be established by facts-not by mere allegations of the foreign gov-
ernment or of the enterprises receiving the bounty or grant." Id. Thus the
Court held that the agency can not simply accept the unsupported statements
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In the specific example of the cattle case the full participa-
tion of the petitioner and the role of Commerce was made more
difficult by the nature of the parties investigated and the timing
of the information provided. One of the most critical subsidy al-
legations made by petitioner was the question of whether the
Canadian Wheat Board was providing an indirect subsidy to the
cattlemen in Canada. The CWB has exclusive authority to mar-
ket Canadian feed and malting barley in export markets. In the
Canadian domestic market, the CWB has exclusive marketing
authority only with respect to malting barley. R-CALF alleged
that the CWB's pooling system323 sent distorted market signals
to Canadian farmers, and that the system of marketing feed bar-
of a foreign government in a countervailing duty investigation. The same prin-
ciple underlay Congress' enactment, in the 1979 Trade Act, of the requirement
that information relied upon by the agency in a trade investigation be verified.
Thus, when section 782(i) of the Tariff Act of 1930 was amended, Congress
required Commerce to "verify all information relied upon in making... a final
determination in an investigation." 19 U.S.C. §1677m(i). Where information is
not verifiable because it was submitted late or not at all, or an interested party
significantly impedes an investigation, then Commerce is authorized to rely on
"information available," including information provided by the petitioner. 19
U.S.C. §1677e. In the case of Industrial Nitrocellulose from France, for exam-
ple, the government of France refused to supply data "required to prove or dis-
prove the petitioner's allegation that military sales provide a [subsidy]."
Industrial Nitrocellulose from France, 48 Fed. Reg. 11,971, 11,972 (Dep't Com-
merce 1983). As a result, Commerce resorted to "best information .... avail-
able." Affd Hercules, Inc. v. United States, 11 CIT 710, 729 (1987) (upholding
the use of "best information available" where France refused to submit data
that would establish whether production of the subject merchandise was profit-
able.). In the context of disclosure of verification exhibits, the government of
Thailand has argued that government documents obtained in a countervailing
duty investigation should not be subject to the same rules as business proprie-
tary documents obtained in an antidumping case. The Court of International
Trade rejected the argument as "meritless." Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v.
United States, 13 CIT 698, 704, n.7 (1989). Thailand also argued that princi-
ples of international comity should prevent the release of confidential govern-
ment information. The court rejected this argument, holding that the statute
permitted a foreign government, as much as a private party, to withdraw docu-
ments from the record if it objected to their disclosure. See id., n.8. Concep-
tually, these cases illustrate that after the Trade Act of 1979, foreign
governments in countervailing duty investigations should be treated in the
same manner as would private parties in antidumping investigations.
323. The pooling mechanism is the defining feature of the CWB's operations.
The CWB operates a separate "pool" for each of the four crops under its author-
ity (wheat, durum wheat, feed barley and "designated" or malting barley). Pool-
ing means that the CWB pays every farmer the same amount for a given
quantity and quality of grain based on the weighted-average price received for
all the barley marketed in the pool year, regardless of when in the crop year the
farmer sells to the CWB and regardless of the specific sales prices the CWB
realizes on the individual sales of that grain. CWB characterizes the pooling
mechanism as a risk management tool designed to protect farmers from ad-
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ley in Canada imposed excessive costs on farmers who wished to
export, with the result that feed barley exports were less than
they otherwise would be. As a result, R-CALF alleged more feed
barley was made available on the domestic market, which artifi-
cially lowered prices paid by Canadian cattle producers. R-
CALF contended that Commerce should find the Canadian
Wheat Board Act and its regulations de jure specific because
they provide an indirect "financial contribution" which was ex-
pressly limited to Canadian livestock and poultry farmers. 324
While not an explicit export restriction such as ones which had
been investigated and found countervailable by Commerce in
prior cases, the CWB's control over, and operations in, the feed
barley market had similar results as such export restrictions. 325
The Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) is a state trading enter-
prise.326 As such unique factual and procedural issues arose for
both petitioners and Commerce.
In 1996 a GAO study highlighted the problems and concerns
that governments and individuals have with STEs. "STEs that
have monopoly buying authority for certain domestic products
may gain advantages as a result of their overall control of the
domestic supply."327 In turn, these advantages can be trade dis-
torting, such as where STE authority allows cross-subsidization
verse price fluctuations that may occur throughout the year. See 64 Fed. Reg.
at 57,048.
324. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(D).
325. See Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, 57 Fed. Reg.
22,570, 22,605 (Dep't Commerce 1992) (determination); Leather from Argen-
tina, 55 Fed. Reg. 40,212 (Dep't Commerce 1990) (notice).
326. WTO Committee on State Trading Enterprises, Notification Pursuant
to Article XVII.4.a of the GATT 1994 and Paragraph 1 of the Understanding on
the Interpretation of Article XVII - CANADA, G/STR/N/1CAN (Sept. 29, 1995).
Article XVII defines state trading as occurring where a WTO member "estab-
lishes or maintains a state enterprise... or grants to any enterprise ... exclu-
sive or special privileges." Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Agreement, Annex 1A, Article XVII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade 1947, as amended. The article however, does not define either "state en-
terprise" or "privileges". One result of the Uruguay Round included the Under-
standing on the Interpretation of Article XVII which provides the following
working definition for state trading enterprises:
"Governmental and non-governmental enterprises, including marketing
boards, which have been granted exclusive or special rights or privileges, in-
cluding statutory or constitutional powers, in the exercise of which they influ-
ence through their purchases or sales the level or direction of imports or
exports." WTO Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XVII, paragraph
1.
327. NATL SEC. AND INT'L AFFAIRs Drv., GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CANADA,
AusTRAIuA, AND NEW ZEALAND - PoTENTIAL ABiLTY OF AGRIcuLTURAL STATE
ENTERPRISES TO DISTORT TRADE (1996).
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between domestic and foreign markets or between foreign mar-
kets.328 Government financial support for STEs involving either
direct and indirect subsidies also provides advantages for STEs
over their private competitors in world markets thus distorting
world trade patterns. "Additionally, relationships between STEs
and foreign buyers can provide advantages through the ability
to charge different prices in different markets."3 29 The United
States has consistently placed and continues to place reform of
agricultural STEs high on its agenda for WTO negotiations. 330
Moreover, special U.S. concerns regarding the CWB itself
are contentious, and involve an on-going conflict over the price
effects and role of the CWB. An October 1999 General Account-
ing Office report on the CWB begins with this opening line:
U.S.-Canadian grain trade has been a source of contentious debate be-
tween the two countries over the past dozen years as Canadian wheat
exports to the United States have increased. 33 1
Indeed, the conflict over the CWB is also a contentious issue within
Canada as farmers have protested the government's monopoly control
over grain.33 2 These protests involve civil disobedience, legal chal-
lenges, referendum votes, and illegal exportation of grain to the United
States.3 3
3
Further adding to the concerns about the CWB were practi-
cal issues regarding the ability of anyone to adequately investi-
gate the Wheat Board. The GAO reported that: "[tihe CWB
discloses only limited information about its prices for the wheat
328. Id. Cross-subsidization can occur when an STE sells products at a loss
in one market and finances those losses through highly profitable sales in an-
other market.
329. Id.
330. Ambassador Charlene Barshefsky, American Agriculture in the New
Round, Testimony Before the House Committee on Agriculture (October 20,
1999) in <http'//www.ustr.gov/testimony/barshefsky_3l.html>.
331. NAT L SEC. AND INT'L AFFAIRS Div., GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, U.S. AG-
RICULTURAL TRADE - CANADIAN WHEAT IssuEs 2 (1998).
332. The GAO report samples some of the massive and conflicting academic
literature which examines the role of the CWB. Id. Appendix III, at 70-78.
333. See, e.g., Terry Johnson, Wheat Board Rebellion, Canadian Growers
Eye Profits in the U.S., FARM J., April 1997, at <http//www.access.gpo.gov/
su_docs/aces/acesl60.shtml>; David Lees, Against the Grain: Andy McMechan
Picked a Fight With the Canadian Wheat Board Over Who Could Sell His Crops
and Ended Up in Jail. But Even if the Courts Said He Was in the Wrong, A Lot
of Farmers Say the Wheat Board Isn't Right," FIN. POST (TORONTO), Mar. 1,
1997 at 14; K Archibald, Barley Growers in a Dilemma CALGARY HERALD, Dec.
6, 1996 at A23 ("Polls and a plebiscite in Albertta have shown that most farm-
ers want the freedom to choose how to market their grain - on the open market
or through the Canadian Wheat Board."). Provincial governments also have
sued the Canadian Wheat Board over its grain delivery programs. See, e.g.,
Alberta v. Canadian Wheat Board,, 138 F.T.R.186 (1997).
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and barley that it sells to its trading partners. U.S. officials be-
lieve that the lack of transparency in the CWB's prices may pro-
vide it with more flexibility than is found among private grain
traders."334 The CWB is so secretive that the Canadian em-
bassy wrote, in objecting to disclosure of certain documents to
petitioner counsel, that:
The information in question is extremely commercially sensitive. It
has never been disclosed outside the CWB without the CWB's express
authorization, including in a legal proceeding in any jurisdiction. In-
deed, it has never been disclosed to the Government of Canada by au-
dit or otherwise, and the Government of Canada does not have access
to the pricing information for which [access is requested] .335
This level of secrecy and the significant magnitude of the
issues surrounding CWB heightened petitioner's concerns about
access to information. As indicated above, from the petitioner's
perspective the success or failure of an investigation is in many
respects controlled by the diligence with which Commerce inves-
tigates the foreign party and asks for critical pieces of informa-
tion. From Commerce's perspective the secrecy of the CWB and
the sensitivity of the issues surrounding the Wheat Board un-
doubtedly magnified the internal tensions the agency has in
every case.
The Canadian Wheat Board Act (C-24) was originally en-
acted in 1935. The CWBA established the Canadian Wheat
Board as a government agency accountable to Parliament "with
the object of marketing in an orderly manner, in interprovincial
and export trade, grain grown in Canada. 3 36 Originally enacted
334. NA'L SEC. AND INT'L AFFAIRS Div., GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, U.S. AG-
RICULTURAL TRADE - CANADIAN WHEAT IssuEs 41 (1998).
335. Government of Canada, Live Cattle from Canada- Objection to Disclo-
sure of Certain Information under Administrative Protective Order, Public, at
p.2 April 27, 1999.
336. Canadian Wheat Board Act, R.S.C., ch. C-24, §5 (1985). In Saskatche-
wan Wheat Pool v. Canada [1993] 107 D.L.R. 190, 195, the court briefly re-
viewed the CWBA's early history:
The Canadian Wheat Board Act, 1935, S.C. 1935, c. 53, was first enacted in that
year. At first the Act, and the board established under it, dealt only with
wheat. Initially, the Canadian Wheat Board did not have exclusive control over
the marketing of wheat, but by amendments to the Act in 1947, c. 15, such
exclusive control was conferred on the board. By amendments to the Act in
1948, c. 4. S. 5, Parliament enacted enabling legislation in the form of s. 29A of
the Act, providing for the exclusive control by the Canadian Wheat Board over
the interprovincial and international trading to oats and barley.
On June 11, 1998, the Canadian Parliament approved Bill C-4, which made
certain amendments to the Canadian Wheat Board Act to the structure and
status of the CWB. Prior to the amendments, the CWB consisted of three feder-
ally-appointed commissioners, with an 11-member, farmer-elected Advisory
Committee. As amended, the CWB Act provides for a 15-member board of di-
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as a voluntary organization, the CWB was made compulsory in
1943. 3 3 7 From 1935 until 1949, the CWB's control covered
wheat only. In 1949, the CWB was granted exclusive authority
over the domestic and export trading of oats and barley.
In the 1974/75 period, by regulation, the domestic trading
of, inter alia, feed barley was removed from the CWB's control.
The exclusion of feed barley for domestic sale from the CWB's
control was the result of dissatisfaction and complaints from Ca-
nadian livestock producers who were upset about the high cost
of feed grain. The Western Stock Growers' Association, a group
of Canadian cattlemen, has summarized this issue as follows:
By the 1970s... [w]ith respect to CWB domestic feed pricing policies,
livestock producers had no confidence that the prices they were paying
were reasonable and based on competitive world prices. The CWB's
domestic selling price had no visible relationship to world feed grain
prices and had no floor price consisting of the initial price plus freight
and expected CWB handling costs. Feed grain users complained they
were being ripped off.3 3 8
rectors, ten of whom will be elected by farmers, with the other five, including
the president, to be appointed by the Governor in Council. The CWB Act
amendments also changed the status of the CWB from a Crown corporation to a
mixed enterprise agency. In addition, the CWB Act amendments provide farm-
ers with additional and more flexible pricing options, and allow the CWB to
establish a contingency fund to guarantee adjustments to initial payments or to
cover losses. See generally, Act to Amend the Canadian Wheat Board Act, Bill
C-4, S.C. 1998, c.17 found at <http'//canada.justice.gc.ca/FTP/EN/Regs/>.
Although the CWB Act amendments made significant changes to the CWB's
corporate structure, they did not change the essential operations of the CWB.
The CWB is still empowered to act as a monopoly seller of wheat and barley, the
government still provides financial guarantees, and the CWB is still subject to
government direction and control. In sum, even after the 1998 amendments to
the CWB Act, the CWB still maintains its three "pillars": (1) single-desk selling;
(2) price pooling; and (3) government guarantees.
337. See W. STOCK GROWERS' ASS'N, A RESPONSE TO BiLL C-72, AN ACT TO
AMEND THE CANADIAN WHEAT BOARD ACT AND TO MAKE CONSEQuENTIAL AMEND-
MENTS TO OTHER ACTS, (1997) <http'/www.cattle.ca/cattle%5Forganizations/
wsga%2D9w6/briefs/cwb%5Fall.htm>.
338. Id. Another study has also noted that the price and supply availability
of feed grain to livestock feeders were considerations in removing CWB control
over domestic feed grain sales:
CWB control over interprovincial shipments of feed grains became a
public issue during the grains crisis in 1969 to 1972. Farmer border
crossings (provincial borders, not the U.S. border) lead [sic] to much
publicized RCMP arrests in 1969 and 1970. Western farmer dissatis-
faction with excessive controls on feed grains, and eastern feeder con-
cerns with the price and supply availability were important factors
leading to the Feed Grain Policy changes in the 1970s. Some changes
were made in 1974, and by 1976, the domestic feed grain market had
returned to a reasonably open system with restoration of unimpeded
interprovincial shipments and futures of oats, barley and feed wheat.
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Such historical statements fueled petitioner's allegations.
This however, was not the first time that the CWB's restrictions
on feed barley exports had been cited as conferring subsidies on
Canadian cattle producers. The CWB's benefits to Canadian
ranchers were brought to prominence in 1998 by the NCBA
which stated, "that this price advantage on barley gives Cana-
dian cattle feeders up to a $60 per head advantage on production
costs [vis-A-vis U.S. feeders]." 3 39 This assertion was supported
by Canadian barley farmers and ranchers during Senate hear-
ings discussing the possible reform of the CWB. In field hear-
ings during 1998, Canadian barley farmers stated that they
believed Canadian feed barley prices would equal world market
prices if the CWB control over exports were removed.340 In later
testimony Canadian cattlemen urged their Senators not to
change the CWB because the current marketing structure of the
CWB depressed feed barley prices which resulted in lower input
costs to ranchers. 341
Commerce ultimately determined that the CWB in fact has
extensive control over the feed barley export market and that its
operations in that market can, and do, have a major impact in
the domestic feed barley market.3 42 Thus, as a legal matter,
Colin A. Carter & R.M.A. Loyns, The Economics of Single Desk Selling of West-
ern Canadian Grain (March 1996), at Section III at 3 (subsection "Some Rele-
vant CWB and Operational Issues").
339. NCBA Moves To Eliminate Barley Import Barriers, NCBA Press Re-
lease (June 17, 1996) <http://www.beef.org/newsroom/ncba/archive/
nr_barlncba.html>.
340. Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on Agriculture and For-
estry, 36th Parl., 1st sess. (Can. 1998) (statement of Doug Robertson, represen-
tative of the Western Barley Growers' Association) <www.parl.gc.ca/36/1/
parlbus/commbus/senate/com-e/ agri-e/08eva-e.htm>.
341. During the question and answer period of the Senate Standing Com-
mittee on Agriculture the following exchange occurred:
Senator Ghitter (of Alberta): I found your argument somewhat remarkable in
this sense. I have always regarded the cattlemen as being great free traders
and wanting to be in global markets. I have heard those arguments during my
years in Alberta, but if I am reading you right, you do not want the grain produ-
cers to have that same opportunity. You do not want them to have the opportu-
nity to share in the betterment of their price and product. You want to depress
their prices so that you can take the advantage of it and add value to your prod-
uct, but you do not want them to get value. Am I misreading what you are
saying, or is that what I am hearing?
Mr. Prentice: You have us figured.
Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry,
36th Parl., 1" sess. (Can. 1998) (statement of John Prentice, Director of the
Canadian Cattleman's Association) <http://www.parl.gc.ca/36/1/parlbus/
commbuslsenatecom-eagri-e/09eva-e.htm>. (emphasis added).
342. See 64 Fed. Reg. at 57048.
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CWB control over feed barley exports would be actionable under
the statute depending on whether such control conferred a bene-
fit on Canadian cattle producers by reducing the cost of feed bar-
ley. Hard data therefore came to the forefront in determining
whether the CWB's actions conferred a subsidy.
The original questionnaire, 343 issued January 28, 1999, in-
structed GOC, as follows:
Please report the total volume and value of all export sales of barley
(separately for feed and malt barley) on a monthly basis, by country of
destination, for the period April 1, 1997 to July 31, 1998. State the
quantity measure and value basis (e.g., fob, ex-farm, ex-elevator, etc.).
Identify the source of such information and the manner in which it was
collected. 3
44
In response to this query, the GOC submitted export statistics
compiled by Statistics Canada, and import statistics compiled by
the U.S. Census Bureau.345 The GOC then went on to claim
that the Statistics Canada did not separate malt barley from
feed barley.346 Yet, at all times the CWB had data showing pre-
cisely what was requested.
The CWB not only could separate feed barley from malt bar-
ley sales, but it could further identify individual transactions by
point of sale and identify the grade shipped and discounts ap-
plied. The CWB regulates all barley for human consumption
within the designated area in Canada and all barley, malt or
feed, for export.347 Because feed grade barley is not restricted
for domestic sale, the CWB must be able to distinguish feed
grade and malt barley to prevent illegal off-Board sales and
otherwise perform its function.
In its Second Supplemental questionnaire issued on April
13, 1999, Commerce specifically instructed the GOC to provide
343. Questionnaires serve as the main Commerce investigative tool. Com-
merce's Antidumping Manual provides that "[tihe questionnaire should de-
scribe all the essential information necessary to conduct an investigation or
review for the individual respondent that is involved." Department of Com-
merce, Antidumping Manual, ch. 4, p.1 (Jan. 22, 1998).
344. U.S. Department of Commerce, Original Questionnaire in the Counter-
vailing Duty Investigation of Live Cattle from Canada, Question 15 (Jan. 28,
1999).
345. See Government of Canada, Monthly Canadian Barley Export Data for
Period: April 1997-July 1998, Questionnaire Response, Public, Exhibit 19 (3/
14/99).
346. See Id.
347. See Government of Canada, Countervailing Duty Investigation of Live
Cattle from Canada, First Supplemental Questionnaire Response at 8 (4/16/99);
see also Canadian Wheat Board Act, Ch. 24, § 32(1) (1998) and ch. C-4 § 47(1);
Canadian Wheat Board Regulations, C.R.C C-397 § 14(1) and 16(2) (1997).
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"actual sales information, not secondary sources" for export
sales of barley.348 In its April 22 response, the GOC provided an
exhibit which was purported to provide export prices. The April
22 data provided were in fact adjusted in an undisclosed man-
ner, making it impossible even to discover the average of actual
sales prices. Indeed, the Canadian submission did not reveal ac-
tual export prices obtained by the CWB for Canadian feed bar-
ley. Instead, it contained a series of adjustments as if barley
were shipped by rail first to Vancouver and then to
Lethbridge. 349
In the third questionnaire, Commerce again sought critical
export pricing data, and asked several questions designed to ob-
tain actual feed barley export prices so that these price might be
compared with domestic Canadian feed barley prices. For exam-
ple, question 38 sought a breakdown of the figures in provide in
Canada's April 22 submission (Exhibit 32), by pricing category
and without the (undocumented) freight adjustments:
For the POI, break down your reporting in Exhibit 32 . . . into quar-
terly averages reported separately for each of the seven "pricing cate-
gories." Do not make the freight adjustments made to arrive at the
figures in Exhibit 32. Explain what each pricing category
represents.
3 50
With respect to question 38, the GOC refused to respond. In-
stead of the pretense that Statistics Canada is the only source
for relevant information, GOC in this case refused to supply
data maintained by the CWB because such information might
reveal individual transaction prices or might disclose marketing
practices:
Individual sales would be disclosed if the sales were divided in the
seven "pricing" categories, because of the number of sales involved.
Further disclosure of the pricing categories including explaining what
each pricing category would represent, or of sale by pricing category,
would also reveal commercial selling practices, individual transaction,
and/or customers. 35 1
To object that revealing the quarterly average prices by grade
would disclose marketing strategy or actual prices is only to
claim that such information might deserve confidential treat-
348. Department of Commerce, Second Supplemental Questionnaire in the
Live Cattle from Canada Investigation, Question 2 (April 22, 1999).
349. See Commerce Memorandum, Adjustment of CWB prices reported in
GOC's April 22, 1999 response at Exhibit 32 (May 3, 1999).
350. Department of Commerce, Third Supplemental Questionnaire in the
Live Cattle from Canada Investigation, Question 38 (June 8, 1999).
351. Government of Canada, 3d Supplemental Questionnaire Response,
Public, at.36 (July, 6 1999).
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ment.352 It cannot be grounds, however, for withholding the
data outright. With respect to question 37 of the third supple-
mental questionnaire, the GOC likewise refused to provide
freight rates to U.S. destinations because it might "disclose the
customer's identity as the number of sales and customers is lim-
ited."35 3 Yet, again, such a claim might support proprietary
treatment; it does not support the failure of the GOC to supply
the relevant data at all.
With respect to question 42 of the third supplemental ques-
tionnaire, GOC resorted to the same tactics used in the original
response: it claimed that Statistics Canada could not separate
feed and malt barley sales. 35 4 Yet, of course, the CWB itself
maintained the relevant export figures.
All the relevant data to answer these questions were in the
hands of the CWB. From the petitioner's perspective these CWB
actions, or inactions, should have compelled Commerce to act.
As an investigator such actions seemingly frustrate and impede
the investigation. In some cases when Commerce deals with an
individual private company, lack of cooperation, 355 withholding
of information or untimely provided information can lead to use
of facts otherwise available35 6 and adverse inference. 357 In the
Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip in Coils from Germany case Com-
merce found that respondent:
had three opportunities spread over four months to provide the De-
partment with a complete listing of its U.S. sales. In response to its
failure to do so, as adverse facts available, we are applying the highest
non-aberrational margin calculated based on KTN's [respondent's] cor-
rectly reported CEP transactions to the unreported sales and have in-
352. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 1677f(a)(4), 19 C.F.R. § 351.105(c) (identifying
grounds for proprietary treatment).
353. Government of Canada, 3d Supplemental Questionnaire Response,
Public, at p.35 (7/6/99).
354. See Government of Canada, 3d Supplemental Questionnaire Response,
Public, at 38-39 (7/6/99) ("[njo method has been found to further disaggregate
these data,".).
355. See Photo Albums and Filler Pages from Korea, 50 Fed. Reg. 43,754, at
43,755-56 (1985):
It is the obligation of respondents to provide an accurate and complete
response prior to verification so that the Department may have the op-
portunity to fully analyze the information and other parties are able to
review and comment on it. The purpose of verification is to establish
the accuracy of a response rather than to reconstruct the information
to fit the requirements of the Department.
356. See 19 U.S.C. §1677e(a).
357. See 19 U.S.C. §1677e(b).
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cluded these transactions in our calculation of the overall weighted-
average margin.
3 58
This was done even though the respondent company had pro-
vided a complete packet containing copies of each of the relevant
invoices which the Department later included on the record as a
verification exhibits. 35 9 Nor is this a unique instance. Private
parties have, under other circumstances, also been penalized for
their lack of responsiveness by the application of "facts avail-
able".3 60 During verification information was provided to Com-
merce that the CWB had previously not placed on the record, as
an example the actual export prices and transactions of barley to
the United States were verified by Commerce.361 As highlighted
above, said prices had not been disclosed, except in summary
form, at anytime during the course of the investigation. 36 2 Such
tactical behavior denied the domestic industry the ability to
fully engage in the investigation of subsidies in this case. 36 3
Commerce's dual and conflicting roles may have worked to
prevent it from acting. Perhaps as part of Commerce's statutory
imperative to be a neutral judge, its role as investigator was cur-
tailed. If true, then a profound and systemic problem arises in
the administration of the trade laws. If Commerce does not zeal-
ously investigate a foreign government, the burden of proving an
allegation falls ever more heavily upon petitioning parties.
While perhaps large, multinational companies can shoulder
such a burden, fragmented and diverse groups can not. The fi-
nancial burden placed on petitioners may under the circum-
358. Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value; Stainless Steel
Sheet and Strip in Coils From Germany, 64 Fed. Reg. 30710, 30732 (1999).
359. See Id.
360. See, e.g., SSAB Svenskt Staal AB v. United States, 15 CIT 202, 213
(1991) (upholding the use of "best information available" where SSAB failed to
submit data concerning a grant program). "Best information available" is the
term for the predecessor statute which had provisions roughly equivalent to
facts otherwise available and adverse inference.
361. See Department of Commerce, Verification Report for the Government
of Canada regarding the Canadian Wheat Board, Public, at 34 (Aug. 27, 1999).
362. R-Calf Comments Requesting Cancellation of Verification, Public, at 2-
8 (July 23, 1999).
363. Extensive pricing data were submitted for feed barley prices in Can-
ada, the United States and in third country markets. Depending on the com-
parison used, the data showed both that prices in Canada for feed barley were
lower than export prices, and that there was no difference, or that export prices
were lower than domestic prices. R-Calf, Commerce Dept. Case Brief, Public, at
p.3-34 (Sept. 3, 1999). The pricing data which Commerce ultimately relied upon
generally showed that Canadian domestic prices were higher than export prices
during the last months of the period of investigation (April 1, 1997 - March 31,
1998). See 64 Fed. Reg. at 57051-52.
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stances above rise to such a level that the only fully effective
users of the countervailing duty and dumping laws will soon be
major companies with vast resources. As the evidentiary bur-
dens (in the form of data collection and investigation) on peti-
tioners rise, domestic industries with more limited resources
will find it more difficult to succeed and the trade laws become
increasingly less useful.
D. COMMERCE'S ANTIDUMPING INVESTIGATION
"Dumping" occurs when the imports that are the subject of
an investigation are being sold or offered for sale in the country
of importation at prices that are less than fair or normal
value. 36 4 Normal value may be based upon one of three alterna-
tives: prices in the country of exportation, prices for export to
third-countries, or constructed value.3 65 Country-of-export
prices are the preferred basis under the statute and are in gen-
eral used unless home market sales are below cost or are insuffi-
cient in quantity to form a viable market.366 Where sales in the
home market are at prices below the cost of production or are
inadequate in number, Commerce may resort to third-country
prices, but these prices, too, must not be below cost and the vol-
ume sold must be adequate.
Because below-cost prices for sales in substantial quantities
over an extended period of time are rejected as a basis for nor-
mal value, cost of production in effect sets the lower bound on
normal value. Under the statute, if home market and third
country sales are rejected, normal value is constructed and
equals the sum of materials costs, labor costs, overhead costs,
selling, general and administrative (SG&A) expenses and
profit.3 6 7
Two principal issues in the antidumping investigation on
live cattle from Canada raise questions about the administra-
tion of the law when applied to an industry such as live cattle:
(1) the representativeness of the data base; and (2) preventing
apparent "gaming" of the investigation by respondents. We ad-
dress these in turn.
364. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(a)l; see also BRUCE CHUBB, UNITED STATES FOR-
EIGN TRADE LAw, vol. I, ch. 21 (1991).
365. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a).
366. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1677b(a)(1)(B), 1677b(b).
367. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(e).
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1. Whether Commerce's selection of respondents assured
sufficient representativeness of exports
The "general rule" set out in the statute requires that Com-
merce calculate individual dumping margins for each known ex-
porter and producer of the subject merchandise. 368 The
Canadian cattle industry, however, consists of some 100,000 in-
dividual producers. 369 This made calculation of individual
dumping margins for every exporter impracticable. In these cir-
cumstances, the statute provides two methods for selecting a
"reasonable number of exporters or producers by limiting its ex-
amination to:"
(A) a sample of exporters, producers, or types of products that is statis-
tically valid based on the information available to the administering
authority at the time of selection, or
(B) exporters and producers accounting for the largest volume of the
subject merchandise from the exporting country that can be reasonably
examined.
3 70
In the case of an industry with over 100,000 producers, a
random sample would have required Commerce to (1) obtain a
complete listing of all producers or at least all exporters, and (2)
select a large number of companies in order to produce a statisti-
cally valid sample. 371 Assuming Commerce were able to obtain
from Canada a complete listing of the universe of exporters, a
statistically valid sample would be expected to reflect the diver-
sity of exporters, producers and types of products indicated by
the U.S. import statistics and Canadian export statistics. 372
That is, cattle imports into the United States from Canada con-
sisted of feeder cattle, culls, and fed steers and heifers ready for
immediate slaughter. Feeder cattle and cull cattle are produced
by cow-calf operations. Slaughter cattle are typically produced
by feedlots. 373 Hence, to reasonably reflect the diversity of cattle
that make up the imports, it would have been necessary to in-
368. See 19 U.S.C. §1677f-l(c)(1).
369. Canada's Beef Cattle Producers, Cattle Production and the Environ-
ment Just Facts <www.cattle.ca/cca/environment/justfactsfull.htm>.
370. 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(c)(2).
371. See Petition at 10-12 (and authorities cited therein); R-Calf Response to
Canadian Cattlemen at 4 (Oct. 19, 1998) (at least 384 survey respondents are
needed for large populations).
372. See R-CALF Questionnaire Comments at 3 (Jan. 20, 1999).
373. Feeder cattle are also produced by "backgrounders," who place weaned
cattle on pasture (grass) or feed and raise them to a weight suitable for sale to a
feedlot operator. Many backgrounders, however, are also cow-calf operators or
feedlot operators. Indeed, NCBA statistics indicate that in the United States,
some 60% of all 1996 survey respondents were diversified operations, including
more than one of the following types of operations: cow/calf, stocker, back-
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clude both cow/calf and feedlot operators in a sample or respon-
dent pool.
Commerce invited the parties on both sides to submit
names of known producer/exporters. R-CALF provided a list of
18 producer/exporters while the Canadian Cattlemen's Associa-
tion provided an initial list of 28 producer/exporters, which it
later expanded to 35 entities. R-CALF had urged Commerce to
select producers: (1) at random in order to minimize self-selec-
tion by the respondents; (2) from the four major cattle exporting
provinces of Canada (Alberta, Manitoba, Ontario and Saskatch-
ewan); (3) that included not only feedlots but also cow-calf opera-
tors and backgrounders, in order to reflect the diversity of cattle
that constitute the imports, i.e., feeders, culls and fed cattle. R-
CALF also proposed that the respondents selected should not re-
sult in excluding from the dumping analysis sales of custom fed
cattle (i.e., feedlots that fatten cattle for a fee but do not take
title to them), since such cattle are more prevalent when slaugh-
ter cattle prices are low. Inclusion of custom feedlots would,
therefore, be more representative of actual conditions in the
market. Commerce could include in the respondent pool either
cow-calf operations that retain ownership of custom-fed cattle
or, alternatively, custom feedlots themselves, in which case
Commerce could capture the normal values of the custom feed-
lots' suppliers.37 4
The Canadian respondents argued that it would not be fea-
sible for Commerce to investigate all of the significant producers
and exporters, and that instead Commerce should rely on the
five or six largest companies from among those exporters that
own their own cattle. The Canadian respondents argued further
that the investigation's complexity would be further increased if
Commerce selected companies that obtained cattle from numer-
ous suppliers. Finally, the respondents contended that there
was no basis in the law or the regulations to support R-CALF's
proposal that Commerce take into account either geographical
location or type of operation, including whether the respondent
dealt in custom feeding.375
Commerce ultimately elected to investigate the six largest
known producers/exporters. 376 The reasons given were a lack of
grounding lot, seedstock, feedlot, and/or crop farming. NCBA, Special Edition,
July Cow-Calf Survey (July 1996).
374. Department of Commerce Memorandum, Selection of Respondents at
3-4 (Feb. 26, 1999).
375. See id. at 4.
376. See id. at 6.
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administrative resources and personnel to investigate any more
than six entities and a concern that because "live cattle are in-
herently different from the manufactured or processed agricul-
tural products that the Department typically encounters in
antidumping investigations," novel and complex issues were
likely to arise. 377 Commerce also selected three feedlot opera-
tors from Alberta (the largest cattle-producing province in Can-
ada), two from Saskatchewan and one from Ontario. 378
Commerce noted that at least two of the feedlots engaged in cus-
tom feeding.379
While Commerce's decision to rely on the six largest known
producer/exporters was consistent with the statute, other as-
pects of the respondent selection raise concerns about the ad-
ministration of the statute in a case involving a highly
fragmented industry with numerous producers such as live cat-
tle. As is the case in any investigation where Commerce's pool of
selected respondents is limited to the largest producer/export-
ers, such respondents are likely to have lower production costs
than other, smaller producer/exporters. Part of the rationale of
selecting the largest producer/exporters, however, is that they
likely account for a significant volume of the subject imports and
thus their prices and costs would be representative of most of
the subject imports in the market. And, indeed, Commerce con-
cluded that the six respondents it had selected accounted for a
significant percentage of total export volume, given the "very
large number of producers in Canada."380
However, in most cases, Commerce typically examines all
home market and export sales of selected respondents. In Live
Cattle, for reasons that were never explained in the public rec-
ord, Commerce did not examine sales of custom fed cattle. In-
stead, Commerce calculated the dumping margins based on the
costs and prices of sales of the respondents' self-produced cattle.
In the case of one respondent, Commerce collected cost data for
six suppliers of that respondent's traded cattle. 381 The data
377. See id. at 4-5. Commerce noted that three of the entities included mul-
tiple affiliated entities which Commerce had determined to "collapse" into a sin-
gle entity to avoid the potential for manipulation of price or production. Id. at
6, n. 10.
378. See Department of Commerce Memorandum, Selection of Respondents
at 6 (Feb. 26, 1999).
379. See id.
380. See id.
381. See "Notice of Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value:
Live Cattle from Canada," 64 Fed. Reg. 56,739, 56,745 and 56,750 (Oct. 21,
1999).
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were largely unusable to determine whether the suppliers' sales
were below cost, however, because the suppliers did not main-
tain the types of records that allowed them to track and report
product-specific costs.3 8 2 Consequently, Commerce used the re-
spondent's reported acquisition cost for the traded cattle, which
it adjusted by adding the average loss of the suppliers. 38 3
Thus, Commerce's database was not as representative as it
could have been in two respects: (1) it did not include cow-calf
operators and backgrounders who exported feeder cattle and
cull cattle to the United States; and (2) it did not include the
selected respondents' sales of custom-fed cattle (and thus the
costs of their customers). This compounded the problem that is
always present when Commerce selects only the largest pro-
ducer/exporters, namely, that the data will be biased to reflect
lower production costs.
Indeed, after the investigations were terminated, the Cana-
dian Cattlemen's Association confirmed that this had been their
strategy:
CCA officials planned the Canadian strategy. They were allowed to
put together a list of feedlots they felt would represent the industry.
They chose feedlots large enough to have low costs so the Americans
wouldn't have any chance to suggest Canadians sold cattle below cost
of production.
38 4
The extent to which Commerce's selection likely affected the
magnitude of the dumping margins may be inferred from the
dumping margins that R-CALF had alleged in its petition. Spe-
cifically, the dumping margins ultimately found by Commerce
ranged between 3.86 and 15.69 percent, with one feedlot ob-
taining a rate of de minimis.385 This range was comparable to
the dumping margins that had been estimated in the petition for
feedlots.38 6 However, the petition also had estimated dumping
margins for Canadian cow-calf and backgrounding operations.
Those margins ranged, in the case of Alberta, between 3.69 to
48.82 percent for cow-calf; in Manitoba, between 1.54 and 45.73
382. See 64 Fed. Reg. 56,752.
383. 64 Fed. Reg. 56,752.
384. Mary MacArthur, Dumping Investigation Grueling, Biased, Costly, THE
WESTERN PRODUCER, 1999 <httpj/www.producer.com> (raising a question as to
the completeness of the list of producers compiled by the Canadian respon-
dents, and whether other large producers with higher costs may have been
omitted from the list).
385. 64 Fed. Reg. 56,759.
386. See Petition Requesting Imposition of Antidumping Duties on Imports
of Live Cattle from Canada at 25 (estimating that dumping margins for feedlots
in Alberta ranged between 10.32 and 14.38 %).
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percent for cow-calf and 9.51 to 19.48 percent for backgrounder;
in Saskatchewan, between 11.92 and 13.83 percent for back-
grounder; and in Ontario, between 40.61 and 101.80 percent for
cow-calf.38 7 These margins were based on constructed value as
the data that had been collected for the petition showed substan-
tial below cost sales and massive losses in the Canadian market
throughout all sectors of the industry.
The fact that the database never provided for the possibility
to determine whether such dumping margins existed raises the
question of the extent to which administrative convenience can
be permitted to override a petitioning industry's right to obtain
as complete relief from dumped imports as possible. One solu-
tion would be either for Commerce to promulgate regulations or
Congress to amend the statute to ensure that respondent selec-
tion will provide for actual representativeness of the subject im-
ports when such imports are at various stages of development
and reflect varying levels of costs for different producers.
2. Concerns over "gaming" and agency steps to prevent it
As discussed above, the Canadian Cattlemen's Association,
following the completion of the investigation, acknowledged that
their strategy had been to identify the largest low-cost producers
to minimize the likely dumping margins. Of course, the CCA
had been asked by Commerce to comment on exporters who
should receive questionnaires. If the CCA in fact did not report
all known exporters, then there is a serious question as to the
bona fides of the investigation. Court have ruled that agencies
have the inherent right to protect the integrity of their proceed-
ings. 388 Indeed, agencies can reopen cases sua sponte where
such actions appear tainted.38 9 It is not clear why Commerce
has not pursued this issue.
387. See id.
388. See, e.g., Alberta Gas Chemicals, Ltd. v. Celanese Crop., 650 F. 2d 9, 12
(2d Cir. 1981).
389. See, e.g., United States v. Sioux Tribe, 616 F.2d 485, 493 (Ctl Cl.), cert.
denied, 446 U.S. 953 (1980) ("It is a well established principle that an adminis-
trative agency may reconsider its own decision. 'The power to reconsider is in-
herent in the power to decide.'"); Greene County Planning Board v. Federal
Power Commission, 559 F. 2d 227, 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978)
("agency does have an obligation to make corrections when it has been relying
on erroneous factual assumptions. . . ."); Bookman v. United States, 453 F.2d
1263, 1265 (Ct. Cl. 1972) ("[It is often the case that reconsideration of a prior
decision, within a reasonable period of time, is absolutely essential to the even
administration ofjustice.... [It may be imperative for the tribunal to consider
new developments or newly discovered evidence in order to facilitate the or-
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Similarly, on the day that Commerce was scheduled to issue
its preliminary dumping determination, one respondent,
Schaus, submitted a supplemental response and pre-verification
corrections which substantially altered its reported costs. The
earlier-submitted data had yielded a dumping margin of 5.43
percent, while the corrected data yielded a dumping margin of
15.69 percent, nearly three-fold higher. Because the submission
of the corrected data was so close to the issuance of the prelimi-
nary determination, Commerce did not have an opportunity to
incorporate those corrections into its preliminary dumping cal-
culations. Commerce announced, however, its intention to "ex-
amine the [revised] data further and, if. . . errors corrected
result in a rate that differ substantially from the rates as calcu-
lated for this preliminary determination, we may issue an
amended preliminary determination."390
Schaus subsequently announced that it would decline to
participate in verification of its data and sought to withdraw all
questionnaire responses from the record of the investigation. 391
Schaus claimed that it did not have the resources or the record-
keeping needed to satisfy Commerce's verification require-
ments.3 92 Such action by Schaus in other circumstances would
have led Commerce to use "facts available" against Schaus, pre-
sumably the highest margins alleged. Such action would have
been substantially more adverse to Schaus than the use of its
revised data. Why a company, having generated revised cost
data, would then penalize itself by withdrawing from the inves-
tigation is not understandable in isolation.393
derly and just resolution of conflict. More frequently, reconsideration is often
the sole means of correcting errors of procedure or substance.").
390. 64 Fed. Reg. 56742.
391. See 64 Fed. Reg. 56742. As Commerce does not have subpoena author-
ity, responses to Commerce questionnaires are voluntary. Id. at 56743.
392. See 64 Fed. Reg. 56,742.
393. The peculiarity of Schaus' conduct was further compounded by the fact
that Schaus elected to withdraw from verification even though it had certified
the accuracy of the revised data that was submitted to the Commerce Depart-
ment only a few days earlier. Commerce officials were visibly troubled by
Schaus' conduct, as was made clear by the comments of Commerce Department
officials Richard Moreland and Gary Taverman at the Commerce September 1,
1999 hearing:
TAVERMAN: .... We often hear from petitioners that we too easily
accept information that is submitted by respondents at face value. I
think typically our response is we have no reason to think that the
information isn't accurate. If it's certified to be accurate, we can't dis-
regard it.
The case of Schaus, right before the prelim they give us a significantly
revised response which quadruples its margin certifying it to be cor-
556 [Vol. 9:449
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Under the statute, however, Commerce is supposed to disre-
gard in the calculation of a margin for companies not investi-
gated (the so-called "all others rate") "any margins determined
entirely" on the basis of facts available.394 Had Commerce fol-
lowed normal practices, all other Canadian producers would
have received a much lower cash deposit rate. Such an outcome
would invite "gaming" by foreign producers. Commerce ex-
plained in its final determination the potential implications of
Schaus' decision:
If the Department were to base Schaus' final margin on the facts avail-
able rather than the proprietary information in its questionnaire re-
sponses, Schaus' margin would be excluded from the calculation of the
'all others' rate.... Thus,... [Schaus' desire to withdraw its ques-
tionnaire response from the record could seriously undermine the effec-
tiveness of the antidumping remedy in this case .... 395
Since Commerce had used a respondent pool limited to six pro-
ducer/exporters, the weighted average verified margin from
those six producers would serve as the dumping margin for all
other exporters of live cattle to Canada if an order had been im-
posed. It is a reasonable inference that Schaus was thus seeking
to have a substantially higher "information available" margin
imposed on itself while avoiding having the 15.69 percent mar-
gin based on its proprietary data boost the all others' rate. Com-
merce declined to return Schaus' data and instead retained it
and used it to calculate the all others rate.39 6
rect. Within days after that they drop out of verification presumably
because the data can't be verified.
What are we to make of this? How does this fit into the whole certifica-
tion process? How does it fit into the facts available issue as to
whether or not we should consider Schaus' information?
.... There seems to be a disconnect there.
MORELAND: .... I think that is what I have found most disturbing
about this entire exercise. I also recognize when the resubmission
came in it didn't come to my knowledge fundamentally until the day
that I had to sign off on the notice. I heard about it through peti-
tioner's counsel.
What I found most distressing about this period is that no one was
talking to us about the difficulties here. ... I think the point is that
the changes were so massive that someone had known for weeks before
we got anything.
U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, Hearing,
In re Anti-dumping Investigation of Live Cattle from Canada, Case No. A-122-
833, Hearing T. at 105-109.
394. 19 U.S.C. §1673d(c)(5)(A).
395. 64 Fed. Reg. 56,743.
396. See 64 Fed. Reg. 56,743.
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Although Commerce's decision not to return Schaus' data
and to use it in the calculation of the dumping margin reduced
the potential harm that might otherwise have occurred, it does
not provide a strong disincentive to game the process. Schaus'
actions were against its own interest. This implies the action
was taken on behalf of the larger group. Commerce, at a mini-
mum, should have investigated whether stronger actions were
warranted. The implications of what went on were not lost on
Commerce:
While there is no statutory provision expressly dealing with the with-
drawal of business proprietary information once it has been submitted,
the courts have recognized 'the inherent power of an administrative
agency to protect the integrity of its own proceedings.' . . . [citation
omitted]. Thus, the agency has the discretion to deny a respondent's
request to withdraw information where it is necessary to preserve the
fundamental integrity of the process and the remedial purpose of the
law.
3 9 7
If the only cost for "discovered" gaming is that the agency will
use the information it would have used in a non-gaming situa-
tion, then Commerce is inviting parties to game the process.
V. THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION'S
INVESTIGATIONS
In antidumping and countervailing duty investigations, the
ITC determines whether a domestic industry is materially in-
jured or threatened with material injury, or whether the estab-
lishment of a domestic industry is materially retarded, by
reason of imports that are determined by the Department of
Commerce to be sold at dumped prices or to have benefited from
a countervailable subsidy.398 The investigations of Live Cattle
from Canada and Mexico reveal both systemic problems with
the injury provision of the law as written and as currently inter-
preted by a majority of commissioners that made it ineffective in
addressing the harm that imports were causing the domestic
cattle industry.
A. LiKE PRODUCT AND DOMESTIC INDUSTRY ISSUES
A threshold issue for any industry that is contemplating fil-
ing an antidumping petition is to ensure that the scope of the
petition is sufficiently broad so that relief obtained is effective.
Where essentially the same product is being imported in differ-
397. 64 Fed. Reg. 56,743.
398. See 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a)(2), § 1673(a)(2) (citations omitted).
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ent forms, it is important that the petition is able to reach the
imports in all the forms in which they are entered. The con-
struction of the statute and ITC precedent, however, prevented
the cattle industry from framing a petition that would reach the
totality of imported product which was believed to be causing
harm - namely cattle and beef. As discussed below, the evolu-
tion of the law years before R-CALF filed its petitions immedi-
ately limited the potential relief that the industry could obtain.
1. Background
Before the ITC reaches the specific issues of injury and cau-
sation (or threat), the ITC must first identify the relevant do-
mestic "like product" and the domestic industry. The term
"industry" means:
the producers as a whole of a domestic like product, or those producers
whose collective output of a domestic like product constitutes a major
proportion of the total domestic production of the product.3 99
The term "domestic like product," in turn, means:
a product which is like, or in the absence of like, most similar in char-
acteristics and uses with, the article subject to an investigation ... 4 00
The "article subject to investigation" are the imports which
Commerce is examining to determine if they are dumped and/or
subsidized.
The ITC typically uses a six-factor test to determine what
products are like the imports that are subject to investigation.
These include: physical characteristics and end uses; inter-
changeability; channels of distribution; production processes, fa-
cilities and employees; customer and producer perceptions; and
price.40 1 Where, however, the product in question undergoes
several distinct stages of production, the ITC employs a "semi-
finished/finished" product analysis to determine whether a prod-
uct at an earlier stage of the production process is "like" a
finished or further processed product.40 2 The factors employed
in this analysis include:
(1) Whether the upstream article is dedicated to the production of the
downstream article or has independent uses;
(2) Whether there are perceived to be separate markets for the up-
stream and downstream articles;
399. 19 U.S.C. §1677(4)(A).
400. 19 U.S.C. §1677(10).
401. See Live Cattle from Canada and Mexico, USITC Pub. 3155 at 4, n.2.
402. See Live Cattle from Canada and Mexico, Invs. Nos. 701-TA-386 (Pre-
liminary) and 731-TA-812-813 (Preliminary), USITC Pub. 3155 at 6 (Feb.
1999).
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(3) Extent of the differences in the physical characteristics and func-
tions of the upstream and downstream articles;
(4) Extent of the differences in the costs or value of the vertically differ-
entiated articles;
(5) Significance and extent of the processes used to transform the up-
stream into the downstream articles.
40 3
The purpose of the semi-finished product analysis is "to identify
a product or products, the producers of which are in as similar a
position as possible to one another vis-d-vis the subject
imports."404
Although Commerce defines the scope of the imported prod-
uct or products which are subject to investigation, the ITC de-
fines the domestic like product or products that compete with
the imports, and hence the domestic industry. "Although the
Commission must accept the determination of Commerce as to
the scope of the imported merchandise being sold at LTFV, the
Commission determines what domestic product is like the im-
ported articles Commerce has identified."40 5 Thus, for example,
while Commerce might define the scope of the investigation as
consisting of a single "class or kind" of merchandise, the ITC
could, and has, defined two or more like products and domestic
industries that compete with the imported product within the
scope of investigation. 406 Conversely, Commerce could define
the scope as consisting of multiple classes or kinds of merchan-
dise while the ITC finds a single like product and domestic
industry.407
2. The Processed Agricultural Products Provision
In the case of the cattle industry, an antidumping order lim-
ited to imports of live cattle might be only partially effective
403. Stainless Steel Bar from Brazil, India, Italy, Japan, and Spain, Inv.
Nos. 731-TA-678 through 682 (Preliminary), USITC Pub. 2734 at 1-12 (Feb.
1994).
404. Id. at I-11.
405. Extruded Rubber Thread from Indonesia, USITC Pub. 3191, Inv. No.
731-TA-787 (Final), at 1-3 (May 1999).
406. See, e.g., Cellular Mobile Telephones and Subassemblies Thereof from
Japan, USITC Pub. 1786, Inv. No. 731-TA-207 (Final), at 4, n. 4, 6 (Dec. 1985).
(Commerce's scope of investigation included cellular mobile telephones
("CMTs"), CMT transceivers, CMT control units, and certain subassemblies.
ITC defined eight separate like products: CMTs and seven major subassem-
blies that "'compartmentalize' certain functions common to every CMT.").
407. See Certain Brake Drums and Rotors from China, USITC Pub. 3035,
Inv. No. 731-TA-744 (Final), at 4, n.9 (April 1997). (ITC "may find a single like
product corresponding to several different classes or kinds defined by Com-
merce.") (citing Hosiden Corp. v. Advanced Display Manufacturers, 85 F.3d
1561, 1567-68 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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since imports of beef also put pressure on cattle prices by adding
to the overall supply of beef. Using the ITC's finished/semi-fin-
ished product factors discussed supra, it is certainly arguable
that cattle and beef should properly be considered a single prod-
uct and industry. All cattle eventually are used to make beef,
which satisfies the first factor. The factor with respect to differ-
ences in costs or value is arguably satisfied since most of the
value of the finished product - beef - is already present in the
animal when it arrives at the packing house. Meeting the other
requirements would turn on interpretation of the factors.
Whether, for example, there are perceived to be different mar-
kets for cattle and beef could be answered either in the affirma-
tive (all cattle are destined for use to make beef) or in the
negative (live cattle are sold at auctions, or in feedlots, etc. while
beef is sold by packers to retailers and other distributors, who in
turn sell it to consumers).
There is also precedent that supports the concept that cattle
and beef should be viewed as a single industry for purposes of a
trade remedy investigation. For example, in 1977, the ITC con-
ducted a Section 201 investigation that was initiated pursuant
to a petition filed by the National Association of Meat Promot-
ers, the Meat Promoters of South Dakota, the Meat Promoters of
North Dakota, the Meat Promoter of Montana, and the Meat
Promoters of Wyoming.408 There, the ITC defined the domestic
industry as "cattle growers who raise cattle for slaughter or for
further feeding, feedlot operators who further finish or fatten
cattle on grain prior to slaughter, slaughterers, and processors
who are engaged in the manufacture of beef and veal products
including ground beef, sausages, and other meat products"409
Further, in the 1979 legislative history of the antidumping and
countervailing duty laws, Congress contemplated that cattle and
beef constituted a single industry:
Because of the special nature of agriculture ... special problems exist
in determining whether an agricultural industry is materially injured.
For example, in the livestock sector, certain factors relating to the
state of a particular industry within that sector may appear to indicate
a favorable situation for that industry when in fact the opposite is true.
408. See USITC Pub. 834, supra, at 4.
409. USITC Pub. 834 at 5. The ITC ultimately determined that imports of
live cattle and certain meat products of cattle fit for human consumption were
not being imported into the United States "in such increased quantities as to be
a substantial cause of serious injury, or the threat of serious injury, to the do-
mestic industry .... Specifically, we find that imports are not a substantial
cause of the injury complained of by the petitioners, whether or not there are
increased imports." Id.
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Thus, gross sales and employment in the industry producing beef could
be increasing at a time when economic loss is occurring, i.e., cattle
herds are being liquidated because prices make the maintenance of the
herds unprofitable. 4 1
0
Early post-Tokyo Round antidumping and countervailing
duty investigations involving agricultural products such as
Lamb Meat from New Zealand and Frozen Concentrated Orange
Juice from Brazil suggested that the ITC would view growers
and processors of agricultural products as members of the same
industry. In each of those cases, the ITC found the producers of
the raw product (lamb and round oranges, respectively) to be
part of the same industry as the processors of the processed
product (lamb meat and frozen concentrated orange juice). In
each of those investigations, the ITC noted that Congress had
admonished the ITC to take notice of the special circumstances
that are often presented in trade remedy investigations involv-
ing agricultural products. For example, in Lamb Meat from New
Zealand, the ITC stated:
Were we to exclude the growers (of live lamb) from the scope of this
domestic industry, we would effectively preclude a significant portion
of the domestic industry from any relief against subsidized imports.
Such an anomalous result was not intended by Congress, as indicated
by the legislative history ... Congress foresaw special problems in the
application of the countervailing duty provisions of the Trade Agree-
ments Act of 1979 to agricultural products.
4 11
After citing the language from the Senate Finance Committee
Report which appears supra, the ITC noted the Committee's ref-
erence to
the "industry producing beef," which clearly includes packers and
processors, and "cattle herds," which encompasses ranchers and feed-
ers. Thus, it is clear that Congress not only anticipated this very issue,
but also contemplated the inclusion of processors and growers in one
industry. It is clear that Congress recognized the highly interdepen-
dent nature of the livestock sector of the economy, and did not intend
the statutory definition of industry to preclude an assessment of mate-
rial injury to an adversely impacted segment of a meat producing
industry.4 12
One Commissioner initially used the same approach to in-
clude growers of swine and processors of pork in the same indus-
try in the preliminary investigation of Live Swine and Pork from
410. S. Rep. No. 96-249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 88 (1979) (emphasis added).
411. Lamb Meat from New Zealand, USITC Pub. 1191, Inv. No. 701-TA-80
(Preliminary), at 8-9 (Nov. 1981) (citing S. Rep. No. 96-249, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. 88 (1979) (emphasis added).
412. Id. at 9-10 (emphasis added).
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Canada.413 Nevertheless, in the final investigation, the ITC
concluded that swine growers and pork processors were not part
of a single industry, as well as concluding that live swine and
fresh, chilled or frozen pork were two separate like products.
With regard to defining the domestic industry, the ITC stated:
[Tihe Commission has exercised discretion in defining an agricultural
industry, relying on the following factors. First, the Commission has
considered the extent to which the raw product enters into a single line
of production resulting in the processed product. Second, the Commis-
sion has examined the degree of economic integration between growers
and packers, often looking at the legal relationships between the two
groups. For example, if there is substantial interlocking ownership, if
there are shared revenues, or if, contractually, the prices paid to pro-
ducers directly control the prices to growers, then both groups can be
more certainly affected in a like manner.
Initially, we note that the "single, continuous line or production" stan-
dard has been met in that the raw product is primarily sold in only one
market, and the primary purpose of raising slaughter hogs is to pro-
duce pork meat. The requisite integration of economic interest in this
investigation, however, is lacking. Less than 5 percent of packing facil-
ities are owned by the growers. Virtually none of the grower facilities
are owned by packers. Further, the petitioners have conceded that the
prices for hogs are not linked by contract to the prices received by the
packers.
While the absence of a legal relationship between growers and packers
is not determinative of the absence of economic integration, we are un-
persuaded.., that an integration of economic interest can be reflected
solely by a high price correlation between live swine and fresh, chilled,
or frozen pork. We, therefore, cannot find that growers should be in-
cluded into [sic] a single industry with packers producing pork.4 14
In 1988, the definition of "industry" was amended to codify
the ITC's approach in cases involving processed agricultural
products. Subsection E was added to the definition of "industry"
to provide:
[Iln an investigation involving a processed agricultural product pro-
duced from any raw agricultural product, the producers or growers of
the raw agricultural product may be considered part of the industry
producing the processed product if -
(I) the processed agricultural product is produced from the raw ag-
ricultural product through a single continuous line of production; and
(II) there is a substantial coincidence of economic interest between
the producers or growers of the raw agricultural product and the
processors of the processed agricultural product based upon relevant
economic factors, which may, in the discretion of the Commission, in-
413. See Inv. No. 701-TA-224 at 13 (documenting the opinion of Commis-
sioner Eckes).
414. Live Swine and Pork from Canada, USITC Pub. 1733, Inv. No. 701-TA-
224 (Final), (July 1985), reprinted in 7 ITRD at 2285, 2288.
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clude price, added market value, or other economic
interrelationships.
4 1 5
The "single continuous line of production" requirement is met
where:
(I) the raw agricultural product is substantially or completed devoted
to the production of the processed agricultural product; and
(II) the processed agricultural product is produced substantially or
completely from the raw product.
4 1 6
In assessing the coincidence of economic interest between the
producers of the raw product and of the processed product, the
ITC is directed to consider, among other factors that it deems
relevant,
(I) if price is taken into account,... the degree of correlation between
the price of the raw agricultural product and the price of the processed
agricultural product; and
(II) if added market value is taken into account,... whether the value
of the raw agricultural product constitutes a significant percentage of
the value of the processed agricultural product.
4 17
Subsequently, the pork industry filed another counter-
vailing duty petition against fresh, chilled and frozen pork from
Canada. The ITC referred to the new subsection (E) of the defi-
nition of "industry" as well as its analysis in Live Swine and
Pork to once again exclude hog growers from the scope of the
industry.
In light of the new provisions of the 1988 Act, we determined that the
domestic pork industry is composed of pork packers alone. We believe
the nature of the industry has not changed in four years since the Live
Swine decision. Revisiting the criteria applied in the Live Swine case,
the packers and growers continue to profit at different points in the
cycle, packers continue to need Canadian pork to fulfill demand, and
while the record shows only one packer in opposition to the petition,
many stated no position. Notwithstanding high price correlation and
low value added, vertical integration remains at a minimum, trading is
still conducted at arms length, and.., profitability figures of the pack-
ers and the growers continue to show an inverse relationship.
4 18
Thus, the definition of "industry" has gone through changes
since 1979 which should be of concern to industries such as cat-
tle that produce a raw agricultural product which is subse-
quently further processed to produce meat for human
415. 19 U.S.C. §1677(4)(E).
416. 19 U.S.C. §1677(4)(E)(ii).
417. 19 U.S.C. §1677(4)(E)(iii). Congress also included a provision that the
new subsection would cease to have effect if the United States Trade Represen-
tative notified Commerce and the ITC that the provision is "inconsistent with
the international obligations of the United States." 19 U.S.C. §1677(4)(E)(v).
418. Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Pork from Canada, USITC Pub. 2218, Inv. No.
701-TA-298 (Final) (Sept. 1989), reprinted in 12 ITRD at 1380, 1383-84.
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consumption. The ITC's decisions in Live Swine and Fresh,
Chilled and Frozen Pork, and the codification of those decisions
in the processed agricultural products provision greatly reduce
the range of agricultural imports which the growers of the raw
product can reach unless the growers and the processors are in-
tegrated or otherwise appear to have uniform commercial inter-
ests. Processors such as packers who use competing imports of
the raw product as leverage to reduce prices for the domestic
raw product presumably would not have an interest in bringing
a petition against such imports when they are being dumped or
subsidized. In agricultural sectors such as cattle that are not
yet highly vertically integrated, growers are put into the anoma-
lous position of either obtaining the cooperation of their packer/
processor customers (whose principal interest is getting the raw
product at the lowest possible price) to support a case on the
processed agricultural product as well as the raw product, or fil-
ing a petition the scope of which is limited to the raw agricul-
tural product. It is not self-evident how this development in the
statutory definition of "industry" serves the interests of domestic
producers whom the law was intended to protect from injurious
dumped and subsidized imports. If U.S. law is not, or cannot,
be changed, then the United States must develop other mecha-
nisms to permit U.S. agricultural interests to protect themselves
from import problems.
B. THE ITC's PRELIMINARY INJURY DETERMINATION
In its preliminary injury determination, the ITC declined to
cumulate the imports of live cattle from Canada and Mexico,
and ultimately issued a negative preliminary determination
with respect to Mexico, thus terminating the investigation.
Whether or not correct on the merits, the decision illustrates the
problems that arise from a policy standpoint when the prelimi-
nary test becomes more than a "gatekeeper" function. Certainly,
the problems faced by the industry were more than "negligible."
Whether or not imports would ultimately be deemed a "cause" of
those problems, a standard that excluded Mexican imports from
full consideration raises obvious policy concerns.
1. The Legal Standard for Preliminary Injury Investigations
The legal standard for preliminary injury determinations
requires the ITC to determine whether there is a "reasonable
indication" that a domestic industry is materially injured or
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threatened with material injury by reason of allegedly subsi-
dized and dumped imports.419
In applying this standard, the ITC weighs the evidence
before it and determines whether "(1) the record as a whole con-
tains clear and convincing evidence that there is no material in-
jury or threat of such injury; and (2) no likelihood exists that
contrary evidence will arise in a final investigation."420 The pur-
pose of the preliminary determination is to "eliminate unneces-
sary and costly investigations which are an administrative
burden and an impediment to trade."421 However, termination
of investigations at the preliminary stage is to be the exception,
not the rule. Although the legal standard "involv[es] a process of
weighing the evidence," it does so "under guidelines requiring
clear and convincing evidence of 'no reasonable indication', and
no likelihood of later contrary evidence, [which I provides fully
adequate protection against unwarranted terminations. Indeed,
those guidelines weight the scales in favor of affirmative and
against negative determinations."422 The ITC's task, in short, is
419. American Lamb Co. v. United States, 785 F. 2d 994, 1001 (Fed. Cir.
1986).
420. Id.
421. Id. at 1002-3.
422. Id. at 1001 (emphasis in original). Other courts, including the Supreme
Court, have commented on the "clear and convincing" evidentiary standard.
Their discussion accords with the Federal Circuit's view that the standard
should protect against unwarranted terminations. See, e.g., Buildex Inc. v.
Kason Industries, Inc., 849 F. 2d 1461, 1463 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("The 'clear and
convincing' standard of proof is an intermediate standard which lies between
'beyond a reasonable doubt' and a 'preponderance of the evidence." Addington
v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 1809, 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979); see also
SSIH Equip. S.A. v. United States Intl'l Trade Comm'n, 718 F.2d 365, 380, 218
USPQ 678, 691 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (Nies, J., additional views). Although not sus-
ceptible to precise definition, "clear and convincing" evidence has been de-
scribed as evidence which produces in the mind of the trier of fact "an abiding
conviction that the truth of {the} factual contentions are "highly probable."
Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 316, 104 S.Ct. 2433, 2437-38, 81 L.Ed.2d
247 (1984).
In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Health Dept., 497 U.S. 261, 285, n. 5, 111
L.Ed.2d at 246, n5 (1990), the Supreme Court observed that, "The clear and
convincing standard of proof has been variously defined in this context [pa-
tients' rights cases] as "proof sufficient to persuade the trier of fact that the
patient held a firm and settled commitment to the termination of life supports
under the circumstances like those presented," In re Westchester County Medi-
cal Center ex rel. O'Connor, 72 NY2d 517, 531, 531 NE2d 607, 613 (1988)
(O'Connor), and as evidence which "produces in the mind of the trier of fact a
firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be estab-
lished, evidence so clear, direct and weighty and convincing as to enable {the
factfinder} to come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the
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to "weed. . . out 'those cases which were clearly without
merit.'"423
2. Cumulation of Imports in Injury Investigations
(a) Background and legislative history concerning the
cumulation provision
Section 771(7)(G)(i) of the Tariff Act of 1930,424 requires the
ITC to assess the aggregate volume and impact of dumped and!
or subsidized imports from different countries where the peti-
tions are filed simultaneously and investigations are initiated on
the same day "if such imports compete with each other and with
the domestic like products in the United States market."425
Such aggregated assessment is termed "cumulation." The cu-
mulation provision was first formally added to the law in 1984
based on the recognition that dumped or subsidized imports
from multiple countries can simultaneously cause harm to the
domestic industry:
[Clompetition from unfairly traded imports from several countries si-
multaneously often has a hammering effect on the domestic industry.
This hammering effect may not be adequately addressed if the impact
of the imports are analyzed separately on the basis of their country of
origin. The cumulation requirement is thus an effort to make the ap-
plication of the injury analysis more realistic in terms of recognizing
the actual effects of unfair import competition.
4 2 6
Prior to 1984, cumulation had been exercised on a discretionary,
case-by-case basis by the Commission. The reason for writing
the provision into the statute was "to eliminate inconsistencies
in Commission practice and to ensure that the injury test ade-
quately addresses simultaneous unfair imports from different
countries."427 The Ways and Means Committee noted in its re-
port on the legislation that it "believes that the practice of cumu-
lation is based on the sound principle of preventing material
injury which comes about by virtue of several simultaneous un-
fair acts or practices."428
As originally introduced, the legislation mandated cumula-
tion "if (1) marketing of the goods in question into the United
precise facts in issue." In re Jobes, 108 NJ, at 407-408, 529 A2d, at 441 (N.J.
1987) (quotation omitted). ... "
423. American Lamb, 785 F. 2d at 1002.
424. 19 U.S.C. §1677(7)(G)(i).
425. Id.
426. H.R. REP. No. 100-40, pt. 1, at 130 (1987), H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 100-
576, at 620-21 (1988).
427. H.R. REP. No. 98-725, 98th at 37 (1984).
428. Id.
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States is reasonably coincident, and (2) there is a reasonable in-
dication that the imports in question will have a contributing
effect on causing, or threatening to cause, material injury to the
domestic industry."429 The language was amended to "substi-
tute criteria requiring cumulation if imports from two or more
countries of like products subject to investigation compete with
each other and with like products of the domestic industry in the
U.S. market."430 The reason for the change was explained as
follows:
The Committee amended the criteria to permit cumulation of imports
from various countries that each account individually for a very small
percentage of total market penetration, but when combined may cause
material injury. The requirement in the bill as introduced that im-
ports from each country have a 'contributing effect' in causing material
injury would have precluded cumulation in cases where the impact of
imports from each sources treated individually is minimal but the com-
bined impact is injurious. The Committee does intend, however, that
the marketing of imports that are cumulated be reasonably
coincident.
4 3 1
When Congress amended the law to mandate cumulation, it was
also responding to particular criticism about ITC hesitancy to
cumulate, particularly in preliminary injury determinations:
The law now permits the International Trade Commission to combine
or "cumulate" imports from different countries when making injury de-
terminations in antidumping and countervailing duty investigations.
Cumulation makes sense; death by one or one hundred blows is equally
fatal. The ITC, however, has been hesitant to cumulate imports at all
and extremely reluctant to do so in preliminary injury investiga-
tions.... We believe that it would be helpful to amend the statute to
require cumulation in certain circumstances, Such an amendment
would help to ensure that domestic industries are not denied relief be-
cause of an unwise exercise of discretion by the Commission.
4 32
The ITC's reviewing courts have endorsed a liberal con-
struction to the cumulation provision. The Court of Interna-
tional Trade, for example, observed in Bingham & Taylor, "To
the extent that ... other statutory provisions .... are in pari
materia with the cumulation provision, they must be harmo-
429. Id.
430. Id.
431. Id.; see also H.R. CoNF. REP. No 98-1156, at 174 (1984), reprinted in
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5290, 5291.
432. Options to Improve the Trade Remedy Laws: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Trade of the Comm. on Ways and Means, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 197,
203 (1983) (statement of Adolph J. Lena) (emphasis added), cited in Bingham &
Taylor, Div. v. United States, 627 F. Supp. 793, 798 (CIT 1986).
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nized with the clear congressional purpose in broadly mandating
cumulation."433
(b) The ITC's Approach to Cumulation
In assessing whether subject imports compete with each
other and with the domestic like product, the ITC generally con-
siders four factors:
(1) the degree of fungibility between the imports from different coun-
tries and between imports and the domestic like product, including
consideration of specific customer requirements and other quality re-
lated questions;
(2) the presence of sales or offers to sell in the same geographical mar-
kets of imports from different countries and the domestic like product;
(3) the existence of common or similar channels of distribution for im-
ports from different countries and the domestic like product; and
(4) whether the imports are simultaneously present in the market.4 34
"While no single factor is determinative, and the list of factors is
not exclusive, these factors are intended to provide the Commis-
sion with a framework for determining whether the subject im-
ports compete with each other and with the domestic like
product. Only a 'reasonable overlap' of competition is
required."4 35
(c) The Issue of Cumulation in the ITC's Preliminary
Determination Concerning Live Cattle from
Canada and Mexico
When R-CALF filed its petitions on live cattle from Canada
and Mexico, it observed that the majority of imports from Can-
ada consisted of fed cattle ready for slaughter while imports
from Mexico consisted primarily of feeder and stocker calves
that would go to pastures or feedlots for feeding, but would ulti-
mately be sold for slaughter to U.S. packers. R-CALF then
pointed to the importance of assessing the imports of feeder and
fed cattle in the aggregate:
It is essential that imports of feeder cattle be included in any measure
of market penetration .... Imports of feeder cattle from Mexico at
prices that reflect very large margins of dumping (i.e., in excess of 100
percent) affect the U.S. industry in two ways. The first, immediate im-
pact is on the cow-calf operator with weaned calves and backgrounded
feeders ready to sell to feedlots. The second, deferred impact is at the
slaughter level. The imported feeders, once they are fed in the feedlots,
433. Bingham & Taylor v. United States, 627 F. Supp. 793, 798 (CIT 1986),
aff'd 815 F.2d 1482 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
434. USITC Pub. 3155 at 11.
435. Id.
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add to the volume of available fed cattle, thus depressing prices....
Imports of feeder cattle artificially inflate the actual level of domestic
consumption (i.e., cattle slaughter) that is attributable to the domestic
industry, and thus dilute the impact that imports of slaughter cattle
are having on the industry.... Most measures of domestic consump-
tion of cattle and production of beef include imported feeder cattle as
"domestic" cattle, when, in fact, the domestic cow-calf operator has not
benefited from the sales of those particular cattle.
4 3 6
Elsewhere, the petitioners stressed that because cattle are com-
modities, it is the overall supply that drives price levels in the
market. The markets are sensitive both to cattle ready for
slaughter and cattle becoming ready "on feed."
Responses to ITC questionnaires also indicated that domes-
tic producers perceived Canadian, Mexican and domestic cattle
as interchangeable:
Twenty-nine of the 40 responding cattle associations reported that Ca-
nadian and Mexican live cattle are used interchangeably. Of the 11
that reported they are not, 3 reported Canadian are better quality, 2
reported that Mexican cattle are feeders while Canadian are fed, 5 re-
ported other reasons, and 1 gave no reason. One of 3 responding pur-
chasers, a feedlot, reported that Canadian and Mexican cattle are
interchangeable. 4 37
Further, imported feeder cattle often were purchased and fed in
formula programs or under contract to supply particular pack-
ers. Those end-use customers had the ability to choose between
Canadian and Mexican (as well as domestic) cattle to fill their
packing plant capacity.438 There were no technical or physical
reasons that would prevent feedlots or packing plants from
purchasing either Canadian or Mexican cattle. Although the
majority of Mexican imports were not finished cattle at the time
of importation, there was no dispute that they were destined for
finishing and slaughter at the time of importation.
Further, the ITC collected data for the period covering 1995
through 1997 and the first ten months of 1999.4 3 9 Imports of
Mexican stocker and feeder cattle that entered the United
States in 1997 or 1998, for example, would be ready for slaugh-
ter a year or so later at the time that imports of fed cattle from
Canada were entering. Thus, as a factual matter, imported
Mexican cattle fed in the United States were being sold to pack-
ers at the same time as imports of Canadian fed cattle during
the period examined by the ITC. It is not clear why the market-
436. R-CALF Mexico Petition at 59.
437. USITC Pub. 3155 at 11-9.
438. Petitioners' Supplemental Post-Conference Brief at 14.
439. See USITC Pub. 3155 at C-3, Table C-1.
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ing of such import cattle after fattening would not be "reason-
ably coincident" with imports of fat cattle from Canada. 44°
In looking at cumulation, a majority of the ITC, however,
did not address this marketing reality. Instead, they deter-
mined that imports of Mexican and Canadian cattle were insuffi-
ciently fungible with each other to find a reasonable overlap of
competition. The majority focused on the condition of the ani-
mals on the day they crossed the border. That is, the bulk of
imports from Canada were fed cattle ready for immediate
slaughter while most of the imports from Mexico were stocker
and feeder cattle.
The record reveals that live cattle that have not been fed to slaughter
weight are not substitutes for cattle ready for slaughter, i.e., fed or fat
cattle. Cattle not at the slaughter stage will not produce the same type
of marketable beef in terms of quality grades and sized pieces. Typi-
cally, stocker cattle have not developed to the stage where they are
suitable to be placed on feedlots....
[A]bout 95 percent of imports from Canada consists of cattle in the
slaughter or feeder stage, while only about four percent of imports
from Mexico consists of cattle in this stage. Conversely, some 96 per-
cent of imports from Mexico consists of cattle in the calf or stocker
stage, while only four percent of imports from Canada consists of cattle
in these stages. Moreover, even the small percentage (3.7 percent in 62
1997) of imports from Canada that appear to be stocker/feeder cattle,
where most of the overlap occurs, are significantly greater in size than
the stocker/feeder cattle from Mexico.... This suggests that such im-
ports may be at different points in the stocker/feeder stage of develop-
ment. Because cattle in different stages are poor substitutes for each
other, imports from Canada and imports from Mexico are poor substi-
tutes for each other.
4 4 1
The decision not to cumulate the imports had significant
consequences. The ITC proceeded to make an affirmative pre-
liminary determination as to Canada but a negative preliminary
determination as to Mexico on the basis that the Mexican cattle
were simply too small in volume to have had any impact on the
domestic industry, thus terminating the latter investigation.
442
Presumably, had the ITC cumulated the imports, both investiga-
440. See H.R. REP. No. 98-725, at 37 (1984).
441. USITC Pub. 3155 at 13. Based on the finding that the cattle were en-
tering at different stages of development, the ITC also found that the imports
moved in different channels of distribution (i.e., Canadian fed cattle were sold
to packers while Mexican stockers were sold to backgrounders and feeders were
sold to feedlots. The ITC majority also proceeded to find that there was rela-
tively little geographic overlap, although it made clear that it placed little
weight on this factor because of the limited fungibility at the point of importa-
tion. Id. at 13.
442. See USITC Pub. 3155 at 23-28.
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tions would have moved forward. The exclusion of Mexican im-
ports from the case also had consequences for the ITC's final
injury investigation as to Canada, as discussed infra.
From a policy perspective, the ITC's interpretation of the
cumulation provision is problematic in a number of respects.
First, by deciding at the preliminary stage that Mexican and Ca-
nadian cattle did not compete, the ITC screened out a case that
was hardly "frivolous" or "without merit." As discussed above,
there was no question that imported Mexican cattle fed in the
United States were being sold to the same packers that were
purchasing imported fed Canadian cattle (and, for that matter,
fed cattle that had been born and raised in the United States).
The ITC, however, never addressed in its opinion the argument
that Mexican stocker and feeder cattle, while perhaps not fungi-
ble with Canadian fed cattle on the day of importation, certainly
were fungible after being fed to slaughter weights. In essence,
the ITC required the imports to be fungible with each other on
the day of importation in order to find that the imports compete.
Second, because the ITC had never before failed to cumulate at
the preliminary stage on the basis that the imports were not
fungible because they were at different stages of development,
the domestic industry may have been caught off-guard. As a
consequence, there was little time (or evidence) addressed to the
issue of competition between cattle at different stages of
development.
Third, most importantly, by excluding Mexico, the ITC was
unable to address the overall impact of aggregate supply on U.S.
prices.
As mentioned, the ITC's decision appeared to depart from
earlier cases in which finished and unfinished imports from dif-
ferent countries entered the United States. Specifically, prior to
these investigations, the ITC had routinely cumulated imports
from multiple countries even where such imports entered the
United States at different stage of production or finishing.443
443. See, e.g., Certain Carbon Steel Butt-Weld Pipe Fittings from China and
Thailand, USITC Pub. 2401, 731-TA-520 and 521 (Preliminary), (July 1991);
Certain Carbon Steel Butt-Weld Pipe Fittings from France, India, Israel, Ma-
laysia, Korea, Thailand, United Kingdom and Venezuela, USITC Pub. 2767,
Invs. Nos. 701-TA-360 and 361, 731-TA-688-695 (Preliminary) (Apr. 1994) (cu-
mulating imports of finished and unfinished fittings); Certain Granite from It-
aly and Spain, USITC Pub. 2016, Invs. Nos. 701-TA-288 and 289, 731-TA-
381and 382 (Preliminary) (Sept. 1987) (cumulating imports of rough sawed
granite slabs, face-finished granite slabs, and finished dimensional granite);
Certain Cased Pencils from the People's Republic of China and Thailand,
USITC Pub. 2713, Invs. Nos. 731-TA-669 and 670 (Preliminary) (Dec. 1993) (cu-
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Mexican and Canadian respondents in the cattle cases had
argued that imported stocker and feeder cattle became U.S. cat-
tle by the time they were fed to slaughter weights. 444 The impli-
cation of this argument was that imported stocker and feeder
cattle lost their status as "imports" for purposes of evaluating on
a cumulative basis the impact they had together with imported
fed cattle on the domestic industry. The ITC's precedent sug-
gested the argument was not consistent with previous interpre-
tation of the statute. In several cases concerning butt-weld pipe
fittings, for example, the ITC had included both finished and un-
finished fittings in the definition of "like product" in part be-
cause of "the lack of any independent market for unfinished
pipe fittings."445 The ITC had likewise included in the domestic
industry "fully integrated producers, converters of unfinished
pipe fittings and combination producers." 44 6 Having identified
the relevant like product and domestic industry as consisting of
the product and producers at different stages of finishing, the
ITC proceeded to cumulate finished and unfinished imports
where the imports of "unfinished pipe fittings... are finished by
domestic producers ... and sold as domestic product."447
There are interesting parallels between the cattle cases and
the butt-weld pipe fittings cases. The Canadian and Mexican
imports entered at different stages of production, but dedicated
to the same end use. They were ultimately sold to the same pur-
chasers, namely, the packers, three of which accounted for a
large majority of purchases. The Pipe Fittings cases would ap-
pear to stand for the proposition that imports need not be di-
rectly fungible with each other on the day of importation where
they ultimately compete with each other and the domestic like
product for the same end use and for sale to the same purchas-
ers. Further, that line of cases suggests a construction of the
statute, and the cumulation provision in particular, under which
the fact that an unfinished imported article undergoes addi-
tional processing in the United States before sale to the ultimate
consumer does not efface that article's status as an import for
mulating "raw" and cased pencils). This was also the first time since the
mandatory cumulation provision was made law in 1984 that the ITC had de-
cided not to cumulate imports in a preliminary determination on the basis that
there was insufficient fungibility among the imports.
444. USITC Pub. 3155 at 8, n. 33 (summarizing arguments presented by
Mexican and Canadian respondents).
445. USITC Pub. 2767 at I-7.
446. Id. at 1-8, n. 16.
447. USITC Pub. 2401 at 17-18.
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purposes of cumulation. Had the article not been imported in
the first place, it would not have been finished and sold in the
United States in competition with finished imports from other
countries and with the finished domestic like product. Cumula-
tion in these circumstances would "make the application of the
injury analysis more realistic in terms of recognizing the actual
effects of unfair import competition."" 8 Thus, the Pipe Fittings
line of cases hews to Congress' intent that the cumulation provi-
sion should be broadly mandated," 9 necessitating a more flexi-
ble approach by the ITC.
Prior determinations are generally not regarded as binding
on the ITC. 450 Nevertheless, where, as here, there is a long line
of decisions in which the ITC has cumulated finished and unfin-
ished imports, the decision in a preliminary investigation not to
cumulate premised primarily on a lack of fungibility between
imports on the day of importation, even if legally permissible,
raises concern about the predictable administration of the law.
It would be important to know, for example, whether the ITC's
interpretation of the statute has evolved to the point that cumu-
lation requires imports to be fungible with each other on the day
of importation.451 Parties' only basis on which to judge whether
their particular claim has sufficient merit to proceed are prior
investigations and the ITC's explanation of the reasons for its
determination.
3. The ITC's Negative Preliminary Determination as to
Mexico
Having determined not to cumulate the imports of Cana-
dian and Mexican cattle, the ITC proceeded to examine whether
there was a reasonable indication that imports of Mexican cattle
Were causing or threatening to cause material injury. The ITC
recognized that live cattle were a generally substitutable com-
modity product and that even relatively small volumes can have
448. H.R. REP. No. 100-40, Part I, at 130 (1987).
449. See Bingham & Taylor v. United States, 627 F. Supp. 793, 798 (CIT
1986), affd 815 F.2d 1482 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
450. See Citrosuco Paulista, S.A. v. United States, 704 F. Supp 1075, 1087-
88 (CIT 1988) (citations omitted). ("[E ach investigation is sui generis, involving
a unique combination and interaction of many economic variables; and conse-
quently, a particular circumstance in a prior investigation cannot be regarded
by the Commission as dispositive of the determination in a later
investigation.").
451. Such a "daily" approach to cumulation would appear to be inflexible
and arbitrary. Although cases could be screened out using this approach, query
whether this was Congress' intent.
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significant effects in a price-sensitive cattle market. 452 With re-
spect to Mexico, the discussion focused primarily on the volume
of the Mexican imports and the market share they held:
The volume and market share of subject imports from Mexico have
been small throughout the period of investigation. The quantity of im-
ports... declined over 50 percent from 1995 [4.4 percent] to 1997 [1.8
percent]. While there has been a slight increase ... in interim period
[January-October] 1998 [1.5 percent] compared to interim period 1997
[1.4 percent], the imports remain at historically low levels.... [W]e
conclude that the small volume of subject imports from Mexico and
their market share, even in the context of the conditions of competition
for this industry, are not significant.
45 3
Given the finding that import volumes were not significant, it
was not surprising that the ITC proceeded to find that the im-
ports had not adversely affected domestic prices and had not ad-
versely impacted the domestic industry.454
Here again, the ITC's reasoning, even if legally permissible,
raises a number of concerns from the perspective of predictabil-
ity in the administration of the law. Prior ITC cases involving
price-sensitive fungible commodity products resulted in affirma-
tive determinations even with very low market penetration by
the subject imports.455 Indeed, the statute does not require im-
ports to be increasing, or even necessarily to be in the market,
for an affirmative determination. The ITC has recognized in
previous investigations that the mere presence of an offer at a
given price level can have a substantial impact on the level of
U.S. price. 456 Thus, fact patterns in previous cases similar to
those in the cattle investigations had led to affirmative
determinations.
Yet here, the ITC screened out the case at the preliminary
stage. Given the legislative history and case law regarding the
legal standard for preliminary determinations, the ITC's deci-
sion begs the question of whether the benefit of the doubt should
not have been given to a domestic industry that was obviously
452. See USITC Pub. 3155 at 18, 22.
453. USITC Pub. 3155 at 23.
454. See USITC Pub. 3155 at 24-26.
455. See, e.g., Certain Carbon Steel Products from Spain, USITC Pub. 1331,
Inv. No. 701-TA-155, 157, 158, 159, 160, and 162 (Final), (December 1982).
(Market shares for four categories of imports examined were as follows: hot-
rolled carbon steel plate: 0.9 - 2.3 percent; cold-rolled carbon steel sheet: 0.1 to
0.5 percent; galvanized carbon steel sheet: < 0.6 to 1.8 percent; carbon steel
structural shapes: 1.5 to 4.5 percent. ITC made affirmative final determina-
tions as to each category of imports.).
456. See, e.g., Frozen Concentrated Orange Juice from Brazil, USITC Pub.
1970, Inv. No. 731-TA-326 (Final), (April 1987) at 45-46.
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massively injured in a case involving a price-sensitive commod-
ity product.
Not only did the ITC focus largely on the size and overall
trend in the import volumes and market share of Mexican cattle,
but they also omitted in their discussion mention of two facts
that could have cast the data in a very different light. First, the
imports from Mexico in 1995 were unusually high - 1.6 million
head and 4.4 percent of domestic consumption - because of the
peso devaluation and a severe drought. 457 By using the peak
1995 year for import volumes as a base, therefore, it was not
surprising that the ITC found an overall decline in the volumes.
If the ITC started its analysis with 1996, though, the trend was
increasing by some 48 percent from 1996 to 1997 and by 5 per-
cent in the interim 1998 period compared to interim 1997.458
Thus, an apparently arbitrary practice looking at import data
contributed to preventing the case from going forward to a final
investigation (in which 1995 data would have been excluded
from the period of investigation).
Further, an earlier ITC section 332 investigation of the ef-
fects of NAFTA and the Uruguay Round Agreements Act on cat-
tle and beef had specifically concluded that the increased
imports of feeder cattle from Mexico in 1995 had contributed to
declining prices for feeder cattle in the United States in 1996.4 59
Given these facts, the "clear and convincing evidence" standard,
prior ITC cases involving similarly fungible and price-sensitive
products where low volumes and market shares were found to be
significant, and the undisputed injured state of the domestic in-
dustry, the petitioners understandably found the ITC's decision
to resolve the conflicts in the evidence against the domestic in-
dustry at the preliminary stage difficult to fathom.
C. THE ITC's FINAL NEGATIVE INJURY DETERMINATION IN LIVE
CATTLE FROM CANADA
1. Elements for Showing Injury, Threat of Injury and
Causation
To make an affirmative injury determination, the ITC must
find that a domestic industry is materially injured, or
threatened with material injury, or the establishment of an in-
dustry is materially retarded, by reason of imports that are de-
457. Live Cattle from Canada and Mexico, Staff Conference T. at 93; USITC
Pub. 3155 at IV-3, Table IV-2.
458. USITC Pub. 3155 at IV-2.
459. USITC Pub. 3048 at 2-16.
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termined to be dumped or subsidized.460 This causation
standard in the antidumping and countervailing duty laws has
generally been viewed as the least stringent among the various
trade remedy laws.461 The dumped or subsidized imports need
only cause or threaten "material injury," which is defined as
"harm which is not inconsequential, immaterial, or unimpor-
tant,"462 for the domestic industry to receive relief.
The statute sets forth several factors which the ITC must
take into account in its analysis, including (1) the volume of the
subject imports; (2) the effect that subject imports are having on
domestic prices for the like product; and (3) the impact of the
subject imports on the domestic producers of domestic like prod-
ucts in the United States.463 In evaluating the volume of the
subject imports, the ITC must consider whether the volume of
the imports, or any increase in that volume, is significant either
in absolute terms or relative to production or consumption in the
United States. 464 In evaluating the effect of imports on domestic
prices, the ITC is directed to consider whether there is signifi-
cant underselling and whether the effect of the imports other-
wise depresses domestic prices, or prevents price increases
which would otherwise have occurred, to a significant degree. 465
Finally, in examining the impact of the imports, the ITC must
consider "all relevant economic factors which have a bearing on
the state of the industry 466 and must evaluate those factors
460. See 19 U.S.C. §1671(a)(2); §1673(a)(2).
461. See, e.g., Eric P. Salonen, 'One Tomato, Two Tomato...' Selection of
Trade Remedy Laws in the Florida-Mexico Tomato Conflict, 11 FLA J. INT'L L.
371, 371 (1997) (comparing the injury and causation tests in the antidumping
and safeguard laws).
462. 19 U.S.C. §1677(7)(A).
463. See 19 U.S.C. §1677(7)(B)(I) - (III).
464. 19 U.S.C. §1677(7)(C)(i). The statute does not require there to be an
increase in the volume of imports in order for the ITC to find the volume of
imports to be significant. However, it should be noted that Article 3.2 of the
WTO Antidumping Agreement provides: "With regard to the volume of the
dumped imports, the investigating authority shall consider whether there has
been a significant increase in dumped imports, either in absolute terms or rela-
tive to production or consumption in the importing Member."
465. 19 U.S.C. §1677(7)(C)(ii).
466. 19 U.S.C. §1677(7)(C)(iii). The factors include, but are not limited to,
actual and potential declines in output, sales, market share, profits, productiv-
ity, return on investments, capacity utilization; factors affecting domestic
prices; actual and potential negative effects on cash flow, inventories, employ-
ment, wages, growth, ability to raise capital, and investment; actual and poten-
tial negative effects on the existing development and production efforts of the
domestic industry, and, in an antidumping case, the magnitude of the margin of
dumping. Id. at (iii) (I) - (V).
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"within the context of the business cycle and conditions of com-
petition that are distinctive to the domestic industry."46 7
Congress instructed in the legislative history that no single
factor can give decisive guidance as to whether an industry is
materially injured by imports:
For one industry, an apparently small volume of imports may have a
significant impact on the market; for another, the same volume might
not be significant. Similarly, for one type of product, price may be the
key factor in making a decision as to which product to purchase, and a
small price differential resulting from the amount of the subsidy or the
margin of dumping can be decisive; for others, the size of the differen-
tial may be of lesser importance. 4 68
The statute also sets forth ten factors the ITC must consider
in evaluating whether a domestic industry is threatened with
material injury by reason of dumped or subsidized imports.
These include: existing unused production capacity or imminent,
substantial increases in production capacity, in the exporting
country that is likely to result in substantially increased imports
into the United States; a significant rate of increase in the vol-
ume or market penetration of the subject imports; whether the
imports are entering at prices that are likely to have a signifi-
cant depressing or suppressing effect on domestic prices, and are
likely to increase demand for further imports; inventories of the
subject merchandise (both in the exporting country and in the
United States); and the potential for product-shifting if produc-
tion facilities in the foreign country which could be used to pro-
duce the dumped or subsidized article are currently being used
to produce other articles.469 If there is a countervailable sub-
sidy, the ITC also must take into account the nature of the sub-
sidy, including whether it falls with the provisions of the WTO
Subsidies Agreement concerning prohibited subsidies (Article 3)
or serious prejudice (Article 6.1), and whether imports are likely
to increase.470
Taken together, these factors require the ITC to project the
future availability of additional imports (either through existing
inventories, existing surplus foreign capacity or increases in for-
eign capacity, or shifts of third country exports to the Untied
States), the likelihood that imports will increase to injurious
levels, and the likely impact of imports on domestic prices. The
existence of antidumping or countervailing duty orders in third
467. 19 U.S.C. §1677(7)(C)(iii).
468. S. REP. No. 96-249, at 88 (July 1979).
469. See 19 U.S.C. §1677(7)(F)(i).
470. See 19 U.S.C. §1677(7)(F)(i)(I).
[Vol. 9:449
TRADE AND CATTLE
countries is also a relevant factor. 471 The ITC must consider
whether material injury would occur "unless an order is is-
sued. .. "472 A threat determination "may not be made on the
basis of mere conjecture or supposition."473
Injury or threat of injury must be "by reason of' the imports.
Neither the statute nor the legislative history defines what "by
reason of" means, although the 1979 Senate Finance Committee
report provides some guidance in how the provision is to be
administered:
In determining whether injury is 'by reason of less-than-fair-value im-
ports, the ITC now looks at the effects of such imports on the domestic
industry....
Current law does not, nor will [the new statute], contemplate that the
effects from less-than-fair-value imports be weighed against the effects
associated with other factors (e.g., the volume and prices of imports
sold at fair value, contraction in demand or changes in patterns of con-
sumption, trade, restrictive practices of and competition between the
foreign and domestic producers, developments in technology, and the
export performance and productivity of the domestic industry) which
may be contributing to overall injury to an industry. Nor is the issue
whether less-than-fair-value imports are the principal, a substantial,
or a significant cause of material injury. Any such requirement has the
undesirable result of making relief more difficult to obtain for indus-
tries facing difficulties from a variety of sources; industries that are
often the most vulnerable to less-than-fair-value imports.
Of course, in examining the overall injury to a domestic industry, the
ITC will consider information which indicates that harm is caused by
factors other than the less-than-fair-value imports....
While injury caused by unfair import competition, such as less-than-
fair-value imports, does not require as strong a causation link to im-
ports as would be required in determining the existence of injury under
fair trade import relief laws, the Commission must satisfy itself that,
in light of all the information presented, there is a sufficient causal
link between the less-than-fair-value imports and the requisite
injury.4 7 4
The Statement of Administrative Action to the Uruguay
Round Agreements Act and case law have also expounded on the
causation standard. Consistent with the 1979 legislative his-
tory, they make clear that the Commission "need not isolate the
injury caused by other factors from injury caused by unfair im-
ports. Rather, the Commission must examine other factors to
ensure that it is not attributing injury from other sources to the
471. See 19 U.S.C. §1677(7)(F)(iii).
472. 19 U.S.C. §1677(7)(F)(ii).
473. Id.
474. S. REP. No. 96-249 at 74-75 (1979).
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subject imports."475 The subject dumped imports need not be
the only cause of injury or even as important a cause as some
other factor; it is sufficient that the unfairly traded imports con-
tribute in a more than de minimis manner to the injury suffered
by the domestic industry.476 As the Court of International Trade
ruled in Taiwan Semiconductor v. United States:
That the injurious effects from other sources may be greater than the
effect of the subject imports is not determinative, so long as the Com-
mission reasonably finds that the subject imports' contribution to the
overall harm is material. Therefore, the Commission need not weigh
(i.e., determine which is greater or lesser) causes in complying with the
"by reason of' standard. 4 7
7
Importantly, the fact that the industry's difficulties may be
caused in part by the industry itself does not negate the possibil-
ity that dumped imports are also causing material injury. "To
borrow a principle from tort law, importers take the domestic
industry as they find it."4 7 8
2. The ITC's Final Determination in Live Cattle from Canada
As discussed in Section II, supra, the domestic cattle indus-
try has been and continues to be in a devastated economic condi-
tion. The record before the ITC was replete with examples of the
difficulties that ranchers and farmers raising cattle had exper-
ienced. Indeed, the crisis in the industry was so severe that an
unprecedented fourteen members of the House and Senate ap-
peared before the ITC during its hearing to alert the Commis-
sioners to the problems that their rancher constituents were
facing.479 The ITC acknowledged the injured condition of the in-
dustry, albeit in a mere three sentences in a 21-page, single-
spaced opinion.480 The ITC, however, attributed the evidence of
injury to the cattle cycle only, and not to the Canadian imports:
"Weak performance by the domestic industry is expected during
475. See Taiwan Semiconductor Industry Assoc. v. United States, No. 99-57,
slip op. At 12 n.9 (CIT June 30, 1999), available at <http://www.uscit.gov/slip-
op.html>.
476. See, e.g., Citrosuco Paulista, S.A. v. United States, 704 F. Supp. 1075,
1101 (CIT 1988).
477. Slip Op. 99-57 at 14-15.
478. Iwatsu Electric Co. Ltd., v. United States, 758 F. Supp. 1506, 1518 (CIT
1991).
479. See ITC Hearing T. at 2 (Congressional appearances).
480. USITC Pub. 3255 at 21. The ITC summarizes the industry data in two
extended footnotes. Id. at n.147 and 148.
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the liquidation phase of the cattle cycle, and is not unique to this
agricultural industry.""'
The ITC's negative determination appeared to be driven by
two principal factors. First, the ITC found that the imports
were small, declining and concentrated in so-called "secondary
markets" such as the Pacific Northwest. 482 The second, and re-
lated factor, was the ITC's finding that price discovery between
the primary and secondary markets for cattle were asymmetri-
cal, that is, prices in the secondary markets affects prices in the
primary feeder belt states to a much lesser extent.483 According
to this view, whatever impact the imports may have had on
prices in the secondary markets was not transmitted to any sig-
nificant extent to the rest of the national market for cattle.
Although the ITC also identified other factors to support its
decision, the agency did not address a few key points. First, the
ITC had acknowledged that "a relatively small volume of im-
ports of an agricultural commodity product may be significant in
light of the effect of that small volume on prices."484 In prior
investigations involving agricultural commodities, the ITC had
found even smaller market shares of subject imports to be suffi-
ciently significant to warrant an affirmative determination.4s5
For example, in Live Swine and Pork from Canada, the ITC had
made an affirmative threat determination where the imports of
Canadian swine had reached market share of 2.6 percent during
the period of investigation. 486 As in Live Cattle, the ITC had
found in Swine that prices were "very sensitive to changes in
supply."487 Yet, in Live Cattle, where import market share had
increased from 2.9 percent in 1995 to 3.8 percent in 1996 and
remained at 3.4 percent in 1998, the ITC found imports were not
481. USITC Pub. 3255 at 22.
482. See id. at 13 ("The quantity of subject imports from Canada is small
and declined... during the period of investigation."); 14 ("Live cattle imports
from Canada held a small and decreasing share of the U.S. market over the
period of investigation. . . . "); (Almost 80 percent of subject imports entered
states other than the primary feeder belt states (Texas, Kansas, Nebraska, Col-
orado, and Iowa) and thus the great majority of subject imports entered states
that are considered secondary markets, such as Washington, Utah and
Pennsylvania.").
483. USITC Pub. 3255 at 18-19.
484. Id. at 16.
485. There have even been cases where import market share of less than 1
percent was sufficient to warrant an affirmative outcome. See, e.g., Certain
Carbon Steel Products from Spain, USITC Pub. 1331 supra, n. 456.
486. Live Swine and Pork from Canada, supra note 408, Inv. No. 701-TA-
244 (Final), 7 ITRD at 2291.
487. 7 ITRD at 2291.
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significant. It is not clear what is so different between the cattle
and swine industries and markets that would help reconcile the
different outcomes.
The statute calls for consideration of the business cycle and
the conditions of competition that are distinctive to the industry.
In most investigations, the ITC collects data for the three-year
period prior to the filing of the petition, which is sufficient to
comply with the statutory instruction. In previous investiga-
tions, however, the ITC also has recognized that adhering to its
typical three-year period of examination would not sufficiently
take into account the business cycle and conditions of competi-
tion distinctive to the industry in those cases. 48
In this case, the ITC did not address the fact that import
penetration during the 1995-99 cattle cycle time period (i.e., the
price trough) was significantly higher than that at the same
stage of any previous cattle cycle. By emphasizing the decline in
the import volumes over 1996-98, the ITC implicitly suggests
that the industry waited too late to file its petitions, and ignores
that import penetration had reached a historical high point.489
Moreover, with a fairly well-defined cycle of peaks and
troughs, it is understandable that the industry waited until
1998 to see whether the upward turn in the cycle would resume.
The ITC's decision to limit the period of investigation to a three
year window of time in an industry that has a well-defined busi-
ness cycle that regularly runs 8 to 12 years in effect penalizes
such an industry that waits to bring a case until it can discern
whether a current downturn is truly "cyclical" or due to other
factors.
As to the question of asymmetrical price discovery, the ITC
did not address evidence showing a high correlation between
cattle prices in the Pacific Northwest and other regions of the
country.490 Moreover, the ITC's discussion of the concentration
488. See, e.g., Fresh Atlantic Salmon from Chile, USITC Pub. 3116, Inv. No.
731-TA-768 (Final) (July 1998) (examined four-year period); Frozen Concen-
trated Orange Juice from Brazil, USITC Pub. 1970, Inv. No. 731-TA-326 (Final)
(April 1987) (examined four year period); Softwood Lumber from Canada,
USITC Pub. 2530, Inv. No. 701-TA-312 (Final) (1992) (six-year period).
489. The ITC acknowledged that, if imports for 1995 were included, the
overall trend showed an increase, but found the increase was not significant
because "the increase was small in absolute and relative terms and because
subject imports declined each year after the initial increase from 1995 to 1996."
USITC Pub. 3255 at 13-14.
490. Petitioner's Post-Hearing Br., Exhibit 5 ("Correlations between weekly
prices for fed cattle in various regions Texas Panhandle, Kansas, Nebraska,
Colorado, Iowa, Montana and Montana + Pacific NW").
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of imports in the Pacific Northwest did not respond to testimony
of domestic ranchers living in the region who shipped their cat-
tle outside the region in search of higher prices because packers
were buying the Canadian imports.491
More important, neither was there discussion of the evi-
dence that showed domestic prices for cattle increasing following
the Commerce Department's preliminary dumping determina-
tion in July 1999 and the suspension of liquidation and posting
of cash deposits by importers.492 It is not clear why evidence
showing an increase in domestic prices following the cessation of
dumping through the posting of cash deposits is not sufficient
evidence of causation.
Reviewing courts will uphold the ITC's final determinations
if they are supported by "substantial evidence" and are other-
wise in accordance with law. 493 The standard is generally recog-
nized as deferential, which may foster as a primary objective the
drafting of opinions to withstand judicial challenge. However,
that ought not be the agency's priority. Issues such as those
highlighted above which would appear to be important to the
decision would also appear to deserve discussion. For the sake
of the U.S. industry that comes to the ITC seeking relief, the
opinion should explain clearly and directly why the evidence
they presented was insufficient. The agency should ensure, in
491. See, e.g., Petitioner's Prehearing Br., Appendix Vol. 2, Ex. 65 (State-
ment of Margene Eiguren, Jordan Valley, Oregon (selling calves to a Texas
feedlot to be finished and slaughtered)); Ex. 68 (Statement of Doug Tippet, Lyle
County, Oregon (previously sold cattle in the Northwest, but now shipped to
different places)).
492. See Petitioner's Post-hearing Br. at Ex. 15, Statement of Les Mes-
singer, Member of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange ("[Tihe futures market for
cattle bottomed out on July 1, 1999 at $61.30-35/cwt. The Department of Com-
merce announced the results of its preliminary determinations on July 1 and
published the results on July 8, 1999. During the next 60 days, the futures
market for live cattle rallied by $5 1h per cwt, off the board, to $67 per cwt.,
which is a significant increase. The prices have continued to rally up to the
present time and are currently around $70 per cwt .... [Slince the Commerce
Department's preliminary determination was issued, the cattle futures market
has seen a price rally of $8-9 per cwt., in a span of about 3 months, a very
significant, robust and rapid recovery."). Numerous industry participants also
reported increases in spot prices for cattle following Commerce's preliminary
determination. See, e.g., Petitioner's Prehearing Br., App. Vol. 2, Ex. 2 (State-
ment of Herman Schumacher); Ex. 8, (Statement of Lloyd DeBruycker); Ex. 16
(Statement of Andy Peek); Ex. 21 (Statement of J. Peter Carey and Carolyn
Carey).
493. See, e.g., Goss Graphic System, Inc. v. United States, 33 F Supp. 2d
1082, 1085 (CIT 1998).
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short, not only that the users of the law are fairly treated, but
that they perceive fairness in the final outcome.
The agency also ought to be concerned with providing
greater guidance to prospective parties as to how the statute is
likely to be construed and applied in future cases. To the extent
that an opinion only cites the evidence that supports the out-
come and does not explain why contrary evidence and prior
agency practice relied upon by the losing party were insufficient,
the opinion does little to advance the principle of predictability
in the administration of the law. Rather, combined with a defer-
ential standard of judicial review, the approach fosters the per-
ception, if not the actuality, of arbitrary government.
D. PROPOSALS TO MAKE THE INJURY PROVISIONS OF THE
STATUTE MORE EFFECTIVE FOR THE LIVE CATTLE
INDUSTRY
As the foregoing discussion illustrates, there are several as-
pects of the injury provisions of the antidumping and counter-
vailing duty laws and in the manner of their interpretation and
administration by the ITC which require revision if the law is to
be made more effective in addressing harm caused to an indus-
try such as cattle by unfair imports. First, Congress should re-
examine the operation of the processed agricultural products
provision. Where, as in the case of cattle and beef, the grower of
the raw product provides more than 50 percent of the value of
the finished beef product that is sold to consumers, and where
there is ample evidence that imports of the downstream product
(beef) impact the prices of the upstream product (cattle), then
the growers should be able to bring a case against the upstream
and downstream products. 494
Second, with respect to cumulation, the Congress should
consider an amendment that would require the ITC to consider
the extent of overlap of competition between finished and unfin-
ished imports from different countries at the time they are fin-
ished and ready for sale to the end-user.
Third, Congress should clarify the legal standard for prelim-
inary investigations. The function should be a "gatekeeper" to
screen out truly frivolous cases, and not to resolve conflicting ev-
idence against a petitioning industry before there is an opportu-
nity for the issues to be fully developed.
494. It should be noted that such an amendment might also require revision
of the like product and domestic industry provisions in the WTO Antidumping
and Subsidy Agreements.
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Fourth, Congress should clarify that even low import pene-
tration - or offers to sell prior to importation - can impact do-
mestic prices.
Fifth, public understanding of the administration of the in-
jury provisions of the law would be improved significantly with
increased predictability and greater guidance from the ITC. De-
terminations which clearly explain why particular evidence was
insufficient or prior precedent was not applicable will withstand
the scrutiny of a reviewing court. A more important objective,
however, should be for the ITC to help prospective parties (as
well as the parties in any particular case) to fully understand
why a key issue was decided a particular way, especially where
the same issue in prior cases involving similar fact patterns was
decided differently. While the explanation likely will not always
meet with universal agreement, it nevertheless would serve to
increase universal understanding about the administration of
an important remedial law. It also might help the ITC itself to
test the soundness of its decisions by having commissioners ask
themselves, "What is it about X in this case that is different from
X in previous cases?"
Finally, Congress may want to consider having more fre-
quent oversight hearings to periodically review the ITC's admin-
istration of the law. Such hearings would provide an
opportunity to elicit individual Commissioner's views on their
construction of the statute, which also would provide greater
guidance to private parties contemplating a possible case.
VI. PROPOSALS TO HELP THE CATTLE INDUSTRY
OBTAIN RELIEF
Throughout this article, we have reviewed the devastated
condition of the cattle industry, the various possible sources of
the industry's problems, and various efforts to address those
problems. The possible sources of the industry's problems in-
clude an inequitable trade environment, declining share of the
retail dollar spent on beef, disadvantageous negotiating position
vis-A-vis the packers, ineffective enforcement of existing compe-
tition laws, and unfair imports.
At bottom, the industry has limited ability to address the
kinds of collapses in commodity prices that occurred in recent
years. There are no controls on imports of cattle and imports
tend to compound problems facing producers during downturns.
Likewise, tariff-rate quotas on beef do not apply to product from
NAFTA countries. With concentrated purchasers and frag-
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mented sellers, the ability to obtain a fair price on a perishable
product is greatly impaired. What has been seen in the last cat-
tle cycle has been a flattening of the upswing in prices during
periods of reduced herd size with no corresponding elimination
of the downside of the market.
The mandatory price reporting required by P.L. 106-78 will
help some when implemented in fact. While U.S. law has per-
mitted some agricultural producers to work together through
marketing orders or cooperatives, such laws are largely unwork-
able for an industry with as many producers as cattle. Some
mechanism must be developed to address such price collapses
and the enormous financial and personal harm they cause to
ranchers and their families. Possible approaches which may
need to be taken together include:
" Vigorous enforcement of existing law, including the Packers and
Stockyard Act;
" Development of bilateral (US-Canada), plurilateral (NAFTA, FTAA)
or multilateral (WTO) rules to address special needs of perishable
agriculture including livestock;
" Establish floor prices for cattle and beef;
" Emergency agriculture financial payments for cattle producers;
" Prohibit packers from owning cattle before slaughter or participat-
ing in forward contracts; prohibit sale to packers other than for a
price certain at time of sale;
" Modifying US trade laws or their construction to make relief avail-
able quickly for agricultural producers when prices fall below cost of
production (e.g, standing requirements, inability to address im-
ported beef as well as live cattle, cumulation of cattle at different
stages of growth and injury standard as applied to commodity prod-
ucts like cattle).
It bears noting that each of these approaches presents actual
and potential problems, including, for example, cost to govern-
ment; agency resistance and compatability with international
obligations.
Other issues include reducing concentration in the packing
sector. Certain parts of the United States have few if any
slaughter facilities. This can result in cattle producers having
no effective competition for their cattle. Efforts to open facilities
by new entrants into these marketing areas have not been suc-
cessful. The capital and regulatory costs of entry into the
slaughter business are very high. Producers in other countries
(e.g., New Zealand) have experimented with smaller size facili-
ties which can permit cattle producers to have greater control
over their destiny, appeal to niche markets and can be more en-
vironmentally friendly by reducing the concentration of waste,
etc. in a given geographical area. The U.S. government should
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consider providing loans or seed money for the experimentation
of mini-slaughter facilities to be located in areas not currently
served where there is significant cattle production.
Another critical issue is health care. As the discussion in
Section II, supra, amply demonstrates, many ranching families
have lost their health insurance, been forced to limit insurance
to catastrophic healthcare or been forced to work jobs off of the
ranch to get insurance. The government should consider provid-
ing health care coverage for ranchers and farmers in periods of
depressed prices. Criteria for eligibility for such assistance
should only go to those who are losing their coverage or are be-
ing forced to sharply limit their coverage because of cash flow
problems. Many people who have worked all their lives are find-
ing themselves unable to maintain protection because of the lack
of income. Obviously, if the fundamental problem of depressed
prices can be fixed, ranchers and farmers will not need the gov-
ernment's assistance in obtaining health insurance.
These and other approaches should be explored quickly and
thoroughly. Key for survival of cattle producers and rural
America is the restoration of fair prices. Whatever steps can be
taken to restore pricing to a rational level and permit efficient
producers to survive and prosper should be supported.
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